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Abstract
This thesis examines the optimal mode of financing for banks and financial institutions.
The first chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Jean-Charles Rochet, investigates how
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) should be financed. The main specificity
of such firms is that their failure imposes negative externalities on the financial system and,
more broadly, on the whole economy. Since their shareholders do not internalize these
externalities, they tend to provide less capital than what would be socially optimal, generating
too many failures. In jurisdictions where they receive tax exemptions, CoCo bonds are a
simple means of increasing the resilience of SIFIs while providing large tax benefits to banks’
shareholders. However, we show that when tax revenues are properly accounted for, these
CoCo bonds are detrimental to social welfare.
The second chapter provides a formal model of a bail-in plan, a pre-defined contract that
results in self-recapitalization of a financial institution when it is in distress and has no access
to equity financing. Bail-ins have the potential to eliminate inefficient bank liquidations and
ease financing constraints in bad times. Using a theoretical model of a bail-in contract where
banks face time varying financing frictions, taxation and liquidation costs, I show that banks’
capital structure decisions and optimal financing and pay-out policies are largely affected by
the design of the contingent capital (specifically the conversion ratio). However independent
of its design, for an optimal level of debt, bail-in contracts always decrease shareholders
incentives to build up liquid buffers and to recapitalize in good times but also eliminate any
risk-taking incentives.
The third chapter presents a model of bank optimal maturity structure when banks face
systemic risk through correlated investments. Banks can privately affect the probability of
success of their projects. Risky short-term debt can act as a disciplinary device if it is not
rolled over when an adverse interim-date signal on the quality of banks’ assets is received.
The optimal maturity structure is the result of the trade-off between the disciplinary benefits
of short-term debt and the costs of inefficient early liquidations. I show that bank asset
commonality affects this trade-off since it reduces the costs of exerting effort through positive
information synergies and increases the inefficiency of early liquidations through negative
fire-sale externalities. In particular, there is a more important role for the disciplinary effects of
short-term debt in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and low information synergies
environments.
iii
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conversion ratio, short-term debt, asset correlation, roll over risk
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Résumé
Cette thèse examine le mode de financement optimal des banques et institutions financières.
Le premier chapitre qui a été écrit en collaboration avec Prof. Jean-Charles Rochet étudie
la manière dont les institutions financières d’importance systémique (SIFIs) devraient être
financées. Ce qui caractérise principalement ces sociétés est le fait que leur faillite engendre
des externalités négatives sur le système financier et, de manière générale, l’économie. Etant
donné que les actionnaires n’internalisent pas ces externalités, ils fournissent moins de capital
que ce qui serait socialement optimal. Ceci a pour effet d’engendrer trop de faillites. Dans
les juridictions qui permettent une exonération fiscale des obligations CoCo, celles-ci sont
un moyen simple pour augmenter la résistance des SIFIs tout en fournissant des réductions
fiscales importantes aux actionnaires des banques. Nous montrons toutefois que lorsque
les recettes fiscales sont correctement prises en considération, les obligations CoCo portent
préjudice au bien-être social.
Le deuxième chapitre présente un modèle formel d’un plan de bail-in. Il s’agit d’un contrat
prédéfini qui a pour effet d’auto recapitaliser une banque en difficulté financière et qui n’a
pas d’accès au financement par actions. Les bail-ins ont le potentiel d’éliminer des liquida-
tions inefficientes des institutions financières et assouplir les contraintes financières durant
les périodes difficiles. En utilisant un modèle théorique d’un contrat de bail-in dans lequel
les banques font face à des frictions de financement, de taxation et de coûts de liquidation
variables dans le temps, je montre que la décision de la structure de capital, du financement
optimal et de la politique de redistribution des banques est principalement affectée par les
termes du capital conditionnel (plus spécifiquement le ratio de conversion). Cependant et
peu importe les termes, les contrats bail-in diminuent toujours les incitations des actionnaires
de constituer des réserves de liquidités et de recapitaliser durant les bonnes périodes mais
éliminent aussi toutes incitations à prendre du risque.
Le troisième chapitre présente un modèle de structure d’échéance de la dette pour les banques
lorsque celles-ci font face à des risques systémiques par le biais d’investissements corrélés.
Les banques peuvent de manière privée influencer la probabilité de succès de leurs projets.
Lorsqu’un signal négatif sur la qualité des actifs de la banque est perçu à la date intermédiaire,
des dettes à court terme risquées qui ne sont pas renouvelées peut agir comme un dispositif
disciplinaire. La structure d’échéance optimale est le résultat d’un compromis entre les béné-
fices disciplinaires de la dette à court terme et les coûts d’inefficience liés à des liquidations
v
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anticipées. La corrélation entre les actifs a des effets sur ce compromis car elle réduit les
coûts des efforts des banquiers par le biais de synergies d’information et augmente le niveau
d’inefficacité des liquidations anticipées à cause des externalités négatives des ventes en
urgence. En particulier, les effets disciplinaires des dettes à court terme sont plus importants
dans les environnements de corrélation élevée, d’externalités de ventes en urgence élevées et
de synergies d’information basses.
Mots clefs : Bail-in, obligations CoCo, SIFI, capital conditionnel, réserve de liquidités, ratio de
conversion, dette à court terme, corrélation d’actifs, risque de refinancement
vi
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Abstract (English/Français) iii
List of figures ix
List of tables xi
Introduction 1
1 How to Finance SIFIs? 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 No tax-advantage of debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Privately optimal security design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Optimal security design for regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.3 CDS prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Tax-advantage of debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Straight debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 CoCo bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Numerical illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.1 No tax-advantage of debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.2 Tax-advantage of debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 Bail-in Plan and Macroeconomic Conditions 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Straight debt benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3.1 Valuing corporate securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.2 Optimal bank policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.3 Optimal capital structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4 Bail-in plan: the case of countercyclical CoCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.1 Valuing corporate securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.2 Optimal bank policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
vii
Contents
2.4.3 Optimal CoCo design and bank capital structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3 Debt Maturity and Systemic Risk 89
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.1 Long-term debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2.2 Short-term debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3 Model implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.1 Optimal effort level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.2 Optimal maturity contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3.3 Role of correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.4 A numerical example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Conclusion 123
A Appendices 127
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.1.1 Proofs of Propositions 1.1 to 1.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.1.2 Security re-issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.1.3 Closed form values of equity and debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.1.4 CoCo bonds - social welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.2.1 Values of bank’s securities - straight debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.2.2 Values of bank’s securities - CoCo debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Bibliography 151
Curriculum Vitae 159
viii
List of Figures
1.1 CDS price - no tax-advantage of debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.2 CDS price - straight debt case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.3 Effect of social costs of SIFI’s failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.4 Dividend threshold - straight debt case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5 Pay-out policy - straight debt case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Optimal straight debt coupon payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7 Optimal coupon payment - straight debt vs CoCo bond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.8 Optimal value to regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.9 Optimal conversion threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.10 Optimal capital structure and pay-out policy - CoCo bond . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Value of bank securities - straight debt case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.2 Financing and pay-out policies - straight debt case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.3 Effect of conversion ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4 Straight debt versus CoCo debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.5 Value of bank securities - CoCo debt case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.6 Marginal value of cash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.1 ∆p and ∆SW versus investment correlation (ρ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.2 ∆P and ∆SW versus positive and negative externalities (a and b) . . . . . . . . 119
3.3 ∆P and ∆SW versus bad project outcome (RL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.4 ∆P and ∆SW versus good project outcome (RH ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.5 ∆P and ∆SW versus private benefit of control (B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.1 Optimal capital structure and pay-out policy - CoCo bond . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
ix

List of Tables
1.1 Base case parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.2 No tax advantage - optimal dividend threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3 Optimal policy choices and capital structure with straight debt . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4 Optimal policy choices and capital structure with CoCo bonds . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.1 Base case parameters and implied variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.2 Optimal bank capital structure and policy choices - regulated straight debt . . . 78
2.3 Effect of conversion ratio - unregulated bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.4 Effect of conversion ratio - regulated bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.5 Optimal bank capital structure and policy choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1 Long-term debt pay-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.2 Short-term debt pay-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.3 Base case parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A.1 Optimal bank capital structure and policy choices - unregulated straight debt . 149
xi

Introduction
The main focus of this thesis is the privately and socially optimal capital structure and policy
choices of banks in a systemic and interconnected financial system. The financial crisis of 2007-
2009 demonstrated that the distress of a bank or financial institution can threaten the overall
stability of the financial system. Failure of a Systemically Important Financial Institution
("SIFI") has significant disruptive effects on other financial firms and on the financial system
as a whole. SIFI’s shareholders do not internalize the social costs associated with these negative
externalities. Because of this, the private costs of bank’s failure are significantly lower than its
social costs and thus the privately optimal bank leverage can be higher than what would have
been socially optimal. This generates too many bank failures. Consequently, the composition
of bank capital structure and possible solutions to deal with the too-big-to-fail problem have
been the subject of many discussions by policy makers and academics. These discussions have
motivated the proposals for contingent capital "CoCo" financing and "bail-in" requirements
for SIFIs.
CoCo bonds, which are the focus of Chapter 1, are defined as bonds that convert into equity
or sustain automatic write-downs when some pre-defined threshold is reached. Such hybrid
securities have gained increasing attention in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis since
they correspond to a debt contract in good times whilst their conversion to equity provides an
automatic recapitalization when banks face financial distress. In Chapter 1, I show that with
tax deductions on debt, CoCo bonds are good both for shareholders and regulators because
they reduce taxes while increasing the resilience of SIFIs due to their superior loss absorption
capacity. However, social welfare which includes tax revenues is always lower with any form
of market debt and equity financing is the socially optimal mode of financing for SIFIs. This
main result is not affected by different design features of CoCo contract including conversion
ratio (which determines burden sharing between shareholders and debt holders in the event
of conversion), and conversion threshold (which determines the probability of conversion or
conversion risk).
In Chapter 1, I discuss how SIFIs should be subject to capital requirements because their
failure leads to significant social costs that are not internalized by their shareholders. The
objective of bank’s regulation is thus to decrease the probability of bank’s failure or equivalently
government bail-outs. In Chapter 2, I study a "bail-in" plan as an alternative solution to deal
with the social costs of SIFI’s failure. A bail-in plan is defined as a pre-determined contract that
1
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results in an automatic recapitalization of the bank when it is in distress and has no access
to equity financing. My objective in Chapter 2 is twofold. First by using the debt to equity
conversion in the context of a restructuring contract that is set ex-ante, I entirely eliminate
the risk of bank’s failure and its associated social costs without any equity support from the
government. Second, I study bank’s optimal capital structure decisions and optimal pay-out
and financing policies in the presence of such a plan. I show that although bank’s policy
choices and capital structure decisions are largely affected by the design of the bail-in contract,
for an optimal level of debt, bail-in contracts always decrease shareholders incentives to build
up liquid buffers and to recapitalize in good times. So bail-in plans can potentially lead to
a less capitalized, more levered banking system; however, they can create value from both
private and social points of view by eliminating both the costs of liquidation and the costs of
negative externalities associated with SIFIs’ failures.
Having discussed the choice of bank leverage in Chapters 1, and 2, Chapter 3 focuses on the
choice of bank maturity structure. In current financial markets banks and other financial
institutions extensively use short-term debt to fund their long-term assets. The maturity
mismatch between bank’s assets and liabilities leads to roll over risk. This roll over risk can
cause banks’ failures and lead to financial crises. The collapse of the asset-backed commercial
paper market and the role it played in the current financial crisis, have highlighted the need to
better understand the optimal maturity structure of banks. To this end, a substantial body
of literature investigates the optimality of short-term debt as a disciplinary device that can
help align the incentives of shareholders and debt holders. When investors are not willing
to roll over their debt if they receive an interim adverse news on the quality of bank’s assets,
short-term debt financing bears roll over risk. In a model where bankers can privately affect
the probability of success of their projects by exerting costly effort, risky short-term debt acts
as a disciplinary device. Short-term financing can become the optimal mode of financing if
the disciplinary benefits of short-term debt overcome the costs associated with its roll over
risk and inefficient early liquidations.
As the experience of the recent financial crisis shows, banks hold correlated assets. This asset
commonality can become a source of systemic risk when one bank’s failure affect the other
banks in the financial system. A representative bank framework that studies the optimal
bank maturity structure assumes the disciplining effect of short-term debt at an individual
level and excludes the effects of asset commonality and the systemic risks it exposes banks
to. Recognizing this short-coming, Chapter 3 develops a set-up with multiple banks that are
subject to negative and positive externalities because they invest in correlated assets. Bank
asset commonality reduces the costs of exerting effort through positive information synergies
and increases the inefficiency of early liquidations through negative fire-sale externalities. In
Chapter 3, I seek to understand how the trade-off between the costs and benefits of short-term
financing is affected by bank asset commonality. To do so, I study the optimal level of effort
exerted by each banker and the social welfare as functions of the correlation between banks’
investments in both long-term debt and short-term debt cases. I show that short-term debt
can discipline bankers to exert more effort, however whether or not this higher effort leads to
2
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a higher social surplus depends on the level of the correlation between banks’ assets and the
level of externalities this correlation leads to. In particular, there is a more important role for
the disciplinary effects of short-term debt in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and
low information synergies environments.
3

1 How to Finance SIFIs?
with Jean-Charles Rochet
1.1 Introduction
The debate on how Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) should finance them-
selves has become very polarized. On the one hand Admati and Hellwig (2014) claim that,
contrarily to what bankers assert (IIF 2011), equity is not expensive and that regulatory capital
requirements should be raised way above the levels contemplated by the Basel Committee.1
On the other hand, other academics (see for example DeAngelo and Stulz (2013)) argue that
"high leverage is optimal for banks" and that raising capital requirements could have a large
social cost because it would prevent banks from performing adequate liquidity provision to
the financial system.
The objective of this paper is not to come up with quantitative recommendations on what
should be the optimal level of capital for banks. Instead, it examines the qualitative question of
what type of securities should be eligible as bank "capital". As such it belongs to the abundant
recent literature that has tried to show why and how hybrid securities (contingent capital,
CoCo bonds) can be useful.2 We use a stylized model of a SIFI, defined as a financial institution
whose failure entails important costs for society, and abstract from adverse selection or risk
shifting problems due to deposit insurance systems. The presence of this failure externality
is the justification for regulating the financing mode of SIFIs. We study the question of the
optimal way to finance SIFIs, both from private and public perspectives.
Our main results are as follows: first, in the absence of exogenous benefits of debt (such as a
tax advantage, or a way to reduce adverse selection problems), any form of long-term debt
1Their arguments seem to have finally convinced international regulators who are considering imposing very
large “Total Loss Absorbing Capacities” to SIFIs (see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/11/adequacy-of-
loss-absorbing-capacity-of-global-systemically-important-banks-in-resolution/)
2This literature is discussed later on. Note, however, that it is dismissed by Admati and Hellwig (2012) as second
order considerations compared with the need for a massive increase in banks’ equity.
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(straight, CoCo, . . . ) is sub-optimal because it leads to too many defaults.3 Second, with tax
deductions on debt, CoCo bonds are good both for shareholders and for regulators because
they allow reducing taxes while decreasing the bank’s probability of default, due to the superior
loss absorption capacity of CoCo bonds. However social welfare (which includes tax revenues)
is always lower with any form of long-term debt: equity financing of SIFIs is socially optimal.
Therefore the main message of the paper is that CoCo bonds should be viewed as a bad com-
promise struck between regulators and bankers, at the expense of the taxpayers. Bankers only
accepted to increase their loss absorbing capacity in exchange for a tax relief, i.e. another form
of a Too Big to Fail subsidy. All the papers on CoCo bonds that use standard corporate finance
models (which do not incorporate adverse selction or asset substitution), are potentially
misleading because in such models any kind of debt financing is socially suboptimal.
Related literature. Our paper relates to the extensive research on contingent convertible
bonds, their design features and their impacts on bank capital structure. First introduced by
Mark Flannery in (2005) "CoCos" are defined as bonds that convert into common equity or
sustain automatic write-downs once some threshold is reached. Such securities have gained
increasing attention since they correspond to a debt contract in good states of the world
whilst their conversion to equity provides an automatic recapitalization when banks face
financial distress and their market access to equity capital is limited. Since their introduction,
all versions of the CoCo proposals studied by academics and regulators have the common
goal of establishing a contractual structure that increases bank capital in bad states of the
economy (the bail-in feature); there are, however, numerous differences in the designs of
such proposals. Specific proposals usually vary with regard to the conversion trigger (which
determines the probability of conversion or conversion risk) and the conversion ratio (which
determines burden sharing between shareholders and debtholders in the event of conversion).
Contingent Capital valuation formulas along with its key design issues have been obtained
by Pennacchi et al. (2010), Glasserman and Nouri (2010), Albul et al. (2013), Sundaresan and
Wang (2015), McDonald (2010), Barucci ad Del Viva (2012, 2013) and Chen et al. (2013) among
others.
McDonald (2010) prices CoCo with a dual trigger using both the bank’s stock price and a
market index. In a framework based on the traditional capital structure model of Leland
(1994), Albul et al. (2013) obtain closed form pricing expressions and show that if not required,
shareholders of SIFIs whose straight debt is guaranteed by government will not willingly
include any CoCo bonds in their capital structure since by doing so they will lose a fraction of
the government subsidy. Glasserman and Nouri (2010) analyse the case of contingent capital
with an accounting based capital ratio trigger and partial conversion. Using option pricing
methods, Hilscher and Raviv (2014) evaluate how the introduction of CoCos into a bank’s
capital structure reduces its probability of default. Pennacchi (2010) develops a structural
model for contingent bank capital when bank’s assets follow a jump diffusion process with
3The role of debt as a way to reduce adverse selection problems has been put forward in the early contributions
of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).
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stochastic interest rate, and shows that the possibility of sudden declines in a bank’s asset
value has a qualitatively distinct impact on valuing contingent capitals.4 Barrucci and Del
Viva (2013) show that an automatic conversion imposed by the regulatory authorities induces
banks to issue less CoCo but more debt than in the case of a conversion barrier chosen by
shareholders.5 So the intervention by the authorities is not necessarily positive if the goal is to
minimize expected bankruptcy costs. Finally Chen et al. (2013) study the design features of
CoCo’s in a capital structure model with bank specific and market wide tail risk.
Another strand of literature analyses the incentives created by CoCo bonds. Chen et al. (2013)
investigate how CoCos affect debt overhang, asset substitution, the firm’s ability to absorb
losses and the sensitivity of equity holders to various types of risk. They find that CoCos
generally have positive incentive effects when the conversion trigger is not set too low. Hilscher
and Raviv (2014) argue that incentives to shift risk can be eliminated when the profits and costs
of conversion offset each other. Thus one can find a level of conversion at which shareholders
are indifferent to the amount of risk and have no incentive to take excessive risk. Pennachi
(2010) suggests that designing CoCo’s as close to default free as possible instills incentives
in shareholders similar to those which would occur under unlimited liability; thereby both
risk-shifting incentives and debt overhang problem can be reduced when a bank issues
appropriately designed CoCos. Berg and kaserer (2015) assume that asset value is only known
to regulators who enforce conversion or default, and show that if a wealth transfer from CoCo
bond holders to equity holders takes place at conversion, the CoCo bonds can magnify both
the asset substitution as well as the debt overhang problem. Barucci and Del Viva (2012) study
the effects of a counter-cyclical contingent capital on shareholders’ risk taking incentives and
bankruptcy costs.6 They conclude that the added counter-cyclicality feature mitigates the
asset substitution incentives, whilst at the same time does not help reducing the bankruptcy
costs.7 Sundaresan and Wang (2015) suggest that the conversion ratio that achieves a unique
equilibrium for market prices must produce no value transfer between equity holders and
CoCo bond holders, and thus might not be able to generate the desired incentives for bank
managers. Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) show that when contracts are incomplete in the sense
that owners enjoy discretion over the risk of their investments, CoCo bonds always distort risk
taking incentives, and thus can increase the bank’s probability of default as well as its expected
distress costs.
In an empirical study, Avdjiev et al. (2015) provide an overview of the CoCo bonds market, the
issues and the participants. The paper shows that the volume of CoCo issues has been increas-
ing since 2012 as regulatory pressure on banks to boost their Tier 1 capital has increased. The
4Jump-diffusion processes allow for the possibility of sudden large declines in the bank asset value which can
characterize a financial crisis.
5Barrucci and Del Viva (2013) assume such conversion trigger to be an exogenously given rule that applies
similarly to all banks.
6Counter-cyclical contingent capital is defined as notes that are converted into equity in the bad state of the
economy upon the decision of a regulatory authority.
7Thus Barucci and Del Viva (2012) argue that depending on the priority of objectives (reducing bankruptcy
costs or mitigating risk-shifting incentives) the counter-cyclicality feature should be removed or added.
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geographical distribution of CoCo issuance mainly demonstrates the way Basel III regulations
are applied by national financial authorities. Whilst about 80% of the CoCo bonds have been
issued by European banks, CoCo issuance is very small in the US, where CoCo bonds do
not qualify for AT1 or AT2 capital.8 Moreover, by analysing the pricing of banks’ securities
after CoCo issuance, Avdjiev et al. (2015) show that CoCo investors view CoCo bonds as risky
investments that bear a significant possibility of conversion.
The literature so far studies the optimality of CoCo financing for shareholders or regulatory
authorities. Our paper differentiates from the existing literature by including taxpayers and
studying the optimality of CoCo bonds from a social point of view. We find that no matter how
CoCo bonds are designed and whether or not they are optimal to include in a bank’s capital
structure from a private or regulatory point of view, they are never socially optimal when their
only benefits are tax subsidies. The impact of taxes on bank capital structure has been studied
by Schepens (2015) among others.9 Schepens uses a natural experiment in the form of a fiscal
change in Belgium in 2006 and suggests that decreasing the relative tax advantage of debt
financing could be used to incentivize banks to build up their capital buffers. We build on this
study by analysing the optimality of different kinds of debt when there is no tax advantage to
debt like instruments. Our results show that in the absence of exogenous benefits of debt, no
kind of debt is socially optimal. So the social optimal financing mode is 100% equity. If interest
payments are tax deductible, CoCo bonds can be optimal for equity holders and regulators
but not for social welfare.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model. Section 1.3 derives closed
form solutions for the value of the bank from private and public points of view when there
is no tax advantage to debt instruments and studies the optimal financing for SIFIs in such
a framework. Section 1.4 studies the same question when there are tax subsidies to debt
instruments. We compare straight debt and CoCo bonds. Section 1.5 is devoted to a numerical
illustration. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Model
Most of the papers on CoCos use models in the spirit of Merton (1974)/Leland (1992) where
firms keep no cash reserves because they can continuously issue equity at no cost. In these
8UK and Swiss institutions are the main issuers of CoCo bonds in Europe. Swiss banks are required to hold a min-
imum 9% of their risk-weighted assets in loss absorbing instruments. Similar loss-absorbing capital requirements
have been adopted by the UK regulators since 2012.
9Other papers relating taxes and bank capital structure are Admati et al. (2014) and Poole (2009).
10In the US, in general, tax deductibility of the distributions on any financial instrument depends on whether or
not the instrument is characterized as debt or equity. Under current US tax-law for an instrument to be treated as
debt, it must include an unconditional promise to pay a certain sum either on demand or at a fixed maturity date.
Whether or not this condition is fulfilled for any particular CoCo bond depends on the likelihood of the conversion
and the sum accrued to CoCo holders upon conversion. Thus there is no reasonable certainty that the interest
payments on CoCo bonds are tax-exempt in the US (see Hammer and Chen (2012)). As Avdjiev et al. (2015) shows
CoCo issuance has been very small in the US. This supports our theory that in the absence of tax subsidies, CoCo
bonds (or any debt-like instrument) are suboptimal.
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models default only occurs for solvency reasons. However in practice, due to fixed transaction
costs, banks only issue equity infrequently. Also, they typically have problems to access equity
markets in distress situations. Moreover, banks default essentially for liquidity, not solvency,
reasons. Given this, we believe that a Merton/Leland type model is not the appropriate set-up
to represent a financial institution. We use instead the same set-up as Radner and Shepp (1996)
and consider a profitable bank or financial firm that may be forced to close down because of
liquidity problems.11 Fixed issuance costs prevent continuous injection of capital. In such a
context, liquidity management becomes crucial.
We model a bank (or more generally a SIFI) as a firm that transforms a fixed volume D of
risk-free deposits into a fixed volume A of risky assets.12 So the bank’s balance sheet is as
follows
Risky Assets A Deposits D
Cash Reserves m Long-term Finance
Note that in our model we isolate long-term financing from deposit financing. Unlike firms
in other industries, a financial firm does not necessarily need external financing for its day-
to-day activities. However the intermediation activity is risky, and the bank needs to manage
its precautionary cash reserves to cover operating losses, otherwise it can face the risk of an
immediate closure.
We model random cash flows generated over time by the SIFI’s operations (net earnings) as
an arithmetic Brownian Motion with positive drift µ and volatility σ defined over a complete
probability space (Ω,F ,P). Specifically cumulated cash flows Rt evolve according to
dRt =µd t +σd Zt , R0 = 0. (1.1)
The process Z ≡ {Zt , t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the filtration {F ; t ≥
0} that models the flow of information. Bank’s assets can involve operating losses dRt < 0 as
well as operating profits dRt > 0.
All investors are risk-neutral and discount the future at rate r . When the bank is started, owners
issue securities to finance cash reserves. We assume that there are no corporate governance
problems such as moral hazard and asset substitution. However, two frictions are present
in our set-up: first, issuance of securities is costly. Second, there is an opportunity cost of
keeping cash in the bank; we assume internally held cash does not earn any interest.13
11Ideally, one would envisage a more general model incorporating both types of default and essentially nesting
Merton/Leland and Radner/Shepp models.
12The assumption that A and D are fixed is not crucial. It allows us to focus on the loss absorbing capacity of
market finance (equity and debt-like instruments). It also allows us to focus on liquidity issues and on the loss
absorbing capacity of liabilities.
13The idea is, as in Décamps et al. (2011), that the managers of the bank can engage in wasteful activities when
the bank holds cash or other liquid assets. The resulting agency costs effectively reduce the rate of return on
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In our model the SIFI defaults when it fails to cover its operating losses by drawing cash from
its reserves or by issuing new securities. The SIFI character in our model is captured by the
simple feature that its failure entails a social cost γ, that is not internalized by shareholders.
The question we examine is the SIFI’s optimal security design problem: what is the best way
to finance such an institution? We try to answer this question both from private and public
perspectives. For the ease of exposition, we model this financing decision by a simple debt-
equity choice.14 Debt pays a constant coupon c per unit of time. The dividend policy is chosen
so as to maximize the wealth of shareholders. Dividends are characterized by a non decreasing
(cumulated) cash flow process L ≡ {Lt ; t ≥ 0}. We do not make any restrictions on L apart from
assuming that it is {F ; t ≥ 0}-adapted and right continuous, and that it is non-decreasing,
reflecting limited liability (non-negative payments to shareholders). For the sake of simplicity,
the liquidation value of the SIFI is assumed to be zero.
1.3 No tax-advantage of debt
In this section we assume there is no tax-advantage to debt instruments and study the optimal
financing methods for a SIFI. There is a fixed cost to issue new securities, thus new issuances
are going to be lumpy and infrequent. In this section we consider the scenario where security
re-issuance is so costly that it actually never happens. Under this assumption we characterize
the optimal security design for both bank’s owners and regulators. The case of re-issuance is
studied in the Appendix.
1.3.1 Privately optimal security design
The shareholders of the bank decide when to distribute dividends. The dividend policy is
characterized by a non-decreasing (cumulated) dividend process Lt . At date zero, the bank
also issues debt which pays a continuous coupon of c. We assume, in this section, that these
coupon payments are not tax deductible. Initial owners maximize their wealth by choosing c,
Lt , and m0 (initial cash reserves) that maximize
E[
∫ τ
0
e−r t dLt ]−m0, (1.2)
where τ= inf{t | s.t . mt < 0} is the random default time and cash reserves mt evolve as
dmt = [(1−θ)µ− c]d t + (1−θ)σd Zt −dLt . (1.3)
θ is the tax rate. Since earnings are i .i .d the solution to (1.2) is Markovian with respect to
the cash reserves process and can be obtained by recursive techniques. In particular, the
internally held liquid assets from r to r −ρ. For simplicity we assume r = ρ. We have checked that the general case
ρ < r generates qualitatively similar results.
14Using a similar model as Radner and Shepp (1996), Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995) study more general forms of
financing.
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decision to distribute dividends at date t only depends on mt . More precisely, no dividends
are distributed (dLt = 0) when V ′(mt )> 1 (the marginal value of the cash inside the firm is
higher than one). The optimal policy is to distribute dividends when a target cash level m∗
is reached, with V ′(m∗)= 1. The total value of the bank V (m), and the target cash level m∗
are the unique solution of the following ODE (ordinary differential equation) with boundary
conditions
r V (m) = c+ [(1−θ)µ− c]V ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2V ′′(m)
V (0) = 0
V ′(m∗) = 1
(1.4)
The left hand side of (1.4) represents the return required by investors for investing V (m) (debt
plus equity) in the bank. The right hand side consists of coupon payments, and the effects
of cash savings and the volatility of the bank’s cash flows. Zero liquidation value and no
re-issuance when cash reserves hit zero result in the first boundary condition. The second
boundary condition has already been explained.
Before solving for the explicit value of the bank, we observe that the optimal coupon payment
c must be zero. Indeed, since there is no tax advantage to interest payments, the only effect
of such payments is to reduce the drift of the cash reserves process. This means that interest
payments will increase the probability that the bank’s cash reserves hit zero and thus increase
the probability of default. Since in this model we assume no other benefit to debt, the optimal
amount of coupon payments to be paid out of the bank’s earnings should be zero. We prove in
Appendix A.1.1 that this is indeed the case and that the optimal coupon payment c∗ is zero.
Given c∗ = 0, we can re-write (1.4)
r V (m) = (1−θ)µV ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2V ′′(m)
V (0) = 0
V ′(m∗) = 1
V ′′(m∗) = 0.
(1.5)
The additional boundary condition in (1.5) is the super contact condition that characterizes
the target cash threshold that maximizes the value of equity which is here equal to the total
value of the bank (see Dumas (1991)).
The closed form solution to the above ODE is
V (m)= e
z1m −ez2m
z1ez1m
∗ − z2ez2m∗
,
where z1 > 0> z2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
r = (1−θ)µz+ 1
2
σ2(1−θ)2z2, (1.6)
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and the dividend pay-out threshold is given by
m∗ =
ln( z2z1 )
2
z1− z2
.
Dividends are only paid when m >m∗, that is when past performance has been good enough
to accumulate cash reserves above m∗. Since V ′(m∗)= 1, m∗ is also the optimal amount of
cash to be invested when the bank is started. After this initial cash injection, the bank restrains
from distributing any dividend until the level of its cash reserves hits again m∗, and then any
cash in excess of m∗ is paid out. If the bank’s performance deteriorates such that its cash
reserves hit zero, the bank defaults because we have assumed for the moment that re-issuance
is too costly.
1.3.2 Optimal security design for regulators
In this section we study the optimal financing mode of a SIFI when regulators are in charge
of making such a decision. As mentioned before, the main characteristic of the SIFI in our
model is that its failure generates a social cost γ, which is not internalized by the bank’s
shareholders. The regulators’ objective function equals the private value V (m) of the bank
minus the expected present value of default costs. Similar to the last case, it is not optimal to
pay a coupon out of the bank’s earnings when these interest payments are not tax deductible.15
So we set c = 0. Regulators’ objective is to choose dividend distribution (cumulated cash flow
process Lt ) and initial cash level mR,0, that maximize the regulatory value of the SIFI
R = E[
∫ τ
0
e−r t dLt −γe−rτ]−mR,0,
where as before τ= inf{t | s.t . mt < 0} is the failure time and cash reserves evolve according to
(1.3). The solution to the regulators’ problem is obtained by the same recursive techniques.
The regulatory value of the SIFI solves the same ODE as before but with different boundary
conditions
r R(m) = (1−θ)µR ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2R ′′(m)
R(0) = −γ
R ′(m∗R ) = 1
R ′′(m∗R ) = 0.
Similar to the case of shareholders, payments to shareholders only occur when the level of the
bank’s cash reserves is higher than m∗R . So these payments are in the form of dividends that
are only paid out when bank’s assets have been performing well. However, due to the social
costs incurred in the event of bankruptcy, regulators impose a higher dividend threshold and
only allow the distribution of dividends to bank’s shareholders when m >m∗R >m∗.
15This is proven in Appendix A.1.1.
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In our simple framework where risky assets A and retail deposits D are fixed, the book value
of equity e =m+ A−D varies one to one with cash reserves. Thus the higher dividend pay-
out threshold translates into a higher capital buffer that regulators require the SIFI to keep
within the bank. Given that the bank has to wait more and build a bigger cash buffer before
distributing any dividend, the higher dividend threshold decreases the probability of default.
In Appendix A.1.1 we provide a formal proof for m∗R >m∗.
The closed form expression for the regulatory value of the SIFI is given by
R(m)= (1+γz2e
z2m∗R )ez1m − (1+γz1ez1m∗R )ez2m
z1ez1m
∗
R − z2ez2m∗R
, (1.7)
where z1 and z2 are given in (1.6), and m∗R is the dividend threshold chosen by regulators
which is determined by the super contact condition.
R ′′(m∗R )= 0=⇒ z21e−z2m
∗
R − z22e−z1m
∗
R −γz2z1(z2− z1)= 0.
The following proposition summarizes our results so far.
Proposition 1.1. When issuance costs are high and there is no tax-advantage of debt the
following holds
a) • Privately optimal long-term financing mode is 100% equity (i.e. c∗ = 0). Initial
owners of the SIFI issue the number of stocks needed to finance productive assets
and a target cash reserve of m0 =m∗.
• Earnings are retained whenever cash reserves are below the target m∗. Excess cash is
distributed as dividends. Bank is closed whenever cash reserves fall below zero.
b) • Socially optimal long-term financing mode is also 100% equity.
• Regulators require more capital than what the owner would issue. The target cash
reserve of regulators is m∗R >m∗.
• This can be implemented by prohibiting dividend distribution if capital is below
some minimum value.
Thus in the absence of tax advantage of debt, all market financing for SIFIs should be in the
form of equity, both from shareholders’ and regulators’ points of view; however, there is a need
for regulation because shareholders do not internalize the costs of failures. Regulation takes
the form of a restriction on dividends: dividend distribution is forbidden if SIFI’s capital ratio
is too low.
In this section we assumed that security issuance is so costly that no re-issuance happens in
the future. In the Appendix we relax this assumption.
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1.3.3 CDS prices
A simple way to analyse the impact of regulation on the probability of default of the bank is to
compute the following function
p(m)= E[e−r t |m0 =m],
where cash reserves evolve according to (1.3). This "discounted probability of default" can be
interpreted as the price of an infinite duration CDS that pays 1 dollar when the bank defaults.
This price satisfies the following ODE
r p(m) = (1−θ)µp ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2p ′′(m)
p(0) = 1
p ′(m∗) = 0.
When the cash level is zero, probability of default is one (and the CDS pays one dollar). At the
dividend threshold, since any additional cash is paid out of the bank, the marginal value of the
CDS is zero. This equation has a closed form solution. The CDS price is given by
p(m)= z1e
z2(m−m∗)− z2ez1(m−m∗)
z1e−z2m
∗ − z2e−z1m∗
(1.8)
When regulators impose a higher dividend threshold m∗R >m∗, the CDS price is reduced for
all values of m. This is a consequence of the following result.
Lemma 1. The discounted probability of default p(m) is decreasing in m∗.
The proof is provided in the Appendix. The following proposition is a direct consequence of
Lemma 1.
Proposition 1.2. The bank’s discounted probability of default is reduced by regulation.
Figure 1.1 shows how the discounted probability of default decreases when the level of cash
reserves increases, and is evaluated for two different values of dividend threshold m∗ and
m∗R . At any given level of cash reserves, the expected probability of default is higher when the
dividend threshold is lower.
Given p(m), we can rewrite the expression for the regulatory value of the bank (1.7) as
R(m)= e
z1m −ez2m
z1ez1m
∗
R − z2ez2m∗R
−γpR (m),
where pR (m) is the CDS price given in (1.8) evaluated at regulatory dividend threshold m∗R .
Thus the regulatory value of the SIFI is equal to its equity value when dividend threshold is set
by regulators minus its expected external cost of failure.
14
1.4. Tax-advantage of debt
The property that 100% equity is the best long-term financing mode, is very general. It can
be extended to other cash-flow processes, new security issuance, interest paid on cash, etc.
The intuition is simple: because of financial frictions, cash is (strictly) more valuable inside
the bank than outside, until the target cash reserve is attained. Any security that draws cash
before the target is attained is suboptimal. Of course this reasoning only applies to long-term
financing: collecting deposits is one of the core activities of banks. Our paper entirely focuses
on the choice between equity and (various forms of) debt instruments for long-term financing.
The next section studies the financing and pay-out behaviour of the SIFI in the presence of tax
subsidies to debt instruments.
1.4 Tax-advantage of debt
In this section we assume that interest payments on any debt instruments are exempt from
taxes. Assuming this tax advantage, we study the privately and publicly optimal financing
contracts using straight debt and CoCo bonds.
1.4.1 Straight debt
Suppose the SIFI can issue some straight debt at time zero, paying a constant coupon of c
as long as the SIFI is not in default. The SIFI is exempt from paying taxes on these interest
payments. Default occurs when the SIFI’s level of cash reserves hits zero. When the SIFI
defaults, both straight debt holders and equity holders receive nothing, since we assume a
liquidation value of zero. The bank is systemically important, meaning that there are some
negative externalities generated by its default, the costs of which are not internalized by bank’s
shareholders. These costs are taken into account by regulatory authorities. Social welfare
includes these negative externality costs, but also the value of taxes collected from the bank. In
the following sections we study the optimal capital structure of the SIFI that can issue straight
debt from the points of view of the SIFI’s equity holders, regulators and social welfare.
Shareholders
Given the assumptions previously discussed, bank’s cash reserves evolve according to
dmt = (1−θ)[(µ− c)d t +σd Zt ]−dLt . (1.9)
Every time the level of bank’s cash reserves hits the target cash level, which for simplicity we
still denote by m∗, shareholders collect dividends. Default occurs when cash reserves hit zero.
Debt holders collect coupon c for as long as the bank is not in default. For the moment, we
take the target cash level m∗ as given. Below we explain how it is chosen. The total value of
15
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the bank, V (m), solves the following ODE subject to the boundary conditions
r V (m) = c+ (1−θ)(µ− c)V ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2V ′′(m)
V (0) = 0
V ′(m∗) = 1.
The first boundary condition reflects the zero liquidation value in case of default. The second
boundary condition comes from the fact that at the optimal dividend threshold, the marginal
value of cash in the bank is equal to one. This means that an additional dollar inside and
outside the bank has the same value. Thus this is the target value at which the bank starts
paying out dividends. At all levels of cash reserves below m∗, the marginal value of cash is
higher inside the bank (bigger than 1 which is the marginal value of cash outside the bank),
thus all the earnings are retained within the bank.
The solution is in closed form. The total value of the bank is
V (m)= c
r
[1−P (m,c)]+ e
y1m −e y2m
y1e y1m
∗ − y2e y2m∗
, (1.10)
where y1 > 0> y2 are the roots of the characteristics equation
r = (1−θ)(µ− c)y + 1
2
σ2(1−θ)2 y2, (1.11)
and P (m,c), which is the discounted expected probability of default defined in Section 1.3.3,
is given by
P (m,c)= y1e
y2(m−m∗)− y2e y1(m−m∗)
y1e−y2m
∗ − y2e−y1m∗
. (1.12)
The first term on the right hand side of (1.10) is the value of debt D(m), which is the value of
risk-free debt (
c
r
) times the discounted probability of the SIFI’s survival. The second term is the
value of equity E (m). Closed form solutions for D(m) and E (m) are included in Appendix A.1.3.
When shareholders can not commit on their future dividend policy, the dividend pay-out
threshold is determined by the super contact condition for the value of equity E(m), which is
E ′′(m∗)= 0. So
m∗ =
ln( y2y1 )
2
y1− y2
. (1.13)
This is because the maximization problem of bank owners is solved sequentially. Equity
holders choose the dividend threshold that maximizes their wealth, after debt has been issued.
So the dividend threshold is determined by (1.13). Given this optimal pay-out threshold, equity
holders decide how much debt they want to include in their capital structure (determining
coupon payments) to maximize the total value of the bank (their value as equity holders
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plus the proceeds from debt issuance) at time zero minus the initial cash injection. Since
V ′(m∗)= 1, optimal initial cash injection is m∗. So m0 =m∗, and the maximization problem
equity holders face at time zero is given by
max
c
V (m∗)−m∗.
There is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt; whilst SIFI can save taxes by paying
interests to debt holders, the interest payments draw cash from bank’s cash reserves before
the pay-out threshold is attained and when marginal value of cash is bigger inside the bank
than outside. To find an optimal amount of debt, shareholders need to find the value of c at
which the costs and benefits of debt are equal. We show in the Appendix that when the tax
rate θ is large enough, the optimal c chosen by shareholders is positive.
Proposition 1.3. For θ large enough, it is optimal for shareholders to choose some debt financing
(i.e. c∗ > 0).
Figure 1.2 shows the graph of CDS prices P (m,c) for different values of c . As could be expected,
P (m,c) increases in c for all values of m.
As is typical in the corporate finance literature, we assume that shareholders decide on the
level of dividend threshold after debt is issued; however it is interesting to look at the case
where shareholders choose the dividend threshold ex-ante and commit to paying dividends
at this threshold. In this case, shareholders choose optimal coupon payments and optimal
dividend threshold simultaneously. This means that to find the optimal dividend threshold
m∗Com., shareholders maximize the whole value of the bank at time zero. So the super contact
condition that determines the optimal pay-out threshold is
V ′′(m∗Com.)= 0.
To choose the optimal coupon payment, bank owners solve the following optimization prob-
lem.
max
c
V (m∗Com.)−m∗Com..
In Appendix A.1.1, we show that this commitment increases the threshold above which div-
idends are distributed. When shareholders commit to receiving dividends later, they are
able to issue more debt. Note that there is an interactive relationship between the dividend
threshold and coupon payments. Dividends and coupons are both cash payments that are
distributed outside the bank; however coupons are tax-deductible. If equity holders commit to
distributing less dividends, they can issue more debt to benefit further from the tax subsidies.
If they do not commit on their future dividend policy, they distribute more dividends and thus
they can issue less debt.
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Regulators
As in Section 1.3, the bank in our model is systemically important, so we assume a social
cost of failure equal to γ that is not internalized by SIFI’s shareholders in the event of default.
When regulators choose the dividend pay-out threshold and the amount of debt to include in
SIFI’s capital structure, they take into account the social costs of failure; thus R(m), the value
function for regulators, is given by
R(m)=V (m)−γE[e−rτ |m0 =m],
where V (m) is the total value of the bank. The ODE for R(m) is given by
r R(m) = c+ (1−θ)(µ− c)R ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2R ′′(m)
R(0) = −γ
R ′(m∗R ) = 1
R ′′(m∗R ) = 0.
The first boundary condition comes from the external costs of SIFI’s failure. The second
boundary condition is given by the fact that at optimal dividend threshold set by regulators,
the marginal value of cash is equal to one. The third boundary condition is the super contact
condition that determines the optimal dividend threshold for regulators.
Solving the above ODE gives the following closed form solution for the regulatory value of SIFI
R(m)= c
r
[1−PR (m,c)]+ e
y1m −e y2m
y1e y1m
∗
R − y2e y2m∗R
−γPR (m,c),
where y1 and y2 are given in (1.11), and PR (m,c) is the discounted probability of default given
in (1.12) when the dividend threshold is m∗R . The first and second terms represent debt value
and equity value respectively and the last term is the present value of the social costs incurred
at the time of default (costs times the discounted expected probability of default).
The dividend threshold set by regulators m∗R solves the super contact condition.
R ′′(m∗R )= 0=⇒ (
c
r
+γ)(y1− y2)+ y1
y2
e−y2m
∗
R − y2
y1
e−y1m
∗
R = 0.
To find the optimal amount of straight debt, regulators need to maximize R(m) at time zero
net of initial cash injection m0 =m∗R .
max
c
R(m∗R )−m∗R .
As was the case for shareholders, regulators trade off the benefits of interest tax savings with
the costs of drawing cash from SIFI’s cash reserves before dividend threshold is attained.
However in the case of regulators, default is more costly. Similar to Proposition 1.3, regulators
choose c∗ > 0 when the tax rate is high enough.
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We show in Appendix A.1.1 that for any given level of c, the optimal dividend threshold is
higher for regulators than for bank owners. If shareholders commit on the dividend policy
ex-ante, the threshold they choose is closer to the regulatory dividend threshold than when
they choose it ex-post.16 However, this committed dividend threshold is still lower than the
regulatory threshold. This is because shareholders do not internalize the costs of SIFI’s failure.
So even if they could commit on future dividend threshold, their objective function would still
be different from the objective function of regulators, implying a need for regulation.
To compare the level of debt that regulators find optimal with the level chosen by SIFI’s
shareholders, the relationship between dividend threshold and coupon payment must be
taken into account. Regulators decide on optimal dividend threshold and optimal coupon
at time zero when debt is being issued. This is comparable to the case when shareholders
can commit on future dividend threshold at debt issuance. We know that when shareholders
commit on future dividend threshold, the target threshold they set is closer to the regulatory
threshold. The difference between these two thresholds depends on the magnitude of the
social cost of failure γ. The lower the social cost, the closer m∗Com. is to m
∗
R . Since default
is more costly to regulators, when dividend thresholds are set close enough, the regulatory
optimal amount of debt is lower than the amount of debt shareholders would have chosen.
Moreover higher social costs leads to lower levels of debt that is optimal from a regulatory
point of view. On the other hand, when shareholders do not commit on the future dividend
threshold, the dividend threshold they choose is much lower; for this low level of dividend
threshold they can not issue as much debt as what they would have if they could commit. So
it is possible for the regulatory amount of optimal debt to be higher than the amount which
would have been issued by shareholders when they do not commit on future dividends. The
next proposition summarizes our findings
Proposition 1.4. When there are tax subsidies to debt and the tax rate is high enough
• regulators also choose a positive coupon for a large enough tax rate.
• regulators choose a higher dividend threshold than shareholders.
• there is a need for regulation. Regulators need to restrict dividend distributions to share-
holders and the amount of debt issued.
Social welfare
From a social point of view, in addition to the social costs of SIFI’s failure, the taxes collected
from SIFI should be taken into account. So W (m), the social value of the SIFI, can be written
as
W (m)=V (m)+T (m)−γE[e−rτ |m0 =m],
16The idea that regulation can serve as a commitment device for shareholders is discussed in Admati et al. (2014).
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where T (m) is the present value of all taxes collected until the time of default.
T (m)= E[
∫ τ
0
θ(µ− c)e−r t d t |m0 =m].
We can calculate the closed form solution for the social value of the SIFI by solving the following
ODE with boundary conditions
r W (m) = c(1−θ)+θµ+ (1−θ)(µ− c)W ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2W ′′(m)
W (0) = −γ
W ′(m∗W ) = 1
W ′′(m∗W ) = 0.
(1.14)
The right hand side of this ODE includes the coupon payments to debt holders, net taxes
paid by SIFI, and the dividend payments to equity holders plus any capital gain on the value.
Boundary conditions are identical to the case of regulators with the only difference that the
dividend threshold is now the level of cash reserves at which it is socially optimal to pay-out
dividends to SIFI’s shareholders. This pay-out threshold is set to maximize the social value of
the bank. Solving the above ODE, W (m) is given by
W (m)= c
r
[1−PW (m,c)]+ e
y1m −e y2m
y1e y1m
∗
W − y2e y2m∗W
− (γ+ θ(µ− c)
r
)PW (m,c), (1.15)
where PW (m,c) is the discounted probability of default given in (1.12) when the dividend
threshold is the socially optimal level m∗W . The first and second terms of (1.15) are the value of
debt and equity and the last term is the value loss in case of SIFI’s default which is the social
costs incurred and the taxes collected from the bank.
The last boundary condition determines the socially optimal dividend threshold m∗W .
W ′′(m∗W )= 0=⇒ (
c
r
+γ+ θ(µ− c)
r
)(y1− y2)+ y1
y2
e−y2m
∗
W − y2
y1
e−y1m
∗
W = 0
To find the socially optimal amount of straight debt, W (m) needs to be maximized at time
zero when the initial cash injection into the bank is m0 =m∗W .
max
c
W (m∗W )−m∗W .
In Appendix A.1.1 we prove that the socially optimal c is always zero. Indeed, in our model the
only benefit to debt is the tax deductibility of interest payments. Since taxes are included in
the social value of the SIFI, there is no social benefit to debt. No social benefit and the costs of
drawing cash from SIFI’s reserves when the marginal value of cash is bigger than one make
debt socially suboptimal. The following proposition formalizes our findings
Proposition 1.5. When the only benefits to debt instruments are tax subsidies, debt is socially
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suboptimal and the socially optimal long-term financing mode for a SIFI is 100% equity.
1.4.2 CoCo bonds
The second case we study is the case in which SIFIs can issue CoCo bonds at time zero. A CoCo
bond pays a constant coupon of c until a pre-defined threshold of cash reserves m¯ at which it
converts to equity. This means that CoCo bond holders stop receiving any coupon payments
but instead they get a fraction α of the bank’s equity. Thus m¯, the conversion threshold, and
α, the conversion ratio are the pre-defined characteristics of the CoCo bond issued at time
zero. They can be decided by shareholders or regulators. The bank is exempt from paying
taxes on the interest paid on CoCo bonds. Similar to the last case, the cost of SIFI’s failure is
not internalized by bank’s shareholders. This cost along with the tax deductibility of CoCo’s
coupon payments lead to a different optimization problem from each different point of view:
private, regulatory and public. This is what we study in the following sections.
Shareholders
Before conversion of CoCo bond, the level of cash reserves of the bank evolves according to
dmt = (1−θ)[(µ− c)d t +σd Zt ]−dLt .
However as soon as CoCo bond converts to equity, there will be no more interest payments
and the dynamics of the cash reserves go back to
dmt = (1−θ)[µd t +σd Zt ]−dLt .
This means that we have different value functions (for both equity and the total value of
the bank): one after conversion (when the bank is 100% equity financed) and one before
conversion when it has CoCo bonds in its capital structure. To solve for the total value of
the bank at time zero we start from the total value of the bank after conversion and work
backwards.
Since there is no debt after conversion, the total value Va(m) of the bank after conversion is
equal to the value of equity Va(m)= Ea(m), and satisfies the following ODE with its boundary
conditions
r Va(m) = (1−θ)µV ′a(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2V ′′a (m)
Va(0) = 0
V ′a(m∗a ) = 1
V ′′a (m∗a ) = 0.
(1.16)
The first boundary condition comes from the fact that after conversion of CoCo bonds there
is no more cushion against losses and as soon as the level of cash reserves hit zero, the bank
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defaults. With a liquidation value equal to zero, the total value of the bank will be zero at
default. m∗a is the dividend pay-out threshold after conversion. Shareholders decide on the
dividend threshold after CoCo bonds are already in place, which gives the second and third
boundary conditions. Solving (1.16) gives us the total value of the bank after conversion, which
is also the value of equity after conversion.
Va(m)= e
z1m −ez2m
z1ez1m
∗
a − z2ez2m∗a
,
where z1 and z2 are given in (1.6), and the dividend pay-out threshold is determined by
m∗a =
ln( z2z1 )
2
z1− z2
.
Before conversion the total value Vb(m) of the bank solves the following ODE with boundary
conditions
r Vb(m) = c+ (1−θ)(µ− c)V ′b(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2V ′′b (m) on [m¯,m∗b ),
Vb(m¯) = Va(m¯)
V ′b(m
∗
b ) = 1.
(1.17)
The first boundary condition is the no arbitrage condition at conversion which comes from
the fact that{
Eb(m¯) = (1−α)Va(m¯)
CC (m¯) = αVa(m¯),
(1.18)
where Eb(m) and CC (m) represent the value of equity before conversion and the value of
CoCo bonds respectively. In Appendix A.1.3, we calculate the closed form expressions of these
two values. The second boundary condition states that before conversion, dividends are
distributed at a target cash threshold of m∗b where the marginal value of cash is equal to one.
Solving (1.17) gives the following closed form solution for the total value of the bank before
conversion
Vb(m)=
c
r
[1− A(m)]+ [Va(m¯)+ e
y2m¯+y1m −e y1m¯+y2m
y1e
y1m∗b+y2m − y2e y2m∗b+y1m
]A(m), (1.19)
where y1 and y2 are given in (1.11), and A(m) is the discounted expected probability of
conversion given by
A(m)= y1e
y1m∗b+y2m − y2e y2m∗b+y1m
y1e
y1m∗b+y2m¯ − y2e y2m∗b+y1m¯
. (1.20)
To maximize their claims shareholders need to decide on several parameters: the amount of
CoCo bonds they issue, the conversion threshold m¯, and the dividend thresholds before and
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after conversion. As previously discussed, we assume that equity holders cannot commit on
future dividend policy. The optimal dividend threshold before conversion is determined by
the super contact condition on the equity value before conversion.
E ′′b (m
∗
b )= 0,
and thus solves the following equation
y21e
y2(m¯−m∗b )− y22e y1(m¯−m
∗
b )+ (1−α)Ea(m¯)y1 y2(y2− y1)= 0.
Conversion threshold and coupon payments are chosen by maximizing the total value of the
bank at time zero minus the initial cash injection of m0 =m∗b,Com..
max
c,m¯
Vb(m
∗
b )−m∗b .
The conversion ratio can then be obtained from the no arbitrage conditions at conversion in
(1.18).
There is a trade-off between the costs and the benefits of CoCo bonds. Since interest payments
on CoCo bonds are assumed to be tax deductible, issuing more CoCo bonds can save SIFI’s
owners in taxes. On the other hand interest payments draw cash out of cash reserves when its
marginal value inside the bank is higher than outside of it. Although this trade-off looks similar
to the case of straight debt, with CoCo bonds SIFI’s owners have the chance of abandoning
coupon payments when SIFI is in distress. This means that when SIFI’s cash reserves are
below a pre-specified level and the marginal value of cash is very high inside the bank, coupon
payments stop. This delays SIFI’s default. So CoCo bonds are less costly than straight debt
because of cushioning the bank against default at the time of distress. This protection makes
CoCo bonds more appealing to shareholders than straight debt. So shareholders choose a
higher level of CoCo compared to straight debt. The dividend threshold after conversion is
lower than the one before m∗a >m∗b . This is because when there is no more debt, shareholders
can get their dividends at a faster rate.
Regulators
Like before, the difference between the objective functions of shareholders and regulators is
the cost of default of the SIFI, which is not internalized by shareholders but is borne by society.
Similar to the last subsection, we perform our analysis backwards, starting by the value to
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regulators after conversion, which we denote Ra(m)
r Ra(m) = (1−θ)µR ′a(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2R ′′a (m)
Ra(0) = −γ
R ′a(m∗R,a) = 1
R ′′a (m∗R,a) = 0.
(1.21)
Comparing (1.21) to (1.16), we observe that the difference is in the first boundary condition:
regulators incur the social cost of SIFI’s default γ when SIFI’s cash reserves fall to zero. Solving
(1.21), the closed form expression for Ra(m) is
Ra(m)= e
z1m −ez2m
z1e
z1m∗R,a − z2ez2m
∗
R,a
−γPR,a(m),
where z1 and z2 are given in (1.6), and m∗R,a is the dividend threshold chosen by regulators
after conversion, which is determined by the super contact condition.
R ′′a (m
∗
R,a)= 0=⇒ z21e−z2m
∗
R,a − z22e−z1m
∗
R,a −γz2z1(z2− z1)= 0.
PR,a(m) is the discounted probability of default in (1.8) evaluated at the regulatory dividend
threshold of m∗R,a . After conversion the total value of the SIFI to regulators solves the following
ODE with boundary conditions
r Rb(m) = c+ (1−θ)(µ− c)R ′b(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2R ′′b (m)
Rb(m¯R ) = Ra(m¯R )
R ′b(m
∗
R,b) = 1
R ′′b (m
∗
R,b) = 0.
(1.22)
Similar to the case of equity holders the first boundary condition is the no arbitrage condition
at conversion. Since regulators choose the (before conversion) dividend threshold that maxi-
mizes the regulatory value of the SIFI, the super contact condition in (1.22) applies. Solving
(1.22) gives the following closed form solution for the total value of the bank to regulators
before conversion
Rb(m)=
c
r
[1− AR (m)]+ [Ra(m¯R )+ e
y2m¯R+y1m −e y1m¯R+y2m
y1e
y1m∗R,b+y2m − y2e y2m
∗
R,b+y1m
]AR (m), (1.23)
where y1 and y2 are given in (1.11), and AR (m) which is the discounted expected probability
of conversion in this case is given by
AR (m)= y1e
y1m∗R,b+y2m − y2e y2m
∗
R,b+y1m
y1e
y1m∗R,b+y2m¯R − y2e y2m
∗
R,b+y1m¯R
.
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We can re-write (1.23) as follows
Rb(m)=
c
r
[1−AR (m)]+[Va(m¯R )−γPR,b(m,c)+
e y2m¯R+y1m −e y1m¯R+y2m
y1e
y1m∗R,b+y2m − y2e y2m
∗
R,b+y1m
]AR (m), (1.24)
where PR,b(m,c) is the expected probability of default given by (1.12) and evaluated at the
regulatory dividend threshold of m∗R,b . Comparing the expression in (1.24) for the regulatory
value of the bank before conversion with its private value before conversion (1.19), the differ-
ence between these two values comes from the external cost that is incurred by regulators
in case of bank’s failure. Since the failure of the bank can only happen after conversion, the
expected cost of default depends not only on the expected probability of default but also on
the expected probability of conversion (PR,b(m,c).AR (m)).
Regulators maximize their objective at time zero by choosing the initial cash injection m0 =
m∗R,b , the conversion threshold m¯R , and the coupon c of CoCo bonds.
max
c,m¯R
Rb(m
∗
R,b)−m∗R,b .
The conversion ratio α can be obtained from one of the no arbitrage conditions at conversion
(1.18).
Given the optimal dividend threshold, we have two parameters left with respect to which
the value of SIFI is to be maximized: c, and m¯. There is a relationship between the coupon
payment c , and the conversion threshold m¯. To be able to optimally issue a CoCo bond with a
higher coupon payment (which allows for bigger tax savings), a higher conversion threshold is
required. Since a bigger coupon payment draws out cash faster from the bank’s cash reserves,
it increases the probability of default. To compensate for this, the CoCo bond should be
converted into equity at higher levels of cash reserves. This means that a bank with higher c is
to be in distress earlier. The bigger the coupon payments, the faster they should stop being
paid. So shareholders can decide to pay out a big coupon payment and save more on taxes as
long as the bank is doing good enough, but when the bank is not doing so well these coupon
payments stop and shareholders face dilution as a result of the conversion of the CoCo bond.
Alternatively shareholders can decide to pay a lower coupon payment on the CoCo bond but
enjoy the benefits of interest tax savings longer since a lower coupon payment allows for a
lower conversion threshold. The same argument holds for regulators.
When shareholders commit on the future dividend threshold by maximizing total firm value
instead of equity value, dividends are paid-out at higher levels of cash reserve. In Appendix
A.1.1, we show that for a given coupon and a given CoCo contract, shareholders choose a
lower dividend threshold than regulators. Committed shareholders’ dividend threshold is
somewhere in between since by committing on the future dividend threshold shareholders
maximize the total value of the bank but they still do not internalize the SIFI’s cost of failure.
The more costly SIFI’s failure, the higher the difference between the regulatory and the privately
optimal dividend threshold.
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Dividends are distributed out of the bank’s cash reserves, so their deferral increases the debt
capacity of the bank. Regulators delay dividends distribution and thus can benefit from higher
tax subsidies by issuing a CoCo bond with bigger coupon payments. This is why for any given
CoCo contract, regulators choose a higher dividend threshold and a higher interest payment.
This higher optimal level of debt creates value. The following properties emerge from our
numerical simulations which we discuss in the next section.
• Issuing CoCo bonds rather than straight debt increases the debt capacity of the bank,
which in turn increases the value of the bank to shareholders and regulators.
• Increasing the conversion threshold allows for a higher optimal coupon payment.
• For any given CoCo contract, the commitment on the future dividend threshold allows
regulators to choose a much higher dividend threshold than shareholders and thus leads
to higher regulatory optimal coupon payments on the CoCo bond.
Social welfare
From a social point of view, the value of taxes collected from a SIFI have to be added to its
regulatory value. In Appendix A.1.4 we obtain closed form solutions for the social values of the
bank before and after conversion, and the maximization problem that solves for the optimal
conversion threshold and the optimal amount of CoCo to be issued.
Proposition 1.6. When the only benefits of debt are tax subsidies, CoCo bonds are socially
suboptimal and the optimal long-term financing mode for a SIFI remains 100% equity.
Appendix A.1.1 provides the proof for the above proposition. The intuition is that although
CoCo bonds can be converted into equity in times of distress, their only benefit comes from
the tax subsidies they provide. Taxes that are paid by the bank are included in its social value,
so there is no social benefit to CoCo bonds. This makes CoCo bonds socially suboptimal, even
though they can be converted into equity in the event of SIFI’s distress.
1.5 Numerical illustration
In this section, we illustrate our results with an example. Table 1.1 reports the base case
parameters we assume for our model. Specifically, we set µ= 0.15, σ= 0.09, r = 0.03, θ = 0.35,
and γ= 2.
1.5.1 No tax-advantage of debt
When there are no tax subsidies to debt instruments, the optimal financing is 100% equity.
Then the only optimizing parameter is the dividend threshold. Table 1.2 summarizes our
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results for the privately and socially optimal dividend thresholds when there is no security
re-issuance.
When there is no re-issuance, equity holders choose to distribute dividends faster than reg-
ulators. Thus the dividend threshold set by equity holders is not socially optimal. With our
base case parameters the regulatory optimal dividend threshold is about 4.4% higher than the
privately optimal threshold. As Figure 1.3 shows, the higher the social costs of default are, the
higher the difference between the privately and the socially optimal dividend thresholds will
be.
1.5.2 Tax-advantage of debt
Straight debt
When interest payments on straight debt provide tax subsidies to the bank, the two optimizing
parameters are the dividend threshold and the amount of coupon payment. In Table 1.3
we summarize our results for these two values when they are chosen by different parties:
shareholders (that can be committed or uncommitted on dividend policy), regulators, and
social planner.
Table 1.3 is an illustration of our results in Propositions 1.3- 1.5. When shareholders cannot
commit on their dividend policy, they choose the dividend threshold that maximizes the value
of equity rather than the whole value of the bank. Table 1.3 shows that shareholders choose
a much lower dividend threshold than regulators. Since dividends are distributed out of the
bank much faster, the probability that the level of cash reserves hit zero increases and thus the
debt capacity of the bank decreases. That is why, as demonstrated in Table 1.3, the optimal
level of straight debt for shareholders is lower than the regulatory optimal level. Moreover,
Table 1.3 shows that if shareholders were to commit on the future dividend threshold, they
could substantially increase the debt capacity of the bank by choosing to distribute dividends
at a much higher level of cash reserves. However since they do not internalize the social
cost of default, the amount of debt they would like to issue is higher than what is optimal for
regulators. Commitment, combined with the external cost of default, leads to an even higher
dividend threshold and a lower coupon payment for regulators. Assuming higher expected
costs of default, along with commitment, regulators can further increase the initial social value
of the bank; however the main benefit of regulation is to allow shareholders to commit. The
commitment increases the initial social value of the bank from 4.658 to 4.944, an increase of
6.2%. Assuming the social cost of default, increases the social value of the SIFI by a further 1%
from 4.944 to 4.996.
When taking into account the value of the taxes paid by the SIFI, the optimal amount of
straight debt is zero. The initial social value of 5.00 when the SIFI is 100% equity financed
is higher than the initial social value in the cases of uncommitted shareholders, committed
shareholders, and regulators by about 7.3%, 1.1% and 0.08% respectively. This shows that even
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though debt can be optimal for shareholders and even regulators, it decreases the value of the
SIFI dramatically from a social point of view. Since taxes that are paid by SIFI are included in
the social value of the bank, there is no advantage in issuing debt.
Figure 1.4 shows how dividend threshold changes with the coupon. The dashed line represents
the case of a regulated SIFI. The solid line and the dot-dashed line represent the cases of
uncommitted shareholders and committed shareholders respectively. Interest payments
draw cash out of SIFI’s cash reserves when the marginal value of cash is higher than one. On
the other hand, tax savings on coupon payments help cash build up faster inside the bank.
Figure 1.4 shows that for our benchmark case, the latter is dominated both for committed
shareholders and regulators. Thus with higher coupon payments, dividend payments are
postponed. However when shareholders cannot commit on the future dividend threshold,
increasing the coupon payment first increases and then decreases the dividend threshold. This
means that increasing the debt coupon payment beyond some point, makes the increased
tax savings the dominant factor in deciding the dividend threshold. For any given level of c
the dividend threshold chosen by shareholders is lower than the regulatory optimal threshold.
Uncommitted equity holders distribute dividends faster than what would have been optimal
for regulators because they do not internalize the social costs of SIFI’s failure and because they
can not commit on future dividend threshold.
Figure 1.5 shows how dividend threshold changes when changing the main parameters of the
model: profitability of the bank, volatility of the cash flows and tax rate. For each parameter
we study three different levels of coupon payment (c = 5%, c = 7%, c = 9%). As panel A
shows higher profitability allows for faster distribution of dividends both for regulators and
committed shareholders. When the bank is more profitable, cash reserves build up faster
in the bank and thus dividends can be paid out at lower thresholds. For shareholders, the
dividend threshold first increases and then decreases with profitability and for any given level
of coupon payment. Panel B shows that the riskier the bank, the higher the probability of
cash reserves hitting zero. This leads to a higher required dividend threshold for a riskier
bank by shareholders and regulators for any given level of coupon payment. Higher tax rates
decrease the dividend threshold as shown in panel C. This is the case for both regulators and
shareholders and for any given level of coupon payment. In all cases, the dividend threshold
for committed shareholders is higher than the dividend threshold for shareholders but lower
than the one for regulators.
Figure 1.6 shows how optimal amount of straight debt changes with profitability of assets
in place, volatility of cash flows and SIFI’s tax rate for shareholders (solid line), committed
shareholders (dot-dashed line), and regulators (dashed line). Higher profitability and lower
volatility increase the debt capacity of the bank. Higher tax rates increase the benefit of debt
and thus increase the amount of debt that trades off its costs and benefits. As discussed
commitment on the future dividend threshold along with the limited liability on the social
cost of SIFI’s failure, allows committed equity holders to choose a higher coupon payment
than both shareholders and regulators no matter the parameter values.
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CoCo bonds
When a SIFI can issue CoCo bonds, coupon payments, conversion threshold and dividend
pay-out thresholds before and after conversion have to be chosen. Table 1.4 summarizes
the financing and pay-out policy of a SIFI with base case parameters of Table 1.1 chosen by
shareholders, regulators and social planner. The table shows how interest payments delay the
distribution of dividends before conversion. After conversion the dividend threshold is always
lower than before conversion. Similar to the last case, since shareholders can not commit on
the future dividend threshold, they choose a much lower pay-out threshold than regulators
by maximizing the value of equity after the CoCo bond has been issued. This decreases the
debt capacity of the bank. The amount of coupon payment chosen by shareholders is 11.7%
compared to 14.6% for regulators. Shareholders choose to distribute dividends out of the
bank when cash reserves are at a level of 0.375 whilst regulators do not allow for any dividend
distribution before cash reserves hit a level of 0.688. This shows how commitment postpones
dividends and allows to save more on taxes by increasing the debt capacity of the bank.
Comparing Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 shows how the conversion feature of the CoCo bond in-
creases the debt capacity of the bank both for shareholders and regulators. For our benchmark
case parameters shareholders pay 11.7% on the CoCo bond whilst they only pay 10% on the
straight debt. Regulators choose to pay a continuous coupon of 14.6% on the CoCo bond
compared to the 13% they pay on the straight debt. Figure 1.7 shows that this statement holds
for different levels of profitability, volatility of bank’s cash flows, and tax rate.17
To see whether or not this increased debt capacity is beneficiary, we calculate the total value
to shareholders at time zero (the sum of the value of equity and debt minus the initial cash
injection into the bank) for both straight and CoCo bonds cases. The 11.7% CoCo bond gives a
total initial value to shareholders of 4.11. The initial total value to shareholders with a 10%
straight debt is 3.92, which shows a decrease of almost 5% compared to the CoCo case. We can
also calculate the total initial value to regulators (the sum of the regulatory value of the bank
and the value of debt minus the initial cash injection into the bank) for both straight debt
and CoCo cases. The initial value to regulators is 4.26 with the 14.56% CoCo bonds, whilst the
12.95% straight debt leads to an initial value of only 4.14, which shows a decrease of almost 3%
compared to the case of CoCo bonds. Figure 1.8 shows how the value to regulators remains
greater with CoCo bonds compared to straight debt, by changing the values of the main model
parameters (profitability, volatility, tax rate and external cost of default).17
Figure 1.9 shows how the optimal conversion threshold changes with the main parameters
of the model.17 It decreases with profitability and tax rate, and increases with volatility. Con-
version occurs at a higher level of cash reserves when the bank is less profitable, more risky
or when the tax subsidies of debt are lower. Moreover, the conversion threshold increases
when SIFI’s failure is socially more costly. This means that regulators consider the SIFI to be in
17 To save space these results have only been demonstrated for regulators. The results for shareholders are
qualitatively similar.
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distress at higher levels of cash reserves when its failure is more costly to the society.
Figure 1.10 shows both the dividend threshold and the amount of coupon payment that
are optimally chosen by shareholders (solid lines) and regulators (dashed lines) for a given
CoCo contract. In addition to our benchmark case, in Figure A.1 in the Appendix, we do the
comparison between shareholders and regulators choices of coupon payment and dividend
threshold for different values of the model parameters (profitability, cash flow volatility, tax
rate and external cost of failure).18 Regulators choose a much higher dividend threshold than
shareholders. Since they distribute dividends at a lower speed, they can issue a CoCo bond
with a bigger coupon payment. This is why we observe that the level of privately optimal
coupon payment is smaller than the regulatory one. Dividends and coupons are both cash
that are distributed outside of the the bank, the difference is that interest payments are tax
deductible whilst dividends are not. Postponing dividend payments, allows for bigger coupon
payments which in turn allow for more tax savings and thus create value. This means that if
shareholders could commit to receive dividends later, they could have benefited more from
the tax subsidies by issuing a higher coupon CoCo bond.
Figure 1.10 also shows how the optimal coupon payment and dividend threshold change by
changing the conversion threshold for both shareholders and regulators. A higher conversion
threshold means that the CoCo bond is converted into equity at a faster rate (at higher levels
of cash reserves). Since the cushion against the default is triggered faster, the bank can make
bigger interest payments on the CoCo bond. This is the case for both shareholders and
regulators. Coupon payments can be bigger if they stop faster. At the same time, the bigger
coupon rates postpone dividend pay-outs, that is why both private and regulatory dividend
thresholds increase by increasing the conversion threshold.
Comparing the total initial values with CoCo bonds and with straight debt, we observe that
the conversion feature of CoCo bonds that is triggered when the bank is in distress and can
delay SIFI’s failure, creates value to shareholders and regulators; however from a social point
of view the optimal amount of CoCo bonds is zero.
1.6 Conclusion
In many jurisdictions, financial regulators have decided to allow large banks to count CoCo
bonds as part of their regulatory capital. As a result, a vast academic literature has started to
study the optimal design (and the pricing) of such hybrid securities. Our paper differs from
this literature in two important ways: first, we consider liquidity problems as the major source
of default for banks. Instead of using the Merton/Leland type of structural models of corporate
finance, where these liquidity issues are neglected, we use a cash management model in the
spirit of Radner and Shepp (1996). In that model, banks default not because they are insolvent,
but because they cannot find enough liquidity in the market. A second difference with the
18Changing the external cost of failure only affects the regulators choice.
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previous literature is that we adopt a social welfare perspective, in which the tax advantage of
debt (a mere transfer between taxpayers and bank’s shareholders) does not create any value.
In this set up, we show that CoCo bonds, like any form of long-term debt, are a socially
inefficient way of financing SIFIs. For CoCo bonds to be socially useful, additional ingredients
have to be incorporated into the analysis, such as adverse selection (which may explain why
equity is more expensive than debt for banks), preference for liquidity (but it is not clear why
CoCo bonds should be more liquid than other securities), or an hypothetical disciplining
role of debt, whose empirical magnitude still needs to be established. The reason for which
CoCo bonds have been adopted in many jurisdictions may therefore be purely political. CoCo
bonds reduce both the probability of default (which is good for regulators) and the taxes paid
by banks (which is good for the financial industry). However this is done at the expense of
taxpayers, who do not seem to be aware of the situation.
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Table 1.1: Base case parameter values
Symbol Interpretation Value
µ The profitability of bank’s operations 0.15
σ The volatility of bank’s operations 0.09
r The risk-free rate 0.03
θ Corporate tax rate 0.35
γ Social cost of SIFI’s failure 2
Table 1.2: No tax advantage - optimal dividend threshold
Privately optimal Socially optimal
No re-issuance 0.182 0.190
Table 1.3: Optimal policy choices and capital structure with straight debt
Shareholders Regulators Social welfare
Uncom. Com.
Div. threshold 0.30 0.617 0.621 0.196
Coupon payment 10.0% 13.3% 13.0% 0
Social value 19 4.658 4.944 4.996 5.0
Table 1.4: Optimal policy choices and capital structure with CoCo bonds
Shareholders Regulators Social welfare
After conv. div. thresh. 0.182 0.190 0.196
Coupon payment 11.7% 14.6% 0
Before conv. div. thresh. 0.375 0.688 -
Conv. thresh. 0.058 0.061 -
Social value 4.806 4.998 5.0
19The initial social value is the social value of the SIFI at time zero given by (1.15) and evaluated at the dividend
thresholds and coupon payments chosen by shareholders, committed shareholders, and regulators respectively.
The level of cash reserves at time zero is equal to the relevant dividend threshold in each case.
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Figure 1.1: CDS price - no tax-advantage of debt
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The figure shows p(m) (the CDS price in basis points) as a function of cash reserves m for two
different levels of dividend threshold: m∗(solid line) and m∗R (dashed line). Parameter choice
reported in Table 1.1.
Figure 1.2: CDS price - straight debt case
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The figure shows P (m,c) (CDS price in bps) as a function of cash reserves m for different levels
of straight debt coupon (c = 0, c = 3%, c = 7%, c = 10%). Parameter choice reported in Table
1.1.
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Figure 1.3: Effect of social costs of SIFI’s failure
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The figure shows the difference between privately and socially optimal dividend thresholds
(m∗R −m∗) as a function of external cost of SIFI’s failure.
Figure 1.4: Dividend threshold - straight debt case
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The figure shows the dividend thresholds as functions of coupon payment for: equity holders
(solid line), committed equity holders (dot-dashed line), and regulators (dashed line).
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Figure 1.8: Optimal value to regulators
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The figure shows the optimal regulatory value of the bank with straight debt (solid lines) and
CoCo debt (dashed lines) as functions of profitability, volatility, tax rate and external cost of
failure.
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Figure 1.9: Optimal conversion threshold
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The figure shows the optimal conversion threshold as functions of profitability, volatility, tax
rate and external cost of failure.
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Figure 1.10: Optimal capital structure and pay-out policy - CoCo bond
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The figure shows how the optimal dividend threshold and the optimal coupon payment of
the CoCo bond change with conversion threshold. Solid lines and dashed lines represent
shareholders and regulators respectively.
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2 Bail-in Plan and Macroeconomic Con-
ditions
2.1 Introduction
Since the onset of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the stability of the financial system has
been the subject of many discussions by policy makers and academics. These discussions
mostly focus on banks or financial institutions that are too big and too inter-connected to fail.
As the experiences of the collapse of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers (among others) show,
the failure of a Systemically Important Financial Institution ("SIFI") has significant disruptive
effects on other financial firms and on the financial system as a whole. The costs of these
negative externalities are not borne by the SIFI’s shareholders. When banks do not or can not
recapitalize, financial authorities have no option but to bail them out using public funds to
assure the stability of the financial system.
The social costs and adverse incentive effects of bank’s bail-outs have motivated the pro-
posals for a "bail-in" requirement as a possible solution to the too big to fail ("TBTF") prob-
lem. A bail-in plan is defined as a pre-determined contract that results in an automatic
self-recapitalization of a financial institution when it faces financial difficulties. The objective
of a bail-in plan is thus to eliminate the risk of banks’ failures without any equity support from
the government. Under a bail-in plan, certain non-equity obligations of the bank transform
into equity at the point of a pre-defined threshold so that the bank can absorb operating losses,
recapitalize and continue its operations. This means that debt to equity conversion is an
essential feature of any bail-in plan. Additionally for the bail-in plan to be effective, the bank
should be able to repeat this procedure in any future cases of financial distress.
The bail-in mechanism, its possible designing options and its implications on banks’ policy
choices have been the subject of many discussions including Coffee (2010), Anderson (2011),
Huertas (2011), Ötker-Robe et al. (2011), De Grauwe (2013), and Zhou et al. (2012). However,
to the best of my knowledge, no theoretical work has been done to analyse the quantitative
aspects of a bail-in plan and its effects on banks’ optimal capital structure and policies. A
large body of theoretical literature analyse the debt to equity conversion feature by studying
different forms of contingent convertible ("CoCo") securities without addressing distress
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situations that the firm can face post conversion. My objective in this paper is twofold. First
by using the debt to equity conversion in the context of a restructuring contract that is set
ex-ante and is triggered when banks are in distress and their access to outside financing is
limited, I eliminate the risk of inefficient bank liquidations. Second, I study banks’ optimal
capital structure decisions and pay-out and financing policies in the presence of such a plan. I
also study the effects of the design of the bail-in contract on these decisions.
To do so, I formulate a dynamic structural model in which financial institutions face stochastic
financing frictions, default costs and taxation. Banks hold a portfolio of risky assets and can
build up risk-free liquid reserves. The failure of the bank in my model triggers significant
disruptions in the financial markets and is thus to be prevented at all times. Committing to
a bail-in plan, banks issue some contingent convertible debt that converts into equity only
when they face financial distress and outside equity financing is not possible. Banks choose
their capital structure and their pay-out, and refinancing policies to maximize shareholders
value.
As customary in the contingent capital literature, I assume that the CoCo debt converts into
a pre-determined fraction (which sets the conversion ratio) of the bank’s equity when a pre-
determined threshold (which sets the conversion level) is triggered. There are, however, two
main differences between my paper and this literature. First, unlike the prior contributions
on CoCo debt, I assume that banks face fixed costs of outside financing, and thus continu-
ous injection of capital inside the bank is not possible. In the presence of these financing
frictions liquidity management becomes crucial: banks retain earnings to build up liquid
buffers that they can use to absorb losses and to save on the costs associated with outside
liquidity. Moreover, I assume financing frictions are stochastic. Banks adapt their policies to
the fluctuations in the financing costs and thus their policy choices become time dependent.
I assume that issuing CoCo debt in the bad state is costlier than issuing equity in the good
state but is less costly than issuing equity in the bad state. Second, upon conversion which
happens only when equity financing is not available, banks replace the converted debt with
newly issued CoCo debt of the same terms. This issuance provides banks with new capital and
a new cushion against future losses and eliminates the risk of inefficient failures.
The main results of my model are as follows. First, the optimal conversion threshold is zero.
Since conversion is followed by costly reissuance of CoCo debt, it is optimal to postpone it as
long as possible. Thus shareholders optimally wait until the bank runs out of cash to trigger
conversion. If there is a change in equity financing conditions from bad to good before cash
reserves are depleted, the bank can issue equity which is less costly. If not, the bank can
convert and reissue CoCo debt at the last possible moment to save on the discounted expected
financing costs and the carry cost of cash.
Second, bail-in plans affect the recapitalization behaviour of banks in good times. In my
model, different states of the world are characterized by different investor demand for bank
securities. Whilst in the good state of the world investors have an appetite for bank equity,
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in the bad state CoCo investments provide an alternative for investors who shy away from
equity markets. As Bolton et al. (2013) show when financing frictions are time varying, it may
be optimal for shareholders to raise new equity funds before they run out of cash in the fear of
the worsening of financing conditions. By providing a new source of outside liquidity when
banks do not have access to equity financing, bail-in plans alleviate the severity of financing
constraints in the bad state. This decreases shareholders incentives to recapitalize in the
good state and drives down the threshold below which shareholders raise new funds. When
choosing its recapitalization threshold, the bank balances the higher costs of liquidity in the
bad state with the carry cost of cash and the refinancing costs in the good state. Therefore
the recapitalization threshold increases with the difference between the costs associated with
equity financing in the good state and CoCo debt financing in the bad state, and the probability
of a jump to the bad state. Moreover the design of the CoCo contract has direct effects on the
recapitalization policy in the good state. Notably for the same level of coupon payment, higher
conversion ratios increase equity dilution at conversion and thus provide shareholders with
more incentives to recapitalize in the good state.
A third result of the paper is to show that banks hold smaller liquid buffers when they commit
to a bail-in plan. When outside financing is scarce, keeping cash inside the bank acts as
a form of risk management. Shareholders choose the target level of cash in each state by
balancing the costs of holding liquid buffer versus the refinancing and default costs. Bail-
in plans eliminate the costs associated with inefficient liquidations, and thus lead to lower
precautionary motives to build up cash buffers. Although the bank does not default when it
runs out of cash in the bad state, shareholders still lose a fraction of their stake in the bank at
conversion. When conversion is more dilutive, shareholders have incentives to build up more
cash to avoid conversion. Thus for a given coupon payment, the target levels of cash increase
with conversion ratio. Additionally the higher costs associated with CoCo debt financing
compared to equity financing increase the value of the cash inside the bank in the bad state
and thus increase the target level of cash in this state compared to the good state. Therefore
banks hold countercylical cash buffers.
Next, I show that depending on their design, bail-in plans can eliminate risk-taking incentives.
When shareholders face financing frictions, the precautionary demand for cash leads to equity
values which are increasing and concave in the level of cash reserves. This is the case in
Décamps et al. (2011), Bolton et al. (2011, 2015), or Hugonnier and Morellec (2016) where
shareholders do not have any risk-taking incentives. When financing conditions are time
varying, such as in Bolton et al. (2013), for low levels of cash reserves in the good state of
the world, the bank which is concerned about losing its access to outside equity may find it
optimal to exercise its option to time equity markets. Since equity refinancing cost is fixed,
equity issuance is lumpy. For a low enough level of cash the motive to time the equity market
overcomes the precautionary need for cash and can lead to a local convexity in the value of
equity in the good state. With a bail-in plan in place, shareholders can face conversion rather
than liquidation if they do not recapitalize before the window of cheap equity financing is
closed. Depending on the cost of CoCo issuance and the dilution they face upon conversion,
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the precautionary motive can dominate and thus lead to a globally concave equity value in
the good state. For a given coupon payment, the higher the conversion ratio the higher is the
level of the cash reserves that separates the concave and convex regions of the equity value.
Lastly, I show that unless the conversion is significantly dilutive, shareholders adjust their
optimal capital structure such that the optimal level of debt commands a zero recapitalization
threshold in the good state. Moreover this optimal leverage leads to a globally concave equity
value and thus entirely eliminates any risk-taking incentives. My results show that bail-in
plans have the potential to decrease recapitalizations and cash buffers within the banking
system. However since they eliminate the costs of liquidation and the private incentives for
risk taking they can be socially optimal.
My paper relates to the literature that examines the design features of contingent capital
bonds and their impacts on bank capital structure and policy choices. CoCo bonds have been
first introduced by Mark Flannery (2005) as bonds that convert into common equity or are
written-off when some pre-defined threshold is reached. CoCo bonds have gained growing
attention during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 as a possible solution for the inadequacy
of bank capital in bad times. Since their introductions, numerous studies have tried to
formulate valuation models and address the key design issues of CoCo bonds. See Pennacchi
et. al. (2010), Glasserman and Nouri (2010), Albul et al. (2013), Sundaresan and Wang (2015),
McDonald (2010), Barucci and Del Viva (2012, 2013), Chen et al. (2013), Flannery (2009), and
Calomiris and Herring (2013) among others. These proposals usually vary with regard to two
main features of a CoCo bond: the conversion trigger (which determines the probability of
conversion or conversion risk) and the conversion ratio (which determines burden sharing
between shareholders and debt holders).
All of these models assume that firms do not keep cash reserves because they can continuously
issue equity at no cost. In these models default occurs for solvency reasons. On the contrary
in my model, I assume banks face time varying financing conditions and can have problems
accessing equity markets. When outside financing is costly, banks have incentives to build up
liquid buffers within the firm. In my model, if banks were to default it would have been for
liquidity and not solvency reasons. Additionally prior studies do not allow for the reissuance
of the CoCo bond and thus can not address the too big to fail problem after the existing CoCo
debt has been fully converted. In my model, committing to a bail-in plan, the bank replaces its
converted CoCo debt with new debt of the same terms to preserve its cushion against future
losses. The bail-in plan in my model acts as a restructuring contract that is set ex-ante in order
to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidations and thus can address the TBTF problem.
The design of my CoCo contract is most closely related to the design of the countercyclical
contingent capital introduced by Barucci and Del Viva (2012). They analyse the case of a con-
tingent capital that is only converted to common shares in poor macroeconomic conditions.
In their model, the operating profit of the bank is affected by macroeconomic conditions but
its access to outside financing which is assumed to be costless is not. The recent financial
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crisis has shown that the appetite for equity investing dries up during poor macroeconomic
conditions. In my model, unlike Barucci and Del Viva (2012) poor economic conditions are
characterized by more severe financing frictions. Thus countercyclical CoCo bond is defined
as a CoCo debt that converts into equity only when the distressed bank does not have access
to outside equity financing.
Another strand of literature on CoCo debt analyses the incentives created by CoCo bonds.
These include Chen et. al. (2013), Hilscher and Raviv (2014), Pennachi (2010), Berg and Kaserer
(2015) Barucchi and Del Viva (2012), Sundaresan and Wang (2015), Koziol and Lawrenz (2012),
and Martynova and Perotti (2015). Although different designs of these models give rise to
different results, they all agree that the design of the contingent capital is detrimental to its
effects on banks policies and risk-taking incentives. In my model, I show that when sharehold-
ers choose the optimal level of CoCo debt in their capital structure, for any conversion ratio
the optimal capital structure significantly decreases or fully eliminates risk-taking incentives,
but also decreases incentives to recapitalize and keep cash within the bank.
My model also relates to the papers that study firms’ capital structure and financial decisions
when their access to outside liquidity is costly. Most of these papers including Décamps et
al. (2011), Bolton et al. (2011), Hartman-Glaser and Milbradt (2014), Hugonnier et al. (2015),
Décamps et al. (2016) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2016) assume financing frictions are
constant. Equity value is globally concave in these models since inefficient liquidations give
incentives to precautionary cash holdings. Moreover except for Hugonnier and Morellec
(2016), firms in these models are all equity financed. Introducing time varying financing
frictions á la Bolton et al. (2013) leads to local convexity and thus risk loving behaviour for
shareholders. Della Seta et al. (2017) study another form of convexity that is observed in the
value of equity close to financial distress due to the roll over losses induced by short-term debt
financing. By introducing countercylical CoCo bond into banks’ capital structure, I provide
banks with another source of financing that can help ease their access to outside liquidity.
So whilst in all other models with cash holdings firms face liquidation at some point, the
bank in my model avoids liquidation by converting and reissuing the debt obligations when it
faces financial distress and has no access to outside liquidity. The bank adapts its financial
and risk management decisions depending on the design of the CoCo debt, i.e. the pay-off
shareholders expect to receive at conversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. Section 2.3 derives closed
form solutions for the value of equity and debt and studies optimal bank policy choices and
capital structure in a benchmark case where the bank has only access to a traditional straight
debt and thus can default. Section 2.4 studies the design of a bail-in contract and characterizes
the bank’s policies and capital structure decisions when it has committed to such a contract.
Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Model
The subject of my study is a SIFI (I use the terms "SIFI", "bank", and "firm" interchangeably)
that I model as a firm that transforms a fixed volume D of risk-free deposits into a fixed volume
A of risky assets. Since the bank is systemically important its failure does not only entail losses
to its own shareholders, but also triggers extreme negative externalities and major disruptions
to the financial market as a whole. So the SIFI character in my model is very stylized; its closure
entails a social cost that is not internalized by shareholders. This cost is so significant that it is
optimal to avoid SIFI’s failure at all times.1
I assume that the bank’s access to capital markets is not perfect, so a profitable bank holds cash
in the fear of future liquidity problems. Specifically the bank needs to build a precautionary
cash buffer to cover operating losses to avoid closure when outside financing is costly. No
dividends are distributed outside the bank before the cumulative performance of the bank is
sufficiently high and its total cash reserves add up to a target level. Thus the bank’s balance
sheet is as follows:
Risky assets A Deposits D
Cash reserves w Market finance
Therefore the liability structure of the bank consists of market financing and deposits. Market
financing can include equity and market debt. Bank’s deposits have a face value of D and are
insured against bank failure. I assume that the bank is required to make a continuous payment
of CD to maintain its deposit accounts. CD includes the interest payment to depositors, the
deposit insurance costs and the costs of servicing depositors.
I model random cash flows generated over time by the SIFI’s operations (net earnings) as an
arithmetic Brownian Motion with positive drift µ and volatility σ defined over a complete
probability space (Ω,F ,P). Specifically the cumulative cash flow process R evolves according
to
dRt = (1−θ)(µd t +σd Zt ), R0 = 0. (2.1)
The process Z ≡ {Zt , t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the filtration {F ; t ≥
0} that models the flow of information. θ is the rate at which the bank pays taxes on corporate
income. Operations of the bank’s risky assets can involve losses dRt < 0 as well as profits
dRt > 0.
All investors in my model are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate is r . I assume that management
acts in the best interest of shareholders and that there are no corporate governance problems
such as moral hazard and asset substitution. However two frictions are present in my set-up:
1I do not explicitly model these external costs. However I implicitly assume that such costs are so high that it is
socially optimal to avoid them.
46
2.2. Model
first, there is an opportunity cost of keeping cash inside the bank; I assume internally held
cash does not earn any interest.2 Second, the bank operates in an economy characterized by
stochastic financing conditions. Specifically, I assume that there are two observable states
of the world i = G ,B . Each state provides the bank with different financing opprtunities.
Similar to Bolton et al. (2013), and Della Seta et al. (2017), in the good state G, shareholders
have access to outside equity markets at a fixed cost γE . In the bad state B, the market for
external equity financing shuts down or equivalently the cost of raising outside equity funds
is too high. However unlike the previous models with stochastic financing frictions, in this
state the bank in my model has access to a new source of outside liquidity in the form of
countercyclical contingent capital debt ("CoCo debt"). Specifically when the bank has no
access to equity markets, it can raise outside funds by issuing CoCo debt at a fixed cost γC > γE .
A CoCo debt is a hybrid security that automatically converts to equity when a predetermined
threshold is triggered. In addition to this general characteristic, the CoCo debt in my model
has a countercyclical feature: it only converts to equity when there is no access to outside
equity markets, i.e. in the bad state B.
I design a CoCo debt instrument as a subordinated debt with continuous coupon payments
CC D ≥ 0 which is issued at par with a face value of C D and an infinite maturity. So CoCo debt
holders are entitled to receive CC D for as long as the CoCo is not converted. This means that
if conversion was never triggered, the CoCo debt would act as a standard debt contract with
infinite maturity. However, as soon as SIFI’s cash reserves fall to/below a pre-determined
level W¯ , the coupon payments to current CoCo holders stop and they instead receive a fixed
fraction α of the bank’s equity. I assume that the bank’s capital structure consists of deposits,
CoCo debt and equity. Upon conversion, depositors who are the most senior claim-holders
do not bear any losses and continue their right to receive the constant stream of interest
payments; a fraction α of equity is allocated to CoCo debt holders, and equity holders are
entitled to the remaining 1−α fraction of the bank’s equity.
The state switches from i to j with probability of pii j where i , j =G ,B and i 6= j . Except from
the costs associated with security issuance, the characteristics of the bank remain the same
in both states of the world. Thereby I can single out the effects of stochastic costs of outside
financing on the bank’s optimal policy choices. To choose the optimal level of liquid asset
holdings the bank balances the lower returns on liquid reserves inside the bank with their
liquidity benefits. The benefits of inside liquidity depends on the costs of accessing outside
liquidity and thus is state dependant. Consequently the bank’s optimal pay-out policy is also
state dependant.
To deal with the high social costs associated with SIFI’s failure, I model a default-free set-up.
To achieve such a set-up in an economy with financing frictions, I define a pre-determined
plan that keeps SIFI’s cash buffer above zero at all times.3 When in state G, the cost of equity
2The idea, as in Décamps et al. (2011), is that the managers of the bank can engage in wasteful activities when
the bank holds cash or other liquid assets. The resulting agency costs effectively reduce the rate of return on
internally held liquid assets from r to r −ρ. For simplicity I assume r = ρ as in Hugonnier and Morellec (2016).
3A typical approach for models studying the capital structure of a firm, that has been applied by Albul et al.
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issuance is not too high. Thus raising new equity funds at a cost can maintain the positivity of
SIFI’s cash reserves and thus its survival. When banks recapitalize willingly, the conversion of
debt into equity is not necessary. However, in the bad state of the world (e.g. during a financial
crisis) equity investors with a positive demand for SIFI’s capital are scarce or alternatively the
cost of equity issuance is very high. Under such circumstances, the SIFI might not be able to
maintain its positive cash reserves if there is no alternative to equity financing. So the bank
can be forced into liquidation following a series of negative shocks. To avoid this, I define a
bail-in plan. Under this plan, in state B the conversion of the CoCo debt into equity is triggered
as soon as the bank’s level of cash reserves hit some low threshold. Whenever the conversion
is triggered the whole amount of debt is converted into equity. However, the SIFI reissues
new CoCo debt with the same characteristics (coupon payment, conversion threshold and
conversion ratio) to replace the converted debt, leading to a capital injection. Such a bail-in
contract can alternatively be regarded as a form of insurance policy that pays off in the bad
state of the world. In this case, the coupon payments are considered as continuous insurance
premiums paid by the SIFI to the insurer. On the other hand when SIFI does not have access to
equity markets, the insurer commits to providing liquidity for the bank in lieu of newly issued
CoCo debt and a fraction of the equity of the bank.4 The conversion of the CoCo debt and the
injection of new capital into the bank upon the reissuance of countercyclical CoCo ensure that
the level of bank’s cash reserves stays positive even when it does not have access to outside
equity markets. With this dynamic mechanism in place, the bank stays immune to any future
events of failure even after the conversion of its initially issued CoCo debt.
Although the conversion of debt into equity is an essential feature of the bail-in plan, the
converted debt has to be replaced by new debt in order to preserve the bank’s cushion against
future losses. I consider that the bank commits to a stationary CoCo debt structure. Specifically,
at conversion the bank replaces the converted CoCo debt with new CoCo debt of identical
coupon, conversion ratio and conversion threshold. Since the cost of reissuing the CoCo debt
is fixed, the bank finds it optimal to issue enough debt to restore its cash buffer to its target
level after paying the reissuance costs.
The SIFI in my model can increase its internal liquidity either by retaining earnings or by
raising new equity funds in the good state or new CoCo debt in the bad state. Given the model’s
assumptions, the bank’s cash reserves W ≡ {wt , t ≥ 0} evolve according to
d wt = (1−θ)((µ−C )d t +σd Zt )−dLt +d Ht −d X t . (2.2)
In this equation C =CC D+CD is the combined interest payment that the bank has to pay on its
(2013), Barrucci and Del Viva (2012, 2013) among others, is to assume that the default of a firm is the result of the
optimizing behaviour of its shareholders and therefore strategic. Whilst this may be a reasonable assumption
for non-financial corporations, it is probably less appropriate in the context of financial institutions, especially
banks. In my model a profitable financial institution may be forced to close down due to liquidity problems. This
non-strategic default is what I am seeking to avoid at all times.
4This type of contingent capital contracts which is also called capital insurance is discussed in Kashyap et al.
(2008) and Hanson et al. (2011).
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deposits and CoCo debt. Lt is a non decreasing process that represents cumulative dividend
payments to equity holders. I do not make any restrictions on L apart from assuming that it
is {F ; t ≥ 0}-adapted and right continuous, and that it is non-decreasing, reflecting limited
liability (non-negative payments to shareholders). Ht and X t are also non decreasing adapted
processes that represent SIFI’s cumulative external financing and SIFI’s cumulative external
issuance costs respectively. This equation shows that the bank’s liquid reserves increase with
after tax earnings and outside financing and decrease with coupon payments to debt holders,
dividend payments to shareholders and the costs associated with external financing.
The bank may be subject to leverage requirements. I define the debt ratio of the bank as the
bank’s book value of liabilities (including deposits and market debt) to its book value of assets
(including the book value of its risky assets and its cash reserves)
ϕ(w)= C D+D
w + (1−θ)µr
. (2.3)
For given face values of market debt and deposits, this debt ratio is decreasing in cash reserves,
and the bank attains its maximum debt ratio at its minimum level of liquid buffer. The
regulatory leverage of the bank (Tier 1 leverage ratio) is given by 1−ϕ(w) which represents the
ratio of the bank’s tangible equity to its book value of assets. When the bank initially issues
market debt it may be required by regulators to constrain its minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio to
a fixed levelΛ. This regulatory requirement is equivalent to
D+C D ≤ (1−Λ)(wmi n + (1−θ)µ
r
) (2.4)
where wmi n is the minimum expected level of the bank’s cash reserves.
Management chooses the bank’s pay-out and refinancing policies after the debt has been is-
sued to maximize the present value of the future dividends to shareholders net of the expected
costs of security issuance and capital injections. In the following, to better understand the
dynamic of the model, I first analyse the bank’s policy choices and its optimal capital structure
when it has only access to straight debt and equity and thus can default in the bad state of the
world. I will then build on the results from this benchmark case to analyse the bail-in plan that
provides a default-free set-up for a financial institution. Moreover, I will study the pay-out and
refinancing policies of a SIFI in the presence of such a plan.
2.3 Straight debt benchmark
In this section, I analyse a benchmark case in which the only source of market debt financing
available to the bank is straight debt. In the good state the costs of equity issuance is low
enough and the bank finds it optimal to recapitalize when inside liquidity drops to a certain
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level.5 In the bad state, the bank has no access to outside equity markets. When the bank
incurs losses, it uses its cash reserves to absorb these losses, thus the level of bank’s cash
reserves decreases and its debt ratio increases. Following a series of negative shocks, the bank’s
cash reserves can drop down to zero. If the bank is constrained to meet leverage regulatory
requirements, it can no longer borrow when it runs out of cash and thus is forced to liquidate.
Under these assumptions, I first analyse the values of bank’s equity and straight debt and then
characterize the policy choices of the bank and its optimal capital structure.
2.3.1 Valuing corporate securities
In the presence of financing frictions it is optimal for SIFIs to retain their earnings to build-up
inside liquidity. At the same time, keeping cash inside the bank is costly. I assume that the
opportunity cost of holding liquidity is constant. When the cash reserves are sufficiently high,
the marginal benefit of saving more cash is decreasing in the level of liquid reserves. This
coupled with the constant marginal cost of holding cash leads to the existence of a threshold
above which it is optimal to pay dividends, since the marginal benefits of cash inside and
outside the bank become equal. Since the cost of financing is state dependant, the target
pay-out threshold also depends on the state of the world. W ∗i denotes the dividend threshold
in state i = G ,B . Because outside financing is costlier in the bad state, I expect W ∗B >W ∗G .
This means that the bank holds a bigger cash buffer in the bad state than in the good state,
consistent with the evidence in Acharya et al. (2010) or Aspachs et al. (2005).
I assume that the straight debt pays a continuous coupon of CSD and has a face value equal to
SD . So the bank’s total interest payment is C =CD+CSD which includes the interest payments
to depositors as well as debt holders. I denote the values of bank’s equity in good and bad states
of the world as EG (w) and EB (w) respectively.6. Consider first state G in which recapitalization
is possible. There is a positive probability piGB that the state switches form G to B at any
moment. Upon this switch, the bank loses its access to outside liquidity. Because of this,
shareholders may have incentives to issue new equity before the cash buffer is depleted. Since
I assume a fixed cost of financing, for any level of liquid reserves smaller than W ∈ [0,W ∗G ],
the bank issues new equity to restore its cash reserves to the target level W ∗G . A positive W
means it is optimal for the bank to issue new equity before it runs out of liquid reserves.7 On
the other hand any cash in addition to W ∗G is paid out as a lump sum dividend to the bank’s
shareholders, since there is no benefit in keeping it inside the bank. This means that in state
G, the cash reserves evolve in [W ,W ∗G ]. In this region, it is optimal to retain earnings and thus
5In general, there exists a critical cost of issuance above which issuing securities is prohibitively costly and thus
the bank prefers to default. If the issuance costs are lower than this critical cost, shareholders prefer to issue new
shares and avoid bankruptcy. I assume here that the cost of issuing equity in the good (bad) state is lower (higher)
than this critical cost. See Décamps et. al. (2011) for more details.
6For tractability I omit the dependence of equity value on (C ,W ∗i ,W ).
7If there was only one state of the world, the equity issuance would have been delayed as much as possible
because of the costs associated with security issuance. So in a one state model with straight debt reissuance only
happens when the bank runs out of cash.
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equity value satisfies the following ODE :
r EG (w)=(1−θ)(µ−C )E ′G (w)
+ 1
2
(1−θ)2σ2E ′′G (w)+piGB (EB (w)−EG (w)).
(2.5)
The left hand side of this equation represents the required rate of return for investing in the
bank’s capital. The right hand side represents the expected change in the value of equity.
The first two terms represent the effects of cash savings and cash flow volatility. The last
term captures the effects of time varying financing frictions. This term is the product of the
probability of a state switch from good to bad and the change in the value of equity upon this
switch from EG (w) to EB (w).
Consider now the bad state of the world. In this state, the bank retains earnings in [0,W ∗B ],
where W ∗B >W ∗G . Financing frictions are very severe in this state, and it is never optimal for
shareholders to recapitalize. So the bank is forced into liquidation as soon as its cash reserves
are depleted. I assume that liquidation is inefficient and that the liquidation value of the risky
assets of the bank represent a fraction of their first best value. If φ ∈ (0,1] represents the costs
associated with liquidation, the liquidation value is given by
l= (1−φ) (1−θ)µ
r
.
Depositors are the most senior claim holders and in the event of liquidation get paid before
subordinated market debt holders. If the liquidation value is enough to repay the face value of
deposits, the residual is paid-out to debt holders. If not, the difference between the face value
of deposits and the liquidation value is covered by deposit insurance. In this case, depositors
are fully paid-out but debt holders receive nothing. I assume that the liquidation value of the
assets is smaller than the face value of the total debt (deposits plus market debt). This means
that the market debt is risky. When the bank is forced into liquidation, all proceeds accrue to
depositors and debt holders, and shareholders receive nothing.
Due to the time varying financing conditions the boundaries of the cash region are state
dependent. Whilst cash reserves evolve in [0,W ∗B ] in the bad state, they evolve only in [W ,W
∗
G ]
in the good state. If the state switches from bad to good when the level of cash reserves is
in the region of [0,W ], an immediate recapitalization restores the bank’s cash buffer to W ∗G .
This is because in the good state it is optimal for the bank to issue equity when its cash buffer
drops below W . On the other hand if the state switches from bad to good when w ∈ [W ∗G ,W ∗B ],
the bank distributes a lump sum of dividend equal to w −W ∗G since there is no benefit to
keeping any cash in addition to W ∗G inside the bank. So the cash buffer goes down to W
∗
G . As a
result, there are three different ODEs for the value of the equity in the bad state of the world
depending on the level of cash reserves:
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r EB (w)=

(1−θ)(µ−C ) E ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 E
′′
B (w)
+piBG (EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G −γE −EB (w)) w ∈ [0,W ]
(1−θ)(µ−C ) E ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 E
′′
B (w)
+piBG (EG (w)−EB (w)) w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
(1−θ)(µ−C ) E ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 E
′′
B (w)
+piBG (EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G −EB (w)) w ∈ (W ∗G ,W ∗B ]
(2.6)
The equations in (2.6) are similar to (2.5) except for the third terms on the right hand side
which capture the effects of a state switch from B to G. The difference comes from the fact
that the variation in the value of equity upon this state switch depends on the level of cash at
which this switch happens. Equity value changes from EB (w) to EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G −γE when
the switch occurs in the range of [0,W ] due to the immediate recapitalization. If the switch
occurs when the cash reserves are in the range of (W ,W ∗G ], the value of equity goes from EB (w)
to EG (w). If the state switches when the cash buffer is in the range of (W ∗G ,W
∗
B ], the value of
equity goes from EB (w) to EG (W ∗G )+ (w −W ∗G ) due to the instantaneous dividend distribution
in the good state.
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) are solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, in
both states of the world, at dividend threshold, the marginal value of the cash inside the bank
is equal to the marginal value of the cash outside the bank, so there is no benefit in retaining
more cash. Thus the bank distributes w −W ∗i as a lump sum of dividend, and for all w ÊW ∗i
we have
Ei (w)= Ei (W ∗i )+w −W ∗i .
After subtracting Ei (W ∗i ) from both sides, dividing by w −W ∗i , and taking the limit where w
goes to W ∗i , the following condition holds
E ′i (W
∗
i )= 1.
The dividend threshold that maximizes the value of equity is determined by the smooth
pasting condition (as in Dumas (1991)):
E ′′i (W
∗
i )= 0.
When the bank incurs losses, the level of cash reserves decreases and the marginal value of
cash inside the bank increases. Below a threshold, it can be optimal for the bank to issue new
equity. This only happens in the good state of the world since in the bad state the cost of equity
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issuance is too high or there is no demand for bank’s equity. So for any w ÉW in the good
state, the bank raises new funds. When the financing cost is fixed, it is optimal for the bank to
raise enough to reset its cash buffer to W ∗G . So
EG (W )= EG (W ∗G )− (W ∗G −W )−γE .
To recapitalize, shareholders wait until the marginal value of cash inside the bank is equal to
the marginal cost of raising new funds which is one. Thus
E ′G (W )= 1
should hold when W > 0.
In state B, outside financing is not available to the bank. Thus when the cash buffer is depleted,
the bank is forced into liquidation. Since I assume that the liquidation value of the bank is
smaller than the face value of the bank’s total debt, shareholders receive nothing in liquidation
and
EB (0)= 0
should hold.
In addition to these boundary conditions, I need to impose the continuity and smoothness
conditions at W and W ∗G to ensure that the different regions for the value of equity in the bad
state are smoothly pasted:
lim
w↓W ∗G
EB (w)= lim
w↑W ∗G
EB (w)
lim
w↓W ∗G
E ′B (w)= limw↑W ∗G
E ′B (w),
and
lim
w↓W
EB (w)= lim
w↑W
EB (w),
lim
w↓W
E ′B (w)= limw↑W E
′
B (w),
Consider next the value of straight debt SDi (w) (where I have dropped the dependence of
debt value on other arguments (C ,W ∗i ,W ) for tractability). Debt holders receive a contin-
uous coupon payment of CSD in both states of the world for as long as the level of bank’s
cash reserves is positive. In state G the bank retains earning for w ∈ [W ,W ∗G ] and optimally
recapitalizes when its cash buffer hits W . So in this state, the bank is never liquidated and the
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value of the straight debt in the earnings retention region satisfies:
r SDG (w)=CSD + (1−θ)(µ−C )SD ′G (w)
+ 1
2
(1−θ)2σ2SD ′′G (w)+piGB (SDB (w)−SDG (w)).
(2.7)
The left hand side of equation (2.7) is the rate of return required by straight debt holders. The
right hand side of the equation captures the total change in the value of the straight debt in the
good state. The first term is the coupon payment to debt holders. The second and the third
terms represent the effects of a change in cash reserves and cash flow volatility. The last term
captures the change in the value of straight debt due to the time varying financing conditions.
Similar to equity value, in the bad state of the world the value of straight debt solves three
different equations depending on the level of the bank’s cash buffer:
r SDB (w)=

CSD + (1−θ)(µ−C ) SD ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 SD
′′
B (w)
+piBG (SDG (W ∗G )−SDB (w)) w ∈ (0,W ]
CSD + (1−θ)(µ−C ) SD ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 SD
′′
B (w)
+piBG (SDG (w)−SDB (w)) w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
CSD + (1−θ)(µ−C ) SD ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 SD
′′
B (w)
+piBG (SDG (W ∗G )−SDB (w)). w ∈ (W ∗G ,W ∗B ]
(2.8)
The last term on the right hand side of each of these three equations is the change in the debt
value following a jump from the bad to the good state. If the state switches when cash reserves
are in (0,W ], the bank immediately issues new shares and takes the level of cash buffer back
to W ∗G . So the value of the straight debt goes from SDB (w) in the bad state to SDG (W
∗
G ) in the
good state. When cash reserves are in (W ,W ∗G ], earnings are retained in both states, and if
the state jumps from B to G , the value of debt goes from SDB (w) to SDG (w). When the cash
reserves are in (W ∗G ,W
∗
B ] the level of the bank’s cash buffer is higher than the pay-out threshold
in the good state. Because of this, a switch from B to G results in an immediate lump-sum
dividend distribution. Since all of this dividend accrues to shareholders the value of straight
debt goes from SDB (w) in the bad state to SDG (W ∗G ) in the good state.
Equations (2.7), and (2.8) are solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, in the
good state issuing new shares every time cash reserves hit W restores the bank’s cash buffer to
W ∗G . Thus the following holds:
SDG (W )= SDG (W ∗G ).
Second, the value of the straight debt does not change when dividends are distributed since
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dividends are only paid out to shareholders. So
SD ′i (W
∗
i )= 0
holds. Lastly, the bank is liquidated in the bad state of the world when it runs out of cash. Thus
at zero, straight debt holders receive the residual of the liquidation value of the bank’s risky
assets after depositors are paid-out. If the liquidation value of the assets is smaller than the
face value of deposits, debt holders receive nothing in liquidation. Thus the following holds
SDB (0)= ((1−φ) (1−θ)µ
r
−D)+.
In addition to this, for the value of the debt to be continuous, conditions similar to the case of
equity value should hold at W and W ∗G :
lim
w↓W ∗G
SDB (w)= lim
w↑W ∗G
SDB (w)
lim
w↓W ∗G
SD ′B (w)= limw↑W ∗G
SD ′B (w),
and
lim
w↓W
SDB (w)= lim
w↑W
SDB (w),
lim
w↓W
SD ′B (w)= limw↑W SD
′
B (w),
Closed form expressions for the values of equity and straight debt in both states of the world
are provided in the Appendix.
2.3.2 Optimal bank policies
Having determined the values of the bank’s equity and debt in both states of the world, I now
turn to the analysis of the optimal bank policies. In the straight debt benchmark, there is
no conversion of debt and management chooses the bank’s pay-out, default and financing
policies that maximize the present value of the future dividends to shareholders after the debt
has been issued. I first analyse the shareholders optimal policy choices assuming baseline
values for the parameters of the model. I will then investigate how these policies are affected
in different economic environments.
Table 2.1 reports the baseline values of the model parameters, as well as the endogenous values
implied by the model. I set the risk free rate of return to r = 0.035, the tax rate to θ = 0.20, the
average cash flow rate to µ= 0.15, and the cash flow volatility to σ= 0.08. I assume that the
probability of a jump from the bad to the good state is piBG = 0.20 and the probability of a
jump from the good to the bad state is lower and equal to piGB = 0.18. The issuance costs of
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equity in the good state is set to γE = 0.01. I set the value of the liquidation costs to φ= 0.30,
which means the liquidation value of the bank’s assets is equal to 2.4. I assume that the bank
takes deposits (D) in an amount equal to 50% of the first best value of its risky assets. I set
the costs of deposits to CD = 2%. Assuming the model parameters, the bank holds 1.71 in
deposits. So the value to straight debt holders in liquidation is equal to 0.69. Shareholders
choose the value maximizing bank policies after they have issued the debt. Since debt holders
have rational expectations, the value of the debt reflects these policies. In this section, I set the
coupon rate to CSD = 8.24%. In the next section I show that this is the optimal coupon level
that shareholders choose to maximize the bank’s value minus the cost of capital injection at
debt issuance. I also study the case where the coupon payment is set to CSD = 5.79%. In the
next section, I discuss that this is the coupon payment that shareholders choose when the
bank is regulated and thus is subject to a Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement ofΛwhich is set to
4%.
Following the literature that studies firms’ optimal dividend policies when outside financing is
costly (including Décamps et al. (2011), Bolton et al. (2011, 2013), Hugonnier et al. (2015), and
Hugonnier and Morellec (2016) among others), the optimal pay-out policy for shareholders
in both states of the world is of barrier type: the bank distributes dividends to maintain its
cash buffer at or below a constant threshold. Since financing frictions depend on the state
of the world, it is natural to expect that the bank’s policy choices are also state dependant.
Shareholders have more incentives to build inside liquidity when the cost of accessing outside
liquidity is higher, so dividend threshold is increasing in the issuance costs (see Décamps et al.
(2011) for more details). Thus the higher issuance cost in the bad state compared to the good
state, leads to a higher dividend threshold in this state.
In the bad state the bank is forced into costly liquidation following a series of negative op-
erating shocks since it cannot raise new funds to cover operating losses when it runs out of
internal funds. On the other hand, bank optimally raises new funds in the good state to avoid
liquidation because the costs of refinancing is not too high. Although shareholders would like
to delay this refinancing due to the costs associated with security issuance, they might find
it optimal not to wait until the last moment (when the cash buffer is depleted ) to raise new
funds. This is due to the threat of liquidation that they face if the state switches from G to B
when cash reserves are low. Thus unlike the one state model when the reissuance threshold is
always set to zero, a positive refinancing threshold can be optimal.
Table 2.1 shows the optimal target levels of cash buffer in both states of the world. For the
baseline parameters and CSD = 5.79%, shareholders distribute dividends to maintain liquid
reserves at or below 0.210 (5.78% of the total asset value) in the good state and 0.253 (6.94%
of the total asset value) in the bad state. Thus the bank’s liquid holdings are countercyclical,
in line with the evidence in Acharya et al. (2010) and Aspachs et al. (2005). In the good state
shareholders find it optimal to tap equity markets when the level of the cash buffer drops to
0.060 which represents 1.64% of the total asset value. Upon this issuance shareholders will
refinance the bank to restore its cash holdings to the target level in the good state by injecting
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an amount equal to 0.150 (W ∗G −W ). When the coupon payment is set to CSD = 8.24%, the
bank’s target level of cash in the good and the bad states are equal to 0.238 and 0.285 which
represent 6.50% and 7.77% of the total asset value of the bank respectively. For this level of
coupon payment, in the good state shareholders raise new equity funds when the level of cash
reserves drop to 0.069 (1.89% of bank’s total asset value).
Table 2.1 also shows the ranges for the debt ratio of the bank as defined in (2.3) but for the face
value of straight debt SD . Even though the value of deposits and the coupon payment on the
debt are fixed, the bank’s debt ratio fluctuates within a band since the cash buffer of the bank
fluctuates in [0.060,0.210] in the good state and in [0,0.253] in the bad state for CSD = 5.79%.
As the table shows for this level of coupon payment, the debt ratio in the good state fluctuates
between 92.03% at the target level of cash and 96.00% at the point where the bank raises new
funds. In the bad state, the debt ratio fluctuates between 90.96% at the target level of cash and
97.67% at the point where the bank runs out of cash and defaults.
Figure 2.1 top panel shows the values of straight debt in both good and bad states as functions
of the bank’s cash reserves and for CSD = 5.79%. The value of the debt in the good state is
the highest at the boundaries of the region in which cash reserves evolve [W ,W ∗G ]. At W the
value of debt is SDG (W ∗G ) since new equity is issued to restore the bank’s cash reserves to the
target level. After W , increasing cash reserves has two opposing effects on the value of debt:
first it decreases the probability of a reissuance. Second increasing the cash buffer decreases
the probability of default which can occur if the state switches to the bad state and the bank
runs out of cash. For lower levels of cash buffer the first effect dominates and the value of
debt decreases the further cash buffer gets from the reissuance threshold. For higher levels
of cash buffer the lower probability of default in the bad state dominates and the value of
debt increases with cash buffer. When cash reserves reach the target level, any additional cash
accrues to shareholders as dividend and the value of debt remains at its maximum value of
SDG (W ∗G ). In the bad state the value of debt is increasing in cash reserves since the probability
of an inefficient liquidation is lower for higher levels of cash. Note that compared to the value
of debt in the bad state, the value of debt is less sensitive to the level of cash buffer in the good
state because the risk of default in this state is zero.
The middle panel of Figure 2.1 shows the value of equity in states G and B. The bottom panel
shows the marginal value of cash to equity holders in these two states. In the bad state since
the bank has no access to outside financing, it has a precautionary motive to hoard cash. The
value of equity is increasing and globally concave in cash reserves. On the other hand, the
value of equity in the good state of the world is increasing in cash reserves but not globally
concave. In models featuring time invariant financing constraints, limited access to outside
liquidity gives rise to inefficient liquidations and provides a motive for precautionary cash
savings. In these models, shareholders behave in a risk averse manner and the value of
equity becomes a concave function of cash reserves. Introducing time dependant financing
conditions provides incentives for bank’s shareholders to time equity markets in the good
state because if they do not do so, they may lose the opportunity of accessing cheap equity
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financing in the future. So shareholders may optimally issue new equity before the bank runs
out of cash. Equity issuance is lumpy when it happens because the associated cost is fixed.
Upon this issuance, shareholders incur the costs of security issuance and the carry costs of the
additional cash holdings since the bank’s cash reserves immediately increase. On the other
hand by issuing equity faster they make sure to take advantage of cheap financing option
before it vanishes. When choosing their financing policy, shareholders balance these costs and
benefits. When the level of cash reserves is high, the option to issue equity is not so valuable
since the bank is not in immediate need of external funds. For high enough levels of cash
reserves the precautionary motive to keep cash leads to an increasing and concave equity
value. On the other hand, when cash reserves are low, the option to tap equity markets before
financing conditions worsen becomes very valuable. The time varying financing constraints
along with the fixed costs associated with security issuance, can generate a local convexity in
the value of equity for low levels of cash holdings in the state with more favourable financing
conditions. This convexity gives rise to risk-taking incentives. In that, shareholders may find it
optimal to increase asset risk when the bank is close to financial distress. The bottom panel of
Figure 2.1 shows that in-line with this discussion, the marginal value of cash to equity holders
is positive but not monotonic in the good state.8
To study the effects of the main model parameters on bank’s policy choices, Figure 2.2 plots
the reissuance threshold, and the dividend thresholds in the bad and good states of the world
as functions of the coupon payment CSD , the financing cost of equity γE , and the switching
intensities (piBG , and piGB ).
Coupon payments are cash outflows which drive down the bank’s cash reserves. So for a
given profitability µ, a higher coupon payment results in a lower drift. For the lower levels
of coupon payment, the continuation value of the bank to equity holders is high enough
to induce the shareholders to keep the bank alive by waiting longer before distributing any
dividends. This is why increasing coupon payments increases the dividend thresholds in both
states of the world for lower levels of coupon payment. When coupon payments are very high,
continuation value to shareholders become very small and they lose their incentives to keep
the bank alive. Because of this, for very high levels of coupon payment shareholders start
distributing dividends faster, when interest payments increase. There is a similar pattern for
reissuance threshold. When increasing the interest payments on debt, shareholders first find
it optimal to tap equity markets faster in anticipation of worsening financing conditions. At
the point where interest payments become so big that shareholders lose their interest in the
bank survival, they delay any equity issuance further to avoid the costs associated with such
an issuance.
To optimally choose their dividend policy shareholders balance the carry cost of cash with the
external cost of financing. As a result, when the cost of equity issuance increases shareholders
wait longer before they recapitalize. Additionally it becomes optimal to delay costly recapital-
izations by retaining more cash inside the bank. This is why both dividend thresholds increase
8For a more detailed discussion of the convexity of the value of equity in the good state, see Bolton et al. (2013).
58
2.3. Straight debt benchmark
whilst reissuance threshold decreases when the cost of equity issuance in the good state rises.
When in the good state, an increase in the risk of switching to the bad state (a higher piGB )
where outside financing is too costly increases the precautionary demand for cash. This gives
incentives to shareholders to build up more cash inside the bank. They do so by both delaying
dividend payments and accelerating equity reissuance. Thus both reissuance and dividend
threshold in the good state increase with piGB . On the other hand when in the bad state, an
increased probability of recovery from this state (a higher piBG ) leads to a higher likelihood of
future access to outside financing and thus decreases the value of the cash inside the bank. As a
result, the bank’s cash inventory drops through a combination of increased dividend pay-outs
and delayed equity financing. Thus both reissuance threshold and dividend threshold in the
bad state decrease with piBG .
Figure 2.1 also shows that changing different parameters of the model does not change the fact
that the target level of cash in the bad state is higher than the one in the good state because
financing constraints are more severe in this state.
I have so far characterized the bank policy choices for a given coupon payment. In the next
section, I study the optimal capital structure that bank shareholders choose to maximize
bank’s value at the time of issuance.
2.3.3 Optimal capital structure
Having discussed bank’s optimal policies, I now investigate the privately optimal financing
structure of the bank. I consider that the bank which is initially in the good state of the world
issues some perpetual debt with coupon CSD and infinite maturity to take advantage of the
tax exemption of the interest payments. Paying coupon payments to debt holders depletes the
bank’s cash reserves. This increases the default risk in the bad state. Shareholders receive zero
upon bank’s liquidation. At the same time in the good state of the world, the level of coupon
payments affects the reissuance and thus expected refinancing costs. The value maximizing
level of debt is determined by balancing its tax benefits with its default and refinancing costs.
Shareholders choose the optimal level of the bank’s debt by maximizing the value of equity
after debt issuance plus the proceeds from this issuance net of the costs of providing the
required capital. Assuming that the bank has no initial liquid reserves before debt issuance
(w0− = 0), the following static maximization problem decides the optimal capital structure of
the bank
max
CSD∈R+
EG (W
∗
G (CSD ))+SDG (W ∗G (CSD ))−W ∗G (CSD ). (2.9)
I assume that the failure of the bank imposes negative externalities on the financial system and
thus leads to significant social costs that are not internalized by bank’s shareholders. Higher
levels of debt increase the probability of bank’s default and thus the expected social costs
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associated with its failure. This means that from a regulatory point of view the cost of debt does
not only include its liquidation and refinancing costs, but also the social costs associated with
the disruptive effects of the bank’s failure on the whole economy. So debt is more costly for
regulators compared to shareholders. Shareholders who do not include the social costs of debt
in their optimization problem tend to take on more debt than what would be socially optimal.9
For this reason, I assume that the bank is constrained by regulatory leverage requirements as
described in Section 2.2. In the good state, when the bank initially chooses its optimal capital
structure, the bank’s maximum debt ratio (which is attained at equity reissuance threshold)
should not exceed the regulatory required level of 1−Λ. So I append the constraint defined in
(2.4) when wmi n =W to shareholders’ optimization problem in (2.9).
With the baseline parameters reported in Table 2.1, shareholders choose a coupon payment
equal to 8.24% if the bank is not regulated and 5.79% when the bank is required to maintain
a Tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 4%. Although I assume that the level of bank’s deposits
and the coupon payment on straight debt remain constant, the dynamic of the bank’s cash
reserves results in a dynamic capital structure. When the bank is regulated, for the baseline
parameters, the leverage constraint is binding and the bank is constrained to choose a smaller
level of coupon payment. For this level of CSD , the bank’s debt ratio fluctuates in the range
of [92.03,96.00] in the good state and [90.96,97.67] in the bad state. When the bank runs out
of cash in the bad state of the world, its debt ratio increases to 97.67 which is more than the
maximum regulatory level of 96%. The bank does not have access to outside equity in this
state and thus can not maintain its minimum regulatory capital to asset ratio. As a result, the
bank can not issue additional debt to inject new capital inside the firm and thus defaults.
I investigate the effects of varying the main parameters of the model on the optimal capital
structure and policies of the regulated bank by varying these parameters around their base
case values and thus considering different cases reported in Table 2.2.
I study the effects of asset risk by considering a low volatility environment whereσ is set to 0.06
and a high volatility environment with σ equal to 0.10. When the bank’s leverage constraint is
binding, shareholders can choose a higher level of coupon payment when the bank is riskier.
This is because the face value of debt is decreasing in the volatility of the bank’s risky assets.
Panels B and C of Table 2.2 show that shareholders can issue debt with a coupon payment
equal to 5.95% when the volatility of the bank’s cash flows is 0.10, but can only choose a
coupon payment equal to 5.66% when the volatility is set to 0.06. If the leverage constraint
was not binding or the bank was unregulated, shareholders would choose more conservative
debt levels when assets are more risky since higher volatility leads to an increase in default
probability and thus increases the cost of market debt. In Table A.1 in the Appendix, I report
the optimal capital structure and financing policies of an unregulated bank when varying
the main parameters of the model. As the table shows shareholders of an unregulated bank
9In this context see also Sigrist and Rochet (2017) who study the optimal mode of financing for SIFIs from both
private and public points of view and argue that the presence of SIFIs’ failure externalities is the justification for
regulating their financing mode.
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choose a lower level of debt (CSD = 7.65%) when bank’s assets are riskier (σ= 0.10). Table 2.2
also shows that an increase in asset risk leads to an increase in the frequency of refinancing
and a decrease in pay-outs to shareholders in both states of the world. Changing σ from 0.10
to 0.06, decreases the reissuance threshold from 0.090 to 0.032, the target level in state G from
0.283 to 0.138 and the target level in state B from 0.342 to 0.167.
I also study the bank’s behaviour when the probability of getting shut out of financial markets
is higher (piGB = 0.20) or lower (piGB = 0.16). When piGB is higher, the expected duration of the
good state is shorter. In response, the bank increases its liquid reserves by both raising new
funds sooner and paying dividends later. Panels F and G of Table 2.2 show that by increasing
the risk of deteriorating financing conditions from 0.16 to 0.20, W and W ∗G increase to 0.063
and 0.212 from 0.056 and 0.207 respectively. Moreover for higher levels of piGB , probability
of default that happens in the bad state of the world increases and thus the value of straight
debt is decreasing in piGB , this allows shareholders to issue more debt when piGB is higher and
when the leverage constraint is binding. Panels F and G of Table A.1 in the Appendix show that
when the bank is not regulated, shareholders choose less debt for higher levels of piGB because
of the increased probability of default.
Finally, I investigate the effects of the severity of financing frictions by changing the reissuance
costs of equity in the good state γE around its base case value and set γE to 0.005 and 0.02.10
The lower the costs associated with equity financing, the earlier the bank taps equity markets to
raise new funds. Panels D and E of Table 2.2 show that when outside financing cost decreases
from 0.02 to 0.005, the reissuance threshold rises from 0.042 to 0.075. When outside financing
becomes less costly in the good state, the precautionary incentives of hoarding cash inside
the bank are weaker and thus dividends are paid-out faster. Panels D and E demonstrate that
the magnitude of the effects of the refinancing costs is smaller on pay-out boundaries than
reissuance threshold. Coupon payments are cash outflows that drive down the level of the
bank’s liquidity buffer and thus raise its need to external liquidity. When external liquidity is
more costly, it is optimal to issue less debt. Table 2.2 shows that the optimal level of coupon
decreases from 5.85 to 5.74 when the cost of issuing equity increases from 0.005 to 0.02.
2.4 Bail-in plan: the case of countercyclical CoCo
Having studied the effects of time varying financing conditions on bank’s policies with straight
debt, I now turn to a set-up where the bank commits to a pre-determined bail-in plan. When
the bank is systemically important to the financial system, and recapitalization is too costly
to be privately optimal, financial authorities are forced to bail-out the bank using public
funds to avoid the disruptive effects of the SIFIs collapse on the whole financial system. A
bail-in plan is an alternative solution to deal with this too big to fail problem. In my simplified
bail-in framework, in the bad state of the world the bank has access to another source of
10For both these cases, the costs associated with security issuance in the bad state are assumed to be so high that
security issuance in this state remains suboptimal.
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outside liquidity in the form a countercyclical CoCo debt. The main feature of this security
is its automatic conversion to equity when the bank faces financial distress and when equity
financing is not possible (optimal) for bank’s shareholders. Moreover since the bank’s debt
obligation converts into equity when it faces financial difficulties, the post-conversion debt
ratio of the bank drops down. This in turn allows the bank to be able to borrow again and
inject new capital inside the bank. This is in contrast with the case of straight debt in which
higher than regulatory acceptable debt ratios constrain the bank from issuing new debt when
it runs out of cash. Having access to this mode of financing in state B, shareholders update
their optimal choices of pay-out and financing policies and their optimal capital structure.
The objective of a bail-in plan is to eliminate the possibility of bank’s failure and its associated
social costs. If shareholders could commit to a bail-in plan, the costs of debt would be fully
internalized and the level of debt that maximizes the value to shareholders would also be
regulatory optimal. Thus if the execution of the bail-in plan is efficient, one can argue that it
can replace (at least partially) banking regulation. In this section, I first study the case where
the bank does not face any regulatory leverage requirements because it has committed to
a bail-in plan. I will then study the case of a bank with a bail-in plan that faces regulatory
leverage requirements and compare the two cases.
2.4.1 Valuing corporate securities
When in state B, losses due to negative operating shocks are absorbed by the bank’s internal
cash buffer until the bank’s cash inventory drops to a given threshold W¯ . At this point, the
bank’s outstanding debt is converted into equity. Upon this conversion current equity holders
give up a fraction α of the bank’s equity to CoCo debt holders.11 I keep the assumption that
the equity financing cost in state B is too high for any equity issuance to be optimal. However,
unlike the benchmark case of straight debt where no financing is possible (or optimal) in state
B, the bank can reissue CoCo debt by paying a fixed cost of γC . This cost is higher than the
costs associated with equity issuance in the good state. Nonetheless, it is still lower than the
costs of issuing equity in the bad state when investors are reluctant to invest in bank’s equity.
Reissuance of CoCo debt upon conversion in the bad state along with equity refinancing in
the good state provides a default free set-up.
Although with a bail-in plan the bank never faces liquidation, it still faces higher costs of
refinancing with CoCo debt in state B. This means that state B is still characterized by more
severe financing constraints. In state G, the bank has a finite window of opportunity to issue
equity which is the cheaper source of financing. For low levels of cash reserves, if shareholders
do not exercise this option, they can face higher refinancing costs if the state switches to B
and conversion is triggered. Depending on the relative refinancing costs (equity in state G
11As previously noted, bail-in plan acts as a pre-determined restructuring plan. When conversion is triggered,
depositors who are the most senior claim holders continue to receive the same fixed interest payments as before
and thus do not bear any losses. The interest payments to current CoCo debt holders stop and they receive a
fraction α of the bank’s equity. Equity holders receive the residual fraction 1−α of the bank.
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versus CoCo debt in state B), and the probability of a jump from G to B, shareholders may find
it optimal to tap equity markets to raise new equity funds in the good state before the bank
runs out of cash. So the optimal reissuance threshold in state G can be strictly positive. Similar
to the case of straight debt, more severe financing frictions in the bad state lead to a larger
level of target cash buffer in this state and thus W ∗B is expected to be bigger than W
∗
G .
12 So
bank’s cash holdings remain countercylical.
Consider now the value of the bank’s equity. I keep the same notation Ei (w) for the equity
value in state i =G ,B (where I omit the dependence on (C ,α)). In the good state the cash
reserves evolve in the region of [W ,W ∗G ]. In this region the bank does not deliver any cash
flows to shareholders. Above W ∗G , any additional cash is paid out as dividends and below W ,
the bank recapitalizes to restore the cash buffer to its target level. So the value of equity in the
good state satisfies the same ODE as the value of equity with straight debt which is given in
(2.5).
In the bad state of the world, the bank reissues CoCo debt upon the conversion of the existing
debt at a given threshold W¯ . To do so, shareholders incur a fixed cost γC . Since this cost is
higher than the equity issuance costs in the good state, it is optimal for shareholders to delay
the conversion and the reissuance of the CoCo debt for as much as possible. This means that
shareholders wait until internal cash reserves are depleted before they convert the existing
debt. To better understand this, consider a series of negative operating shocks. The bank
draws down on its cash reserves to cover operating losses. When the level of cash reserves are
low, at any point in time shareholders can either convert the existing CoCo debt and replace it
with new debt that restores the cash buffer to its target level or wait for a jump to the good state
of the world. If the state switches from B to G before CoCo debt is converted, shareholders
have the option to raise new funds at a lower cost in the good state. If the sate does not switch
before the bank runs out of cash, shareholders convert and reissue the CoCo debt at the last
moment, i.e. when the level of cash buffer hits zero. Given that the bank has access to a
cheaper source of outside liquidity in the good state and that carrying cash inside the bank
is costly, shareholders optimally postpone the conversion of CoCo debt to when all internal
funds are exhausted. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. The optimal conversion threshold is zero.
A direct implication of Proposition (2.1) is that, the optimal bail-in plan is a contract that
acts as a resolution mechanism. Such a plan is considered to be an automatic restructuring
contract that is set in place ex-ante in order to prevent the costly restructuring process of a
SIFI in the event of financial distress.13 Given the results in Proposition (2.1), I set W¯ = 0 in
12For the sake of simplicity, I have kept the same notations for reissuance and dividend thresholds. Their values
are, however, different in straight debt and CoCo debt cases.
13There are costs associated with both chapter 11 and private negotiation debt restructuring. These costs include
direct (out of pocket transaction costs such as charges for legal and investment banking services) or indirect costs
(time and effort negotiating with different parties involved such as banks, creditors, and authorities). See Gilson et
al. (1990), Betker (1997), and Hotchkiss et al. (2008) for more on distressed debt restructuring. See James (1991)
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my analysis. So cash reserves evolve in [0,W ∗B ] in the bad state of the world and the value of
equity in this state EB (w) follows the same system of equations as in (2.6).
The equations for the values of equity in both states of the world (which are included in
Appendix A.2.2) are solved subject to the following boundary conditions. The first boundary
condition
E ′i (W
∗
i )= 1
represents the fact that at target level of cash, the marginal benefit of cash inside the bank
is equal to its marginal cost which is one since the costs associate with security issuance are
assumed to be fixed. The second boundary condition
E ′′i (W
∗
i )= 0
solves for the value maximizing target level of cash (see Dumas (1991)).
In the good state of the world, if the bank’s cash buffer decreases to a sufficiently low level,
the bank raises new equity by paying the issuance cost of γE . The threshold below which
shareholders find it optimal to raise new funds W is the level of cash reserves at which the
marginal value of cash to shareholders is equal to the marginal cost of raising new equity
which is one due to the fixed reissuance costs. So when W > 0, the following should hold
E ′G (W )= 1.
When there is no W that satisfies this condition, it is not optimal for the bank to raise new eq-
uity funds before it runs out of cash. In this case, W = 0 and the bank only taps equity markets
when its cash reserves are depleted. The threat of the tightening of financing conditions when
cash buffer is close to zero, can lead to non-zero reissuance thresholds in the good state. A
positive W means that the bank raises new funds in the equity market before it runs out of
cash.
Up until now, the analysis of the value of equity closely follows the benchmark case of straight
debt. The main difference in the solutions to the values of equity in the straight debt and
CoCo debt cases comes from the boundary conditions on the value of equity in the bad state
of the world. In the case of straight debt, in the bad state of the world the bank is forced into
liquidation as soon as its cash buffer is exhausted. Shareholders receive nothing in the event
of liquidation. By contrast, in the case of CoCo debt as soon as the level of cash reserves hit
the conversion threshold, the bank converts its existing CoCo debt and issues new debt of
identical terms (CC D ,α) to restore its cash buffer back to W ∗B . The issuance of new CoCo debt
injects new capital in to the bank which avoids bankruptcy and helps maintain the bank’s
and Flannery (2011) for bank-specific cost of failures. A bail-in mechanism provides a pre-determined structuring
plan that eliminates the need of private or court-organized negotiations and thus avoids the costs associated with
these negotiations.
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cushion against future losses. So the value to shareholders when the bank runs out of cash in
the bad state is not zero any more.
To fully characterize the value to equity holders when cash buffers hit zero in state B, note that
in the bad state of the world, CoCo debt is the only source of outside financing available to the
bank. At the same time it is optimal for the bank to inject cash inside the firm to take its cash
reserves back to the target level because refinancing costs are fixed. So the proceeds from the
CoCo reissuance should be high enough to cover the cash injection into the bank and the cost
of reissuance. I assume that the bank commits to a stationary debt structure and keeps the
same level of coupon payment and the conversion ratio at each conversion. So the following
budget constraint should hold
C DB (W
∗
B )≥W ∗B +γC ; (2.10)
where C DB (W ∗B ) is the value of CoCo debt at the target level of cash in the bad state of the
world which I will solve for later on.
Even though no equity is issued in the bad state, when conversion of the CoCo debt is triggered,
current shareholders of the bank face dilution since they give up a fractionα of the new bank to
the current CoCo debt holders. The value to shareholders at conversion has two components:
first, current shareholders get a fraction (1−α) of the equity of the newly capitalized bank
(EB (W ∗B )). Second, shareholders also get a fraction (1−α) of the proceeds from debt issuance
net of cash injection and reissuance costs. If the proceeds from the new debt issuance is
higher than what the bank requires to restore its cash buffer to the target level and cover the
reissuance costs, the budget constraint in (2.10) is not binding. The bank places no premium
on internal funds in addition to the target level, thus distributes the additional cash to the
bank’s new and old equity holders. The old shareholders now own a fraction (1−α) of the
bank, so they are entitled to a fraction (1−α) of the surplus from the debt issuance. As a result,
the value of equity in the bad state of the world should satisfy
EB (0)= (1−α)

value of equity ex-dividend : EB (W ∗B )
value of dividend : C DB (W ∗B )−W ∗B −γC
= (1−α)(EB (W ∗B )+C DB (W ∗B )−W ∗B −γC )
In addition to the boundary conditions discussed above, continuity and smoothness con-
ditions at W and W ∗G for the value of equity in the bad state should hold. The boundary
conditions along with the ODEs for the values of equity in both states of the world are summa-
rized in Appendix A.2.2.
Consider next the value of the CoCo debt C Di (w), i = G ,B (I again omit the arguments
(C ,α)). In the good state, CoCo debt acts as an ordinary straight debt with continuous coupon
payments and infinite maturity since the conversion into equity only happens in the bad
state of the world. Thus C DG (w) satisfies the same ODE as in (2.7) where CSD , SDB (w), and
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SDG (w) are replaced with CC D , C DB (w), and C DG (w) respectively.
On the other hand, in the bad state of the world CoCo debt holders receive a continuous
coupon payment of CC D up to the conversion threshold at which point, their debt gets con-
verted into equity and they own a fraction α of the newly capitalized bank. The value of CoCo
debt in this state C DB (w) satisfies a similar system of ODEs as in (2.8) where CSD , SDB (w),
and SDG (w) are replaced with CC D , C DB (w), and C DG (w) respectively.
The equations for C DG (w) and C DB (w) (which are included in the Appendix) are solved
subject to the following boundary conditions. First, the value of the CoCo debt does not
change when the level of cash reserves hits the target threshold. This is because above the
dividend threshold any additional dollar of earnings is distributed to the bank’s shareholders.
So the following should hold
C D ′i (W
∗
i )= 0.
Second, in the good state the bank recapitalizes every time its cash reserves hit W to bring
back the cash buffer to W ∗G . This means the following holds
C DG (W )=C DG (W ∗G ).
Finally, in the bad state the CoCo bond is converted whenever cash reserves are depleted.
Current CoCo debt holders receive a fraction α of the bank’s equity after new CoCo debt is
issued. Additionally they get a fraction α of the proceeds from the new debt issuance net of
the costs of capital injection and security reissuance. So the following holds
C DB (0)=α(EB (W ∗B )+C DB (W ∗B )−W ∗B −γ)
Given the budget constraint (2.10), the market value of the new CoCo debt to be issued should
be at least enough to take the cash reserves back to the dividend pay-out threshold after paying
for the reissuance cost γC . So the term C DB (W ∗B )−W ∗B −γC is either positive or zero. This
boundary condition characterizes the main difference between the value of the straight debt
and CoCo debt. Whilst straight debt holders receive the liquidation value of the bank when
the bank runs out of cash in state B, CoCo debt holders receive a fraction of the bank value
upon conversion which includes a fraction of the equity value and net proceeds of new debt
issuance.
Lastly, for the value of the CoCo debt to be continuous and smoothly pasted over different
regions of the cash buffer, continuity and smoothness conditions similar to the case of equity
value should hold at W and W ∗G . A summary of the ODEs for C DG (w) and C DB (w) along with
the relevant boundary conditions is provided in Appendix A.2.2.
I can solve for the values of equity and CoCo debt in states B and G similar to the values of
equity and straight debt in the benchmark case assuming the same ODEs (thus the same
analytical solutions as in (A.10), (A.14),(A.15), and (A.16) in Appendix A.2.1) but with different
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boundary conditions (so with different coefficients).
2.4.2 Optimal bank policies
With a bail-in plan in place, the bank replaces inefficient liquidations with conversion and
costly reissuance of CoCo debt. The conversion ratio, the proceeds from the debt reissuance,
and the costs of CoCo reissuance at conversion threshold determine the value to current
equity holders upon conversion. As a result, the design of the CoCo contract, including the
coupon payment, conversion ratio and conversion threshold, affects both the values of equity
and CoCo debt. Moreover the refinancing policy of the bank in the good state is directly
affected by the characteristics of the conversion in the bad state. For any given CoCo contract,
management chooses the bank’s pay-out and financing policies in both states of the world to
maximize the present value of future dividends to shareholders.
Proposition (2.1) characterizes the optimal financing policy of the bank in the bad state of
the world. To save on the discounted expected refinancing costs and the carry cost of cash,
shareholders optimally choose a zero conversion and refinancing threshold. So the bank
waits until cash reserves are depleted to convert and reissue CoCo debt. On the other hand,
in the good state of the world shareholders can optimally choose to issue equity when the
bank’s cash buffer is low but not zero because they are concerned that they could possibly
face higher financing costs in the future. Equity issuance in the good state of the world is still
a cheaper source of outside liquidity. As long as there is a positive probability of a jump to
the bad state of the world, it can be optimal to raise equity at W > 0. Whether the optimal
equity issuance threshold is bigger than zero or not depends on the costs associated with
security issuance in state B compared to those costs in state G. When this difference is larger,
the option to raise equity in the good state becomes more valuable, so it is more probable
for the bank to find it optimal to raise equity funds before it runs out of cash. Additionally
higher probability of a state switch from the good to the bad state of the world makes it more
likely for shareholders to time the equity market in the good state. As previously discussed
the optimal equity reissuance threshold solves E ′i (W )= 1. When there is no W that satisfies
this condition, a corner solution W = 0 characterizes the optimal equity reissuance threshold.
When this is the case, the option to recapitalize before cash reserves are depleted has no value
to shareholders and they only recapitalize when it is absolutely necessary to do so. This can
happen when the expected increase in the costs of financing due to a jump to the bad state is
not too high or the probability of such a jump is small.
Table 2.1 summarizes the model implied financing and pay-out policies of the bank in the
CoCo debt case for a given conversion ratio of α= 0.50 and a coupon payment of CC D = 5.60%
and with the base case parameters.14 Given this CoCo contract, in state G shareholders rely on
inside equity for as long as the bank’s cash reserves are not depleted, and only raise new funds
14 I assume in this section that the coupon payment CC D = 5.60% is given. In the next section, I show that this is
indeed the value maximizing coupon payment that shareholders choose given α= 0.5.
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when the bank runs out of cash.
Since CoCo debt financing alleviates financing frictions in the bad state of the world, it is
expected that for a given level of CC D , the reissuance threshold in the good state is higher with
straight debt financing compared to the CoCo debt financing. With straight debt, the lack of
access to any outside liquidity, makes the option to time equity markets in the bad state very
valuable. CoCo financing, although more expensive than equity in the good state, provides a
new source the bank can turn to in the bad state and thus decreases shareholders’ incentives
to tap equity markets in the good state. For the sake of comparison, Table 2.1 also includes
shareholders policies when the level of coupon payment is set to CC D = 5.79%, the optimal
coupon in the case of straight debt. For this level of coupon payment, shareholders find it
optimal to tap equity markets well before the bank runs out of cash (W = 0.060) in the straight
debt case. For the same coupon payment, shareholders in the bail-in case choose to abstain
from equity financing until absolutely necessary, i.e. W = 0. For this level of coupon payment,
the reissuance threshold stays zero for as long as the cost of CoCo issuance is smaller than 0.55
which represents about 35% of the face value of CoCo debt with CC D = 5.79%. For γC ≥ 0.55, it
becomes optimal for the bank to raise equity funds in the good state before its cash buffer is
depleted. Therefore for shareholders to optimally tap equity markets before the bank runs out
of cash, the costs of CoCo reissuance in the bad state should be fairly high.
In line with models with costly external financing, the optimal payout policy for shareholders
is to distribute dividends to maintain bank’s cash buffer at or below a target level. More severe
financing frictions in the bad state increase the value of the cash inside the bank and lead to a
higher target level of cash in this state compared to the good state. So similar to the case of
straight debt, bank’s cash holdings are countercyclical. As Table 2.1 shows the target level in
the bad state is 0.158 (4.48% of the total asset value) which is higher than the target level in the
good state 0.116 (3.28% of the total asset value). By committing to a pre-defined bail-in plan
shareholders eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidations. Because of this the optimal target
levels of cash in both states are lower with CoCo debt compared to the straight debt. Table
2.1 shows that for CC D = 5.79%, both pay-out thresholds are significantly lower than pay-out
thresholds with straight debt financing.
The pay-off to shareholders when the bank runs out of cash in the good state depends directly
on the level of conversion ratio. For a given level of CC D a higher conversion ratio means lower
expected pay-off to shareholders if the state switches to B and conversion is triggered. This
provides stronger incentives for shareholders to raise equity funds in the good state when cash
reserves are low and thus increases the threshold at which shareholders tap equity markets.
At the same time, for a higher conversion ratio, shareholders wait more before distributing
dividends outside the bank to postpone conversion since the value they receive at conversion
is lower. Figure 2.3 shows how reissuance threshold and target levels of cash in both good
and bad states increase when the conversion ratio increases. For CC D = 5.60%, reissuance
threshold becomes positive for conversion ratios bigger than 0.55, and increases to 0.059 when
conversion ratio increases to 1. Figure 2.3 also shows that the dividend threshold in the bad
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(good) state increases from 0.062 (0.020) to 0.250 (0.208) when conversion ratio increases from
0 to 1.
Figure 2.4 plots the reissuance threshold and the target levels of cash in states B and G as
functions of coupon payment for straight debt and for two different levels of conversion
ratio α= 0.5 and α= 0.80. For higher conversion ratios, the expected pay-off to shareholders
at conversion is closer to their expected pay-off in liquidation with straight debt (which is
zero). Because of this, shareholders choose financing and dividend thresholds closer to those
thresholds with straight debt. For the fully dilutive case of α= 1 the optimal reissuance and
pay-out thresholds coincide with the case of straight debt since shareholders receive nothing
in conversion. Moreover, Figure 2.4 demonstrates that the patterns identified in the case of
straight debt remain and that both target levels of cash and reissuance threshold first increase
and then decrease with CC D . The following statement summarizes my results:
Result 2.1. For a given coupon payment shareholders choose lower reissuance and pay-out
thresholds with CoCo debt financing compared to straight debt financing.
A direct implication of Result (2.1) is that, CoCo debt financing can lead to lower frequencies
of recapitalization in the good state and lower cash holdings in both states compared to
straight debt financing. As long as conversion ratio is less than one, shareholders get more in
conversion than in bankruptcy, and thus are less willing to recapitalize the bank in the good
state of the world. Moreover keeping cash inside the bank has a precautionary motive and
thus is a form of risk management when outside financing is scarce. When committed to a
bail-in plan, shareholders have weaker precautionary incentives to hoard cash inside the bank
since the access to CoCo debt financing reduces the severity of the financing frictions in the
bad state.
Figure 2.5 plots the values of equity Ei (w), marginal value of cash to shareholders E ′i (W ) and
the value of debt C Di (w) for i =G ,B as functions of the bank’s cash reserves and for the base
case parameters of Table 2.1 and CC D = 5.60%. The values of CoCo debt in states G and B
display patterns analogues to the case of straight debt. Value of CoCo debt in the good state
is highest at reissuance threshold (here zero) and at the target level of cash. Since no default
or conversion happens in this state, the value of CoCo debt is quite insensitive to the level of
cash reserves. Value of the CoCo debt in the bad state of the world is increasing with the level
of cash buffer since higher cash holdings bear lower risks of conversion.
Figure 2.5 also shows that the value of equity is increasing in cash reserves in line with other
dynamic models with financing frictions. Additionally, the marginal values of cash to equity
holders show that equity values in both states of the world are now concave. This means that
for this given bail-in contract, the option to time the cheaper equity market before the bank
runs out of cash has no value to shareholders.
To study the effects of the terms of the CoCo contract on the convexity of equity value in
the good state of the world, Figure 2.6 plots the marginal value of cash to shareholders for
69
Chapter 2. Bail-in Plan and Macroeconomic Conditions
different cases. To see how the levels of interest payment and conversion ratio affect this
convexity, I fix the coupon payment (at CC D/SD = 4.00%, CC D/SD = 5.60%, CC D/SD = 6.00%,
and CC D/SD = 7.00%) and plot the marginal value of cash for straight debt and CoCo debt with
α= 0.5 and α= 0.8. The marginal value of cash to shareholders starts decreasing when the
option to time equity markets loses its value to shareholders. When the bank has no access to
external liquidity with straight debt, the level of cash reserves that separates the convex and
concave regions of equity value is quite high. With CoCo debt, bank’s shareholders have access
to an alternative source of financing in the bad state but they lose a fraction of the bank upon
conversion. If the conversion is not too dilutive, CoCo financing becomes a very attractive
alternative source of liquidity. The precautionary motive dominates the motive to time the
market and thus the value of equity in the good state becomes globally concave. On the other
hand when conversion ratio is high, CoCo refinancing becomes less appealing to shareholders.
Thus for low levels of cash the option to time the cheaper equity markets in the good state of
the world dominates the precautionary motive. This leads to a local convexity in the value of
equity.
Figure 2.5 shows that for a given coupon payment the higher the conversion ratio, the larger the
inflection point that separates the convex and concave regions. The maximum happens forα=
1 which coincides with the case of straight debt. Additionally for a given conversion threshold,
higher coupon payments decrease the continuation value of the bank to shareholders and
thus their incentives to tap equity markets in the good state before the bank runs out of cash.
This decreases the inflection point at which equity value becomes concave. For example,
when CC D/SD = 4.00% equity value in the good state becomes concave for cash reserves as
low as 0.04 when conversion ratio is 0.5 but stays convex up to levels as large as 0.07 for a
conversion ratio equal to 0.8. When CC D/SD = 5.60%, the value of equity is globally concave
when α= 0.5, but is convex up to a level of 0.065 when α= 0.8. For both cases the cash level
that separates the convex and concave regions is the highest for straight debt financing. The
following statement summarizes the results on the convexity of equity value in the good state:
Result 2.2. With CoCo debt financing, the level of cash reserves that separates the convex and
concave regions of the equity value in the good state is lower than with straight debt financing
and is increasing in conversion ratio and decreasing in the level of coupon payment.
Result (2.2) has direct implications on the risk-taking incentives of shareholders when they
commit to a bail-in plan. Appropriate choice of the CoCo bail-in contract (the level of interest
payments and the conversion ratio) can eliminate the local convexity in the value of the equity
in the good state and thus discourage shareholders from risk taking.
Results (2.1) and (2.2) imply that the level of dilution shareholders face upon conversion and
the level of interest they pay to CoCo debt holders are key determinants of the effects of CoCo
financing on bank’s payout and refinancing policies. Shareholders keep less cash inside the
bank and recapitalize less frequently when they are committed to a bail-in contract. To what
extent they do so depends largely on the conversion ratio. Moreover appropriate choice of
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the terms of the bail-in contract can decrease or fully eliminate shareholders’ risk-taking
incentives.
2.4.3 Optimal CoCo design and bank capital structure
Having analysed the optimal bank policy choices and the effects of the design of CoCo contract
on these policies, I now study the optimal capital structure of the bank. When the conversion
threshold is optimally set to zero, the level of coupon payments and the conversion ratio
determine the value of the CoCo debt. For any given level of conversion ratio, the optimal
coupon is such that the sum of the equity value and the proceeds from debt issuance net of
the costs of capital injection is maximized when CoCo debt is issued for the first time. Bank’s
shareholders choose the level of interest payments that maximizes 15
max
CC D (α)∈R+
EG (W
∗
G (CC D (α))+C DG (W ∗G (CC D (α))−W ∗G (CC D (α)). (2.11)
Since the bail-in plan is designed to eliminate the possibility of the bank’s failure, I assume
that the bank who commits to such a plan does not face regulatory leverage requirements. I
will discuss the case where the bank with a bail-in plan is also regulated in the next section.
Under the baseline parametrization of Table 2.1, the optimal coupon payment for the bank’s
shareholders is C∗C D = 5.60%. This is the level of coupon payment reported in Table 2.1 and
used for the analysis in Section 2.4.2. For this level of coupon, shareholders set the optimal
target level of cash to 0.116 (3.28% of the total asset value) in the good state and 0.158 (4.48%
of the total asset value) in the bad state. Equity reissuance threshold is zero which means that
the option to time equity markets in the good state has no value to shareholders.
Table 2.3 reports the value maximizing capital structure and the implied bank policies as
functions of conversion ratio. The optimal reissuance threshold is zero for all conversion
ratios. The table shows that higher conversion ratios increase the debt capacity of the bank.
When the conversion ratio is high, the price of the CoCo debt is high and so are the proceeds
from CoCo issuance. The two features of the bail-in plan that eliminate the risk of inefficient
liquidations include conversion of the debt into equity and reissuance of new CoCo debt to
replace the converted one. I assume that conversion is efficient, in that there is no cost in
converting debt into equity shares of the bank. However CoCo refinancing is costly. Higher
interest payments decrease the bank’s cash reserves faster and thus increase the probability of
hitting the conversion and reissuance threshold. So even though a higher coupon payment
cannot lead to higher costs of default (since these costs do not exist in this set-up), they can
still increase the CoCo refinancing costs. The increased frequency of CoCo refinancing leads
to higher expected costs. So to find the value maximizing coupon, the tax benefits of the debt
are balanced against its refinancing costs. Table 2.3 shows that for high levels of conversion
15Depositors are senior claim holders that do not bear any losses in the event of conversion and continue
their right to receive a fixed stream of interest. Since deposits and issuance costs are fixed, I omit them from the
maximization problem.
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ratios, this trade-off happens at higher level of coupon payments, and shareholders choose
higher levels of debt that lead to big tax savings. At the same time, coupon payments are
cash outflows that decrease the bank’s cash reserves and increase the probability of conver-
sion. To compensate for the higher cash outflows, shareholders optimally wait longer before
distributing any dividends outside the bank.
If shareholders set the conversion ratio to one, they commit to a restructuring plan that
transfers the full ownership of the bank from shareholders to debt holders in the event of
bankruptcy. This means that by defining how to deal with the bank’s failure ex-ante, share-
holders avoid the costs of liquidation and create value.16 The following statement formalizes
these results:
Result 2.3. Higher conversion ratios lead to higher optimal leverage ratios and create more
value for the shareholders of the bank.
To study the effects of asset risk and the severity of financing conditions in the bad state,
Table (2.5) reports the optimal capital structure, the value of the bank net of cash reserves (as
calculated in (2.11) at the optimal level of C∗C D ), the reissuance threshold, the target levels of
cash in both states of the world, and the debt ratio ranges in both states for different model
parameters. The table reports these values for two different conversion ratios: α= 0.5, and
α = 1 and for the case of regulated straight debt. Panel (A) reports the values obtained in
the base case environment. Whether or not CoCo financing for a bank that does not face
regulatory leverage requirements leads to higher debt ratios depends on the level of dilution
shareholders face upon conversion. However, as the panel shows no matter how dilutive the
conversion is, since bail-in plan eliminates the costs of liquidation and decreases the severity
of financing constraints in the bad state, it increases the bank value. Moreover shareholders
are less willing to recapitalize before they have to in the good state of the world since they
have access to an alternative source of outside liquidity in the bad state. Lastly, shareholders
have less incentive to build up liquidity buffers since they do not face inefficient liquidations
when the bank runs out of cash. Shareholders face dilution and incur the cost of refinancing
when the bank depletes its cash reserves, however for as long as these costs are lower than the
liquidation costs, the optimal target levels of cash in both states are smaller with CoCo debt
compared to straight debt.
Panels (B) and (C) report the bank’s optimal choices for high (σ= 0.10) and low (σ= 0.06) levels
of asset risk. The results demonstrate that the patterns identified with straight debt financing
remain and here again riskier assets decrease the optimal leverage ratios and increase the
pay-out thresholds for an unregulated bank. An additional result is that no matter how risky
16 There is an additional benefit to more dilutive CoCo bonds. As Calomiris and Herring (2013) discuss, higher
conversion ratios make CoCo debt financing more interesting to investors and thus increase the demand from
investors. In my model, CoCo refinancing cost is independent of the design of the CoCo. However if there is a
higher demand for more dilutive (thus more debt-holder friendly) CoCo debts from investors, one can assume the
refinancing cost of such debt obligation to be lower. This will only re-enforce the fact that higher conversion ratios
create more value.
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bank’s assets are, shareholders always choose a level of debt that eliminates any incentives
to time the equity markets in the good state, and thus only recapitalize at the last moment.
The optimal level of debt results in a globally concave value of equity in the good state and
eliminates any risk taking incentives. These results hold for both levels of conversion ratio
when the bank is not regulated.
Panels (D) and (E) show the effects of CoCo reissuance costs (which is an indication of the
severity of financing constraints in the bad state). Higher refinancing costs lead to lower
optimal leverage ratios, and higher target levels of cash. Since refinancing is more costly, cash
becomes more valuable inside the bank and dividends are paid-out later. It is also optimal to
issue CoCo debt with lower coupon payments since coupon payments are cash out-flows that
can increase the probability of conversion and thus expected refinancing costs. Shareholders
respond to the more severe financing constraints in the bad state through a combination of
lower leverage and higher cash buffers inside the bank. For the case of α= 0.5, shareholders
choose to recapitalize only when the bank runs out of cash in the good state for both levels of
reissuance costs. When conversion is fully dilutive, the higher CoCo issuance cost of γC = 0.20
in the bad state leads to a positive reissuance threshold in the good state. The combination of
high dilution and high reissuance cost makes conversion very costly for shareholders and thus
provides them with higher incentives to raise new equity funds before the bank runs out of
cash in the good state.
Finally panels (F) and (G) demonstrate the effects of the higher probability of a jump from the
good to the bad state. Results are similar to the ones obtained in panels (D) and (E). Since
higher piGB increases the probability of facing more severe financing constraints, shareholders
decrease the coupon payments and increase the target levels of cash to retain larger cash
buffers inside the bank.
Overall the comparison of the results obtained in different panels for both CoCo cases and
for straight debt case, shows that as long as liquidation is more inefficient than conversion
and refinancing, CoCo debt financing creates value for shareholders. The following statement
summarizes my results in this section:
Result 2.4. A bank who commits to a bail-in plan
• can choose lower or higher leverage ratios depending on how dilutive CoCo debt is.
• chooses to recapitalize less in the good state and keep lower cash buffers in both states of
the world, independent of the conversion ratio.
• for any given conversion ratio, chooses a debt level that leads to globally concave equity
value and eliminates risk-taking incentives when it is not regulated.
The above discussion implies that bail-in plans have the potential to increase leverage ratios,
and decrease recapitalizations and cash buffers within the banking system. However since
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they eliminate the costs of negative externalities associated with SIFIs’ failures they can be
socially optimal, for as long as their execution is efficient.
Regulated bank
In this section, I study the effects of banking regulation on the bank’s optimal capital structure
and policy choices in the presence of a bail-in plan. When the bank is regulated, I append the
leverage constraint in (2.4) evaluated at W to shareholders optimization problem in (2.11).
When shareholders initially raise some debt in the good state of the world, they are constrained
to choose a coupon payment for which their maximum debt ratio (which is attained at equity
reissuance threshold in the good state) does not exceed the regulatory level of 1−Λ.
Under the baseline parametrization of Table 2.1, the leverage constraint is not binding and
the optimal coupon payment CC D = 5.60% satisfies the regulatory leverage requirements
since the maximum debt ratio for this level of coupon payment is 95.79 which is less than
96%. Table 2.4 reports the optimal capital structure and the implied bank policy choices as
functions of conversion ratio for a regulated bank. The table shows that the results in the case
of regulated bank generally follow the same pattern as the results for the case of unregulated
bank. Specifically, higher conversion ratios allow shareholders to choose higher coupon
payments. Additionally both dividend thresholds and the reissuance threshold increase when
conversion ratio increases. The variation in the optimal level of debt is, however, much smaller
than the case of unregulated bank. Increasing conversion ratio from 0.40 to 1 increases the
unregulated optimal coupon from 4.49% to 11.61%, whilst it only increases the regulatory
optimal coupon from 4.49% to 5.62%. Apart from α = 0.4 and α = 0.5 cases, the leverage
constraint is binding and the debt ratio fluctuates over a fairly similar range. The small
variation in the optimal coupon payment when the leverage ratio is binding is due to the fact
that the face value of the CoCo debt that is issued at par when the bank is in the good state and
its capital buffer is at its maximum (target level) is quite insensitive to the level of conversion
ratio. When the leverage constraint is binding the value of the bank net of capital injections
decreases with the conversion ratio. This is because the increase in capital injection (which
is equal to the target level of cash in the good state of the world) is more significant than the
increase in the coupon payment when conversion ratio increases.
Comparing the results for regulated and unregulated bank shows that for any level of conver-
sion ratio for which the regulatory constraint is binding, regulation decreases the debt capacity
of the bank and its debt ratio. It also increases the dividend thresholds in both states of the
world and the reissuance threshold. Banks that are subject to Tier 1 leverage requirements,
issue less debt, keep bigger cash buffers and recapitalize more often in the good state. Notably,
reissuance threshold that is zero for all conversion ratios for an unregulated bank increases to
0.059 for a regulated bank with a fully dilutive CoCo debt. However, regulation decreases the
value of the bank net of capital injection when leverage constraint is binding.
SIFIs are subject to capital requirements since their failure can lead to significant social costs
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that are not internalized by their shareholders. The objective of bank regulation is thus to
decrease the probability of banks’ failure or equivalently government bail-outs. A bail-in
plan is defined to eliminate the possibility of banks’ failures and thus the associated social
costs. If the execution of a bail-in plan is efficient, one can argue that it can replace (at least
partially) banking regulation. Indeed if shareholders could commit to a bail-in plan, the
costs associated with their high leverage ratio, lower cash buffers and lower recapitalization
threshold would be fully internalized. Therefore bail-ins have the potential to avoid public
bail-outs and thus reduce the need for banking regulation. On the contrary, when market debt
lacks the conversion feature or when the bank does not replace the converted debt with new
CoCo debt, there is a need for regulation since the external costs of bank’s failure are not borne
by the bank’s shareholders and thus are not included in their optimization problem. In these
cases, the private costs of bank’s failure are significantly lower than its social costs and thus the
privately optimal leverage ratio can be much higher than what is socially optimal. Therefore
there is a need for banking regulation.
To study the effects of asset risk and the severity of financing conditions in the bad state for a
regulated bank, Table 2.5 includes the case of a regulated bank with a fully dilutive CoCo (α= 1
regulated). When the conversion ratio is α= 0.5, the bank’s optimal capital structure satisfies
the leverage constraint and thus regulation does not change bank’s policies. The results for the
effects of asset risk, the CoCo issuance costs, and the frequency of jumps to the bad state on
bank’s pay-out policy follow the same pattern as in the case of unregulated bank. Specifically
higher asset risk, higher reissuance costs, and more frequent jumps to the bad state provide
incentives for shareholders to keep more cash inside the bank. Table 2.5 shows that for all
different cases, the level of coupon payment is much lower and the level of reissunce threshold
is much higher for a regulated bank compared to an unregulated bank. Additionally higher
asset risk and higher probability of a jump to the bad state increase the reissuance threshold.
The effects of increasing reissuance costs from γ= 0.10 to γ= 0.55 on the reissuance threshold
are negligible. As discussed only very high levels of reissuance costs have significant effects on
the optimal level of reissuance threshold. As for the case of straight debt, when the leverage
constraint is binding, the bank can choose higher levels of coupon payment for higher levels
of volatility and higher frequencies of jumps to the bad state. This is because the face value of
CoCo debt is decreasing in these two arguments.
2.5 Conclusion
I develop a formal model of a bail-in plan to eliminate the inefficient liquidations of SIFIs. To
do so, I introduce a countercylical CoCo debt as a hybrid security that converts into equity
when the bank is in distress and recapitalization or reissuance of additional debt is not possible.
The bank in my model faces stochastic financing frictions and it can raise equity at a cost only
in the good state of the world. In the bad state when the conversion is triggered, the bank
issues new CoCo debt to replace the converted debt. Issuing CoCo debt in the bad state is
more costly than issuing equity in the good state. I study the optimal financing and pay-out
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policies of the bank and its value-maximizing capital structure when it has committed to a
bail-in plan. I also examine how the design of the bail-in plan (specifically the conversion
ratio) affects the bank’s policy choices and optimal leverage ratios.
With this model, I first show that higher conversion ratios increase the debt capacity of the
bank and lead to higher potential leverage ratios. At the same time by providing a new source
of outside liquidity and eliminating liquidations costs, bail-in plans decrease shareholders’
incentives to build up cash buffers within the bank and to recapitalize when they can. Inde-
pendent of the conversion ratio, shareholders always choose a level of coupon for which it
is optimal to abstain from recapitalization until absolutely necessary in the good state. This
level of debt leads to globally concave value of equity and thus eliminates any risk-taking
incentives.
My results shows that although bail-in plans potentially lead to a less capitalized, more levered
banking system, they can create value from both private and social points of view since they
eliminate both the costs of liquidation and the costs of negative externalities associated with
SIFIs’ failures.
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Table 2.1: Base case parameters and implied variables
Symbol Value
A. Parameter values
Profitability of bank’s operations µ 0.15
Volatility of bank’s operations σ 0.08
Risk-free rate r 0.035
Cost of deposits CD 0.02
Corporate tax rate θ 0.20
Cost of equity issuance in G γE 0.01
Cost of CoCo issuance in B γC 0.15
Liquidation cost φ 0.30
Probability of moving from G to B piGB 0.18
Probability of moving from B to G piBG 0.20
Regulatory Tier 1 leverage ratio Λ 0.04
Conversion ratio α 0.50
B. Implied variables for straight debt
Regulated Unregulated
CSD = 5.79% CSD = 8.24%
Dividend threshold in G W ∗G 0.210 0.238
Dividend threshold in B W ∗B 0.253 0.285
Equity reissuance threshold W 0.060 0.069
Debt ratio range in G(%) [ϕ(W ∗G ),ϕ(W )] [92.03,96.00] [108.78,114.03]
Debt ratio range in B (%) [ϕ(W ∗B ),ϕ(0)] [90.96,97.67] [107.41,116.33]
C. Implied variables for CoCo debt
CC D = 5.60% CC D = 5.79%
Dividend threshold in G W ∗G 0.116 0.104
Dividend threshold in B W ∗B 0.158 0.147
Equity reissuance threshold W 0 0
Conversion threshold W¯ 0 0
Debt ratio range in G(%) [ϕ(W ∗G ),ϕ(W )] [92.65,95.79] [93.74,96.58]
Debt ratio range in B (%) [ϕ(W ∗B ),ϕ(W¯ )] [91.55,95.79] [92.62,96.58]
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Figure 2.1: Value of bank securities - straight debt case
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The figure plots the values of equity and straight debt and the marginal values of cash to
shareholders as functions of the bank’s cash reserves in the good and bad states of the world.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of conversion ratio
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The figure plots the reissuance threshold, and the target levels of cash in states B and G as
functions of conversion ratio.
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Figure 2.4: Straight debt versus CoCo debt
Straight debtα=0.8α=0.5
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The figure plots the reissuance threshold, and the target levels of cash in states B and G as
functions of coupon payment for straight debt, α= 0.5, and α= 0.8.
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Figure 2.5: Value of bank securities - CoCo debt case
Good state Bad state
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The figure plots the values of equity and CoCo debt and the marginal values of cash to share-
holders as functions of the bank’s cash reserves in the good and bad states of the world.
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Figure 2.6: Marginal value of cash
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The figure plots the marginal values of cash to shareholders in the good state for straight debt,
α= 0.5, and α= 0.8 as functions of the bank’s cash reserves and for different levels of coupon
payment (CC D/SD = 4.00%) top left, (CC D/SD = 5.60%) top right,(CC D/SD = 6.00%) bottom left,
and (CC D/SD = 7.00%) bottom right.
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3 Debt Maturity and Systemic Risk
3.1 Introduction
One of the most prominent features of current financial markets is the extensive use of short-
term debt. Banks and other financial institutions use short-term debt as a main source to fund
their long-term assets. When funding long-term assets with short-term debt, banks face roll
over risk: investors might not be willing to roll over their debt if they receive an interim adverse
news on the quality of banks’ assets, leading to inefficient early liquidation. This makes short-
term debt an attractive disciplinary device that can help align the incentives of shareholders
and debt holders. So although short-term debt can increase roll over and bankruptcy risks,
banks may still find it optimal if the disciplinary benefits of short-term financing overcome
the costs associated with roll over risk and early liquidations. Consistent with this view, several
studies analyse the optimal maturity structure of a bank (see e.g. Huberman and Repullo
(2013), and Repullo et al. (2013)).
The standard theoretical approach to study the optimal maturity structure of banks considers a
"representative" bank framework. In this framework bankers face a trade-off between the costs
of early liquidation of short-term debt and its disciplinary benefits. As the experience of the
financial crisis of 2007-2009 shows, banks hold correlated assets, and this asset commonality
can become a source of systemic risk since one bank’s failure can affect the other banks in the
financial system. Thus a representative bank framework that studies the optimal maturity
structure of banks, has a major short-coming since it only assumes the discipling effect of
short-term debt at an individual level and excludes the effects of asset commonality and the
systemic risks it exposes banks to. Recognizing this short-coming, this paper develops a set-up
with multiple banks that subject themselves to negative and positive externalities by investing
in correlated assets. The trade-off between the costs and benefits of short-term financing takes
into account these externalities. The purpose of this paper is therefore to understand how the
optimal maturity structure changes when banks invest in correlated assets and thus are subject
to systemic risk as well as their own individual risk. To this end, I build a model in which two
banks suffer fire-sale externalities but benefit from information synergies because they invest
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in correlated assets. I then examine the optimal bank liability structure and compare it to the
representative bank framework.
Banks in my model invest in correlated risky assets. The expected pay-off of each asset
depends on the effort exerted by each banker. The correlation between these two investments
is exogenously given and is known to all agents. The effort exerted by bankers is costly and its
costs are increasing in its level. However, the costs of exerting effort are lower when assets are
more correlated because the correlation between assets generates information synergies that
bankers can benefit from. To focus on the choice of maturity structure, I abstract from the
choice of leverage and I assume that banks finance their risky investments entirely with debt.
Bankers act in the best interest of shareholders and choose between long-term and short-term
debt financing to maximize shareholders’ value. In addition to the optimal maturity, bankers
need to decide how much effort to exert. Since bankers decide on the level of effort after the
required funds have been raised and they are the residual claimants behind investors, there
is a misalignment of incentives between bankers and investors who can not observe how
diligently bankers work.
My model has three dates: t = 0 is the initial date when bankers raise funds to invest in risky
projects and decide on the level of effort they exert. t = 1 is the interim date at which a public
signal on the quality of banks’ projects is received. When banks are financed with short-term
debt they have to roll over their debt at t = 1; if short-term debt is not rolled over at this
interim date, banks are subject to early liquidation. t = 2 is the final date when each bank’s
investment’s return is realized if the bank has not been liquidated before. The return of each
investment directly depends on the level of effort each banker decides to exert.
To study the disciplinary effects of short-term debt, my model abstracts from liquidity risk and
focuses on roll over decisions of investors based on the signal they receive on the quality of
banks’ projects.1 This unique binary signal received at the interim date, indicates whether the
investments are likely to fail or succeed. Short-term investors can decide not to roll over their
debt if the signal is sufficiently bad. In this case the bank has to liquidate its assets to pay-off
short-term debt holders. Any banker who faces early liquidation loses a private benefit of
control. Early liquidation is inefficient. However, unlike representative bank models in which
the cost of early liquidation is fixed, in my model the level of inefficiency of early liquidation
depends on how much assets are liquidated in total, i.e. whether one or both banks are subject
to liquidation, and how correlated banks’ assets are. This is because if the investments of the
two banks are highly correlated, fire-sale of the assets of one bank in the market decreases
the selling price of the assets of the other bank. So the failure of one bank affects the other
bank since it increases its cost of liquidation. In my model, similar to the representative bank
models, the threat of early liquidation along with the loss of the private benefit of control can
discipline bankers when they choose their levels of effort. However, the fact that the roll over
1A liquidity shock to investors is another potential reason for which a bank might fail to roll over its short-term
debt. This means that investors might not be willing to roll over their debt because they face a more urgent or
an alternative need for their money. The early liquidations caused by such liquidity shocks have no disciplinary
effects on bankers and are thus excluded from my analysis.
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cost of short-term debt for each bank depends on the performance of the other bank and
the correlation of its assets with the other bank, is a key feature that distinguishes my model
from representative bank frameworks. In my model asset commonality leads to negative
fire-sale externalities and positive information synergies and through these two channels it
affects the costs of exerting effort and the level of inefficiency of early liquidations. So asset
commonality plays an important role in the trade-off between the disciplinary benefits and
the early liquidation costs of short-term debt.
Using this systemic model of banks, I first solve for the optimal effort level each bankers choose
to exert in both long-term and short-term debt cases. I show that when private benefit of
control is large enough or early liquidation value is small enough, short-term debt can induce
each banker to choose a higher level of effort. Given the optimal effort level, I study banks’
optimal maturity structure by comparing the social surplus given the optimal effort level
chosen by each banker in both long-term and short-term debt cases. I show that even though
a higher effort level can be achieved with the use of short-term financing, the inefficiency of
early liquidations, costs of exerting effort and the loss of the private benefit of control do not
guarantee the optimality of short-term financing.
Next, I examine the role of banks’ assets correlation on the optimal effort level and maturity
structure. Since banks can invest in correlated assets, the liquidation of one bank’s assets
can have significant consequences on the other one. When more than one bank is forced
to liquidate correlated assets, liquidation values depress even further. This means that the
failure of one bank to roll over its debt has negative externalities on the other one. On the
other hand, correlation can be beneficial since it leads to information synergies which bank
managers can benefit from to decrease their costs of effort. For example bankers can share
information when they lend to the same sector or to the same geographical area. I show that
in the presence of these positive and negative externalities, the optimal liability structure of
each bank is significantly dependant on the correlation of banks’ assets.
When the level of asset correlation is fixed, the costs of exerting effort depends on the level
of information synergies. Additionally the level of inefficiency of early liquidations depends
on how severe fire-sale externalities are. For a given level of correlation, high information
synergies decrease the cost of exerting effort and provide incentives for bankers to exert more
effort even with long-term debt. In this case, the level of effort with long-term debt becomes
closer to the level of effort with short-term debt and the disciplinary benefits of short-term
debt decreases. Fire-sale externalities can affect the maturity structure in two different ways.
First, for a given level of correlation, when fire-sale externalities are high early liquidations
become more costly. This increases the costs of short-term debt. Second, with high fire-
sale externalities the threat of early liquidation becomes stronger and thus the disciplinary
benefits of short-term debt increase. So when fire-sale externalities are high, early liquidations
associated with short-term debt become more costly but less probable. Short-term debt
becomes the optimal mode of financing when the second effect dominates the first one.
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How changing asset commonality affects the optimality of short-term financing depends
on the level of negative and positive externalities that investment correlation leads to. My
analysis show that when information synergies are low enough or fire-sale externalities are
high enough, increasing correlation can lead to higher disciplinary effects of short-term debt
that induce higher efforts exerted by bankers. In this case the disciplinary benefits of short-
term debt can eventually overcome its costs and short-term debt can become the optimal
mode of financing. Thus there is a more important role for short-term debt in high correlation,
high fire-sale externalities and low information synergies environments.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that each bank’s optimal mode of financing
depends not only on its individual characteristics, but also on the positive and negative
externalities that exist in the banking systems where banks invest in correlated assets. Thus
studying the optimal maturity structure in a representative bank framework can lead to
misleading results since it ignores the role that the correlation between banks’ assets play on
the trade-off between the disciplinary effects of short-term debt and its roll over risk.
Related Literature The literature on the maturity structure of bank’s liabilities and the role
of short-term debt is divided into two main strands. One branch of this literature studies
the liquidity services banks provide through short-term financing. This literature assumes
that investors can be hit by liquidity shocks and thus decide not to rollover their debt; see
for example Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988). The second
branch focuses on the disciplinary effects of short-term debt in the presence of incentive
problems that arise when the interests of bankers and creditors are not aligned. Some examples
include Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992), Diamond and Rajan (2001),
Diamond and He (2013), Cheng and Milbradt (2012), Huberman and Repullo (2013), and
Repullo et al. (2013). My paper belongs to the latter since investors in my model have no
demand for liquidity.
Among the literature that considers the role of short-term debt in the presence of some sort
of frictions, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) is one of the first ones. They consider the role of
short-term debt in a model where the banker can abscond with funds ex-post. Absconding is
socially inefficient and is more tempting to the banker when the realized returns are lower. So
it can be optimal to use short-term debt since investors are able to force liquidation to prevent
absconding. The focus of this paper is thus on the ex-post incentive effect of the maturity
structure and not ex-ante risk taking. Diamond (1991) has an adverse selection set-up where at
an interim date investors can upgrade or downgrade their initial imperfect rating of the bank
according to some new information received. It is more likely for the good type banks to be
upgraded. There is a preference for short-term financing when borrower expects their rating to
improve. This comes at the cost of liquidation risk of short-term debt. The choice of maturity
structure has to trade-off the two. Rajan (1992) focuses on a borrower’s choice between short-
term or long-term bank debt and long-term arm’s-length lender. The optimal bank debt
maturity depends on the bargaining power of the bank after the true state of the project is
revealed. This paper focuses mostly on the effect of lender’s type on ex-ante level of effort
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chosen by the borrower. Diamond and Rajan (2001) model short-term demandable debt as an
effective tool that can incentivize the banker not to attempt to extort rents. Such short-term
debt can help overcome the commitment problem between the banker and depositors.
More recently, Diamond and He (2013) study how the debt maturity affects debt overhang
problem i.e. the reduced incentives for equity holders to undertake investments, because
some value accrue to more senior claimants. The paper studies under what conditions the
debt overhang problem is more severe in case of short-term versus long-term debt. Cheng
and Milbradt (2012) study the optimal maturity decision in a continuous time setting where
the banker can choose the riskiness of the assets. Also in another recent approach, Della Seta
et al. (2017) formulate a dynamic model with financing frictions, and show that short-term
debt can increase shareholders’ incentives for risk-taking.
The papers closest to mine in this literature are Huberman and Repullo (2013) and Repullo
et al. (2013). Huberman and Repullo (2013) use an ex-ante moral hazard framework to com-
pare the benefits and costs of short-term and long-term financings. They show that under
some conditions risky short-term debt can be an effective incentive device. Using a similar
framework Repullo et al. (2013) characterize the optimal mix of short-term and long-term debt
maturities as a function of the project’s profitability. They show that using short-term debt
is optimal only when the investment’s profitability is low and that the gains from short-term
financing are generally small. Both Huberman and Repullo (2013) and Repullo et al. (2013)
model a moral hazard problem within a representative bank framework. My paper is built on
the models used in these two papers; however an additional bank with correlated assets adds
systemic externalities that banks are subject to which affect the costs of exerting effort and the
level of inefficiency of early liquidations and consequently banks’ optimal maturity decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section includes the model and the cases of long-term
and short-term debt. Section 3.3 is devoted to model implications. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
I consider an economy with three dates (t = 0,1,2), two banks, A and B , managed by two
bankers and a large number of investors. All agents are risk-neutral and the risk free rate is
normalized to zero. There are also two risky assets that each for an investment of one unit of
funds at time zero yields stochastic cash flow R˜ at date t = 2. R˜ can take two values
R˜ =
RH , with probability piRL , with probability 1−pi ,
where i = A,B . Each banker chooses the parameter pi ∈ [0,1], i.e. the probability of success,
by deciding how much effort to exert. So the distributions of the cash flows of the two risky
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investments depends on the effort of each banker.2 Each banker incurs a cost when exerting
effort. This cost depends not only on the level of effort but also on the correlation of the
banks’ investments. If banks are invested in correlated projects they can benefit from sharing
information about the projects, i.e. information synergies.3 So for the same amount of effort
they incur lower costs. The cost function is thus assumed to be given by g (ρ)C (p) where g (ρ)
is a decreasing function of the correlation of the two risky assets with g (0)= 1 and C (p) is a
twice differentiable, increasing and convex function of p. C (p) and g (ρ) are identical for both
banks. I define the cost function as a logarithmic function
C (p)= γ ln 1
1−p ,
which is increasing and convex and satisfies
C ′(1)=∞.
I assume the simplest form for g (ρ) as follows
g (ρ)= 1−bρ,
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 shows the level of information synergies bankers can benefit from. For a
higher b the information synergies are greater and the cost of exerting effort is lower for a
given correlation.
The correlation of banks’ investments is public information and is available to both bankers
and investors. Since g (ρ) is a decreasing function of the correlation, more correlated invest-
ments can be appealing to bankers since they can benefit from information synergies that
decrease their costs of efforts. The bankers decide simultaneously how much effort to exert
after they have raised the necessary funds and observed the correlation between the risky
assets.
To focus on the choice of maturity structure, I abstract from the choice of leverage. I assume
that banks have no capital and can only fund their investments by borrowing from the outside
lenders. I also assume that RL < 1≤Di <RH where Di is the face value of the debt that bank i
takes. This means that each bank can only repay its debt when the higher cash flow is realized
and defaults on its debt obligation when the lower outcome is realized. p is not observable by
banks’ investors. However these outside investors observe a signal s˜ on the pay-off of the risky
assets at t = 1. Depending on the signal observed at interim date and the maturity structure of
the bank’s debt, the bank can either get liquidated or continue to t = 2, when the final pay-offs
2Although I do not assume any explicit correlation in the distribution of the two risky investments, they are
indeed implicitly correlated. This is because the outcome of each project depends on the level of the effort exerted
by each banker which in turn depends on the correlation between the risky projects. As I will discuss in more
details later-on, the level of the effort each bankers optimally choose to exert depends on banks’ investment
correlation through both the costs of exerting effort and the liquidation value of the risky project.
3Synergies from sharing information has also been the subject of arguments used to motivate loan syndication.
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are realized. If the bank finances itself with long-term debt, it continues its operations until
the cash flows are realized at t = 2. If the bank finances itself with short-term debt, depending
on the signal received at interim date t = 1, debt holders can decide to roll over their debt or
not. If they roll over the debt, cash flows are realized at date t = 2. Otherwise the bank gets
liquidated at t = 1. Early liquidation is inefficient. If any of the banks continues its operations
until the final date t = 2, its banker earns a private benefit of control B . Bankers lose this
private benefit of control in the event of an early liquidation at the interim date.
The effect of one bank’s failure on the other bank is shown in the form of a drop in the
liquidation value of the risky assets if both banks default or get early liquidated simultaneously.
This depressed liquidation value, through which the failure of one bank affects the other bank,
is the source of systemic risk in my model. At the interim date t = 1, each individual bank faces
inefficient liquidation if it fails to roll over its debt. Additionally if early liquidation is triggered,
its level of inefficiency depends on the ability of the other bank to roll over its debt. Thus in my
model the cost of liquidating banks’ assets depends on how much assets are being liquidated
in total and how correlated these assets are. When only one bank liquidates its assets it can
get a higher price for its liquidated assets while when two banks liquidate their assets at the
same time, their liquidation values drop due to the fire-sale externalities of the simultaneous
asset sales; to what level this happens depends on how correlated these assets are.
To model the fire-sale externalities, I define f (ρ) as the coefficient of fire-sale externalities.
f (ρ) is a decreasing function of the correlation of the two investments with f (0)= 1. I assume
f (ρ) is given by
f (ρ)= 1−aρ,
where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 shows the severity of fire-sale externalities. When more than one bank
liquidate their assets, the liquidation value is a fraction f (ρ) of the liquidation value in the
case where only one bank faces liquidation. This means that in the case of joint bank failures,
the liquidation value of assets depends both on the level of the correlation between banks’
assets and the magnitude of fire-sale externalities (a). The bigger a is, the less the liquidation
value when both banks default at the same time will be. This also holds for ρ. In the following
sections I study the systemic effects of asset commonality in more details in both long-term
and short-term debt cases.
3.2.1 Long-term debt
Suppose that each bank funds one unit of risky investment by issuing long-term debt that
matures at date t = 2. Each banker then decides on the level of effort pi she wants to exert
given that she has to incur a cost g (ρ)C (pi ) and that the probability of the good outcome
RH depends on her effort. So the expected pay-off of each project depends on the level of
the effort that the banker decides to exert which in turn depends on the correlation between
banks’ investments.
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Since the debt is long-term, there is no roll over decision at t = 1 and the debt matures when
the final payments of the projects are realized. This means that each banker gets B regardless
of her project’s outcome since she does not lose control of the bank till final date. If investment
is successful and RH is realized, debt holders get the face value Di of their claims and each
banker gets the remaining cash flows of RH −Di . If investment fails, it only yields a lower
cash flow of RL which is not enough to repay debt and thus the bank defaults. Bankruptcy
which is costly on its own, becomes even more costly when two banks default at the same
time. This is because if the investments of the two banks are highly correlated, the fire-sale of
the assets of one bank in the market decreases the selling price of the assets of the other bank.
To model this, I assume the liquidation value at t = 2 is a fraction λ≤ 1 of the cash flows of
the investment if only one bank defaults, but is a fraction f (ρ)λ of the cash flows if two banks
default at the same time. f (ρ) which is defined as f (ρ)= 1−aρ is a decreasing function of the
correlation of the two investments with f (0)= 1.
The pay-offs to the different claimants of bank i are summarized in Table 3.1. Banker i ’s
pay-off is computed as
Πi = pi (RH −Di )− g (ρ)C (pi )+B.
The optimal contract for bank i , (pi ,Di ), is the solution to the following problem
max
(pi ,Di )
Πi , (3.1)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)
pi = argmax
p
′
i
p
′
i (RH −Di )− g (ρ)C (p
′
i )+B , (3.2)
and the participation constraint
pi Di + (1−pi )λRL[p j + f (ρ)(1−p j )]≥ 1. (3.3)
The ICC determines the bankers choice of effort p given the promised debt repayment of D ,
and the participation constraint ensures that investors get at least their required rate of return
on what they invest. The ICC is equivalent to
g (ρ)C ′(pi )= (RH −Di ). (3.4)
Solving for Di from (3.4) and plugging it into the participation constraint (3.3), I get
pi [RH −λRL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]− g (ρ)C ′(pi )]≥ 1−λRL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)].
The participation constraint is binding at the optimum since investors just break even. So
each banker’s pay-off is equal to the total surplus (the expected pay-off of the debt holders
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plus the expected pay-off of the banker minus the cost of effort and the cost of investment).
SWLT =B +pi RH + (1−pi )λRL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]− g (ρ)C (pi )−1
=B +pi [RH −λRL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]]+λRL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
− g (ρ)C (pi )−1.
If I define h(p) as
h(p)=RH −λRL[p(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)],
I can re-write SWLT as
SWLT =RH − (1−pi )h(p j )+B − g (ρ)C (pi )−1. (3.5)
h(p) represents the difference between the total cash flows available in the good state (no
default case) and the bad state (default case). In the good state the investment yields RH . In
the bad state the investment yields RL but since the bank defaults and default is costly, the
total amount of cash flows available is only λRL[p(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)] which depends on whether
or not the other bank defaults as well. Since there is no early liquidation, B is available in both
states so it does not appear in the expression for h(p). The first two terms on the RHS of (3.5)
are the cash flows available from the project, the third term B is the private benefit of control
to the banker, and the last two terms represent the cost of investment and the cost of exerting
effort.
Given h(p), the optimization problem of banker i is equivalent to
max
(pi )
pi h(p j )− g (ρ)C (pi ), (3.6)
subject to
pi [h(p j )− g (ρ)C ′(pi )]≥ 1−λRL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]. (3.7)
3.2.2 Short-term debt
With short-term debt, investments have the same pay-off structure of the previous case, but
the debt matures at the interim date t = 1. Whether short-term debt is rolled over to the final
period or not depends on the information about the return of the banks’ investments which
is revealed at the date of the roll over decision t = 1. In this case, I assume there is a unique
signal s observed by investors for both banks. Depending on the signal investors receive, they
decide whether or not to roll over their debt for another period. If investors of bank i ∈ {A,B}
decide not to re-finance the bank, the bank will be liquidated at t=1 and investors will get the
liquidation value of the banks’ assets. This early liquidation is inefficient in that investors can
only receive a fraction of the expected pay-offs. Additionally, liquidation value depends on
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whether or not the other bank gets liquidated at t = 1. So the liquidation value of bank i ’s
assets, L1,i , at the interim date t = 1 satisfies
L1,i =
ψE[R˜|s˜ = s], if bank j is not liquidated at t = 1f (ρ)ψE[R˜|s˜ = s], if bank j is liquidated at t = 1,
where ψ is the fraction of the assets that can be recovered in the event of early liquidation. I
assume
ψ<λ< 1,
meaning that early liquidation is more inefficient than bankruptcy at the final pay-off date.
This is because there are deadweight costs associated with closing down the project early. If
the assets were to be sold to an outside buyer (second-best owner) at t = 1, the valuation that
this buyer assigns to these assets are lower at t = 1 compared to t = 2. This assumption means
that if there were no disciplinary benefits to short-term debt, it would have never been optimal
for banks to finance their risky assets with short-term debt. Assuming that early liquidation is
always inefficient allows me to focus on the disciplinary benefits of short-term debt.
If investors of bank i decide to refinance the bank, the bank continues its operations until
the final date when pay-offs are realized. In this case, the banker gets the private benefit of
control B . If investment yields the high cash flow, investors get the face value of their debt. If
the low cash flow is realized, the bank defaults. The liquidation value at time t = 2 depends
on whether or not the other bank has already been liquidated at t = 1 or is defaulting at t = 2.
Thus the liquidation value of bank i ’s assets at t = 2, L2,i satisfies
L2,i =
λRL , if bank j is not liquidated at t = 1 neither at t = 2f (ρ)λRL , if bank j is liquidated at t = 1 or t = 2.
At interim date t = 1 lenders observe a public signal s˜ on the banks’ risky assets which can take
two values s˜ ∈ {sG , sB } such that
Pr (sG |R˜ =RH )= Pr (sB |R˜ =RL)= q,
where parameter q ∈ [ 1
2
,1] describes the quality of the signal. By Bayes’ law for bank i
Pr (R˜ =RH | sG )= Pr (R˜ =RH )Pr (sG |R˜ =RH )
Pr (sG )
= pi q
pi q + (1−pi )(1−q)
,
and
Pr (R˜ =RH | sB )= Pr (R˜ =RH )Pr (sB |R˜ =RH )
Pr (sB )
= pi (1−q)
pi (1−q)+q(1−pi )
.
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Similarly for low realization
Pr (R˜ =RL | sG )= Pr (R˜ =RL)Pr (sG |R˜ =RL)
Pr (sG )
= (1−pi )(1−q)
pi q + (1−pi )(1−q)
,
and
Pr (R˜ =RL | sB )= Pr (R˜ =RL)Pr (sB |R˜ =RL)
Pr (sB )
= (1−pi )q
pi (1−q)+q(1−pi )
.
When q = 1
2
, the signal is uninformative since Pr (R˜ = RH | sG ) = Pr (R˜ = RH | sB ) = pi and
Pr (R˜ =RL | sG )= Pr (R˜ =RL | sB )= 1−pi . The closer to 1 q is, the more informative the signal
will be. For short-term debt to induce the banker to choose a higher level of effort, it needs
to be risky. This means that for a binary signal, short-term debt holders should necessarily
take two different actions: liquidating when the bad signal is observed and rolling over when
the good signal is observed. If this is not the case and investors roll over their debt even when
the bad signal is observed, short-term debt is safe and thus does not induce any disciplinary
effects on bankers. Since my model focuses on the disciplinary effects of short-term debt,
I assume the case where each bank is liquidated at t = 1 if and only if the bad signal sB is
observed. In this case, the pay-offs to different claimants of bank i are summarized in Table
3.2.
Each Banker’s pay-off is computed as
Πi = qpi (RH −Di )− g (ρ)C (pi )+ [qpi + (1−q)(1−pi )]B.
The optimal contract for bank i , (pi ,Di ), is the solution to the following problem
max
(pi ,Di )
Πi , (3.8)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)
pi = argmax
p
′
i
qp
′
i (RH −Di )− g (ρ)C (p
′
i )+ [qp
′
i + (1−q)(1−p
′
i )]B , (3.9)
and the participation constraint
qpi Di + (1−q)(1−pi )λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]+
ψ[q(1−pi )RL + (1−q)pi RH ]u(p j )≥ 1,
(3.10)
where u(p) = [qp + (1−q)(1−p)](1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ) captures the effects of correlation on the
early liquidation value. In the representative bank framework where f (ρ)= 1, u(p) is equal
to 1 and the early liquidation value of one bank is independent of the other bank’s roll over
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outcome. The ICC is equivalent to
g (ρ)C ′(pi )= q(RH −Di )+ (2q −1)B , (3.11)
and shows that for any given level of D if the signal is informative enough (q close to 1) and
the private benefit of control is big enough, the threat of early liquidation can induce each
banker to exert a higher level of effort. Comparing the ICC in both cases of long-term and
short-term debt (3.4) and (3.11), for a given level of D,B , and q , the higher the correlation, the
bigger the difference between the effort levels in the short-term and the long-term financing
will be. This is because g (ρ) is a decreasing function of ρ.
I can do the same comparison for the participation constraints in the long-term and short-
term debt cases ((3.3) and (3.10)), when q is close to 1, i.e. the signal is informative enough.
Since early liquidation is less efficient than the liquidation at the final date (ψ< λ), for any
given level of D and the effort level of the other bank p j , the participation constraint in
the case of short-term financing is stricter than the one in the case of long-term financing.
Moreover since for any given level of p j and q , u(p j ) is increasing in f (ρ) and thus decreasing
in ρ, higher investment correlations make it even more difficult to satisfy the participation
constraint for short-term debt (to see this better consider (3.3) and (3.10) for the completely
informative signal q = 1 ).
Solving for Di from (3.11) and plugging it into the participation constraint (3.10), I get
pi [qRH + (2q −1)B − g (ρ)C ′(pi )]+ (1−q)(1−pi )λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]+
ψ[q(1−pi )RL + (1−q)pi RH ]u(p j )≥ 1,
grouping terms in pi gives
pi [qRH + (2q −1)B − (1−q)λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]+ψ[(1−q)RH −qRL]u(p j )
−g (ρ)C ′(pi )]+ (1−q)λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]+ψqRLu(p j )≥ 1.
Since the participation constraint is binding at the optimum, each banker’s pay-off is equal to
the social surplus.
SWST =qpi (RH +B)+ (1−q)(1−pi )B + (1−q)(1−pi )λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ψ[(1−q)pi RH +q(1−pi )RL]u(p j )− g (ρ)C (pi )−1.
(3.12)
The first three terms on the RHS of (3.12) represent the total pay-offs when the debt is rolled
over (when the good signal is observed). The fourth term is the total pay-off when the debt is
not rolled over and thus the project is liquidated at t = 1. The last two terms capture the cost
of exerting effort and the cost of investment.
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Regrouping terms in pi and simplifying, I get
SWST =pi [qRH + (2q −1)B − (1−q)λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ψ[(1−q)RH −qRL]u(p j )+ (1−q)λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ (1−q)B +ψqRLu(p j )− g (ρ)C (pi )−1.
Let w(p) denote
w(p)=qRH + (2q −1)B − (1−q)λRL[qp(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ψ[(1−q)RH −qRL]u(p),
(3.13)
then I can re-write the social surplus as
SWST =pi w(p j )+ψqRLu(p j )+ (1−q)λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ (1−q)B − g (ρ)C (pi )−1.
(3.14)
So banker i ’s optimization problem is equivalent to
max
(pi )
pi w(p j )− g (ρ)C (pi ) (3.15)
subject to
pi [w(p j )− g (ρ)C ′(pi )]≥1− (1−q)λRL[qp j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]−ψqRLu(p j ). (3.16)
Similar to h(p) in long-term debt case, w(p) represents the difference between the total cash
flows available in the good and bad states, when the signal is informative enough. When q
is very close to 1, investors decide not to roll over their debt when they receive a bad signal
which is when investment is going to fail with a high probability. When the good signal is
received, the project is going to succeed and investors roll over their debt. In the event of early
liquidation total cash flows available is ψRL[p(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)] which depends on whether
or not the other bank’s assets are liquidated at t = 1. In the good state, total cash flows of the
project RH is available and since there is no early liquidation the banker can collect the private
benefit of control B .4
Since ψ < λ and B is positive, w(p) > h(p) for any given level of p. This means that the
difference between the cash flows available in the good and bad states is more significant with
short-term financing compared to long-term financing.
As mentioned earlier, in order for short-term debt to have a disciplinary effect on the banker,
it needs to be risky, i.e. it should not be rolled over when the bad signal is received. For this to
be the case and the threat of early liquidation to be credible, the following condition should
4To see this better, look at the case of the completely informative signal, i.e. q=1. In this case w(p) simplifies to
w(p)=RH +B −ψRL [p(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)].
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hold:
E[R˜|s˜ = sB ]≤D (3.17)
When the bad signal is observed, debt holders do not roll over their debt if their expectation
of the value of the bank at t = 2 is lower than their face value. Solving for Di from (3.10), and
given that
E[R˜|s˜ = sB ]= pi (1−q)RH + (1−pi )qRL
pi (1−q)+q(1−pi )
,
(3.17) simplifies to
[pi (1−q)RH + (1−pi )qRL][qpi +ψ(pi (1−q)+q(1−pi ))u(p j )]
+[pi (1−q)+q(1−pi )][(1−q)(1−pi )λRLr (p j )−1]≤ 0,
where r (p)= qp(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ).
3.3 Model implications
In this section, I examine the implications of the model for the level of the effort optimally
exerted by each banker and the resulting total surplus in both short-term and long-term debt
cases. I will then study the trade-off between the disciplinary effects of short-term debt and its
roll over risk and the effects of investment correlation on this trade-off.
3.3.1 Optimal effort level
According to the optimization problems given by (3.6) and (3.7) for long-term debt and (3.15)
and (3.16) for short-term debt, each banker chooses an optimal level of effort to exert. The
participation constraints for both short-term and long-term financings (3.7), and (3.16) are
binding at optimal levels of effort p∗i ,LT and p
∗
i ,ST . So for any given level of bank j ’s effort we
have
p∗i ,LT h(p j )−p∗i ,ST w(p j )+ g (ρ)[p∗i ,ST C ′(p∗i ,ST )−p∗i ,LT C ′(p∗i ,LT )]=
λRL[(q(1−q)−1)p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)(2−q)]+ψqRLu(p j ).
(3.18)
If the signal is informative enough, i.e. q → 1, both u(p j ) and [(q(1− q)−1)p j (1− f (ρ))+
f (ρ)(2−q)] go to p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ). This means that I can re-write (3.18) as:
[p∗i ,LT h(p j )−p∗i ,ST w(p j )]+ [g (ρ)[p∗i ,ST C ′(p∗i ,ST )−p∗i ,LT C ′(p∗i ,LT )]]=
(ψ−λ)RL(p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)).
ψ < λ, and f (ρ) É 1, so (ψ−λ)RL[p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)] is negative. When short-term debt is
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used as a disciplinary device, the effort level it induces has to be higher than the effort level
with long-term financing p∗i ,ST > p∗i ,LT . When this is the case, and since the cost function C (p)
is convex, g (ρ)[p∗i ,ST C
′(p∗i ,ST )−p∗i ,LT C ′(p∗i ,LT )] is positive. If (3.18) were to hold, the sum of the
two brackets has to be negative. This means that the first bracket has to be negative enough to
compensate for the positivity of the second bracket. For this to happen w(p j ) should be bigger
enough than h(p j ). In this case, when the banker finances the assets with short-term debt,
she experiences a more significant loss in the bad state relative to the good state compared
to when she finances the assets by long-term debt. Thus, she has more incentives to exert
a higher level of effort to compensate for this greater loss. This happens either when the
private benefit of control B is big or when the early liquidation value ψ compared to the late
liquidation value λ is small.5 A bigger loss of value with short-term debt either in the form
of private benefit of control or inefficient early liquidation provides incentives for bankers to
exert more effort.
Proposition 3.1. If private benefit of control is large enough and/or early liquidation value is
small enough, short-term debt can induce each banker to choose a higher level of effort.
A higher level of effort induced by short-term debt does not necessarily lead to the optimality
of short-term debt. This is due to the inefficiency of early liquidations. To study the optimality
of short-term debt, one needs to compare the social surpluses resulting from the effort levels
induced by short-term and long-term debt financing. This is what I study in detail in the next
section.
3.3.2 Optimal maturity contract
To study banks’ optimal financing contracts, I focus on symmetric equilibrium where both
bankers choose the same level of effort, i.e. pi = p j . In this case I can re-write the optimization
problem in the case of long-term debt (3.6) and (3.7) as follows
max
(p)
ph(p)− g (ρ)C (p),
subject to
p[h(p)− g (ρ)C ′(p)]≥ 1−λRL[p(1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)].
Since the constraint is binding at the optimal effort level p∗LT we have
p∗LT [RH−λRL[p∗LT (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]−g (ρ)C ′(p∗LT )]−1+λRL[p∗LT (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]= 0. (3.19)
5When q → 1, w(p j )−h(p j )=B + (λ−ψ)RL(p j (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)).
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The total surplus at this optimal effort level is given by
SW ∗LT =B +p∗LT [RH −λRL[p∗LT (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]]
+λRL[p∗LT (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]− g (ρ)C (p∗LT )−1.
(3.20)
From (3.19) and (3.20) we have
SW ∗LT (ρ)=B + g (ρ)[C ′(p∗LT (ρ))p∗LT (ρ)−C (p∗LT (ρ))]. (3.21)
Equation (3.21) shows that in the case of long-term financing, the social surplus at any given
level of correlation and private benefit of control depends on the optimal level of effort, and
on the cost and the marginal cost of exerting effort. Both cost and marginal cost of exerting
effort depend on the level of effort and also the correlation between banks investments as
it is obvious from the presence of the term g (ρ). Since in the case of long-term financing
bankers stay in control of the bank till the final date, total social surplus also includes the
private benefit of control.
Using the same arguments, we can re-write the equation for the optimal effort in the short-
term debt case (p∗ST ) as follows
p∗ST [w(p
∗
ST )− g (ρ)C ′(p∗ST )]−1+ (1−q)λRL[qp∗ST (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ψqRL[[qp∗ST + (1−q)(1−p∗ST )](1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]= 0.
(3.22)
The total surplus at this optimal effort level is given by
SW ∗ST = p∗ST w(p∗ST )+ (1−q)B + (1−q)λRL[qp∗ST (1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]
+ψqRL[[qp∗ST + (1−q)(1−p∗ST )](1− f (ρ))+ f (ρ)]− g (ρ)C (p∗ST )−1.
(3.23)
From (3.22) and (3.23) we have
SW ∗ST (ρ)= (1−q)B + g (ρ)[C ′(p∗ST (ρ))p∗ST (ρ)−C (p∗ST (ρ))]. (3.24)
The expression for the social surplus for short-term debt (3.24) is very close to the one for
long-term debt (3.21). It is evaluated at the optimal effort level in case of short-term debt and
since the banker loses control in case of early liquidation, private benefit of control is only
added with a probability of 1−q . The optimal level of effort with short-term debt depends on
the private benefit of control since p∗ST depends on w(p
∗
ST ) which in turn depends on B as
shown in (3.13). Social welfare includes the private benefit of control in case of bank’s survival
which happens with a probability of p∗ST (2q −1)+ (1−q). Although the term p∗ST (2q −1) is
accounted for in the second term on the RHS of (3.24), (1−q)B which is independent of p∗ST is
added to SW ∗ST (ρ) separately. By contrast, in the case of long-term financing the optimal level
of effort p∗LT is independent of the private benefit of control and thus B is added as a seperate
term to SW ∗LT (ρ) in (3.21).
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Given (3.21) and (3.24), for short-term debt to dominate long-term debt we should have
∆SW (ρ)= SW ∗ST (ρ)−SW ∗LT (ρ)
= g (ρ)[C ′(p∗ST (ρ))p∗ST (ρ)−C ′(p∗LT (ρ))p∗LT (ρ)+C (p∗LT (ρ))−C (p∗ST (ρ))]
−qB ≥ 0,
(3.25)
which means that
[C ′(p∗ST (ρ))p
∗
ST (ρ)−C ′(p∗LT (ρ))p∗LT (ρ)]≥
qB
g (ρ)
+ [C (p∗ST (ρ))−C (p∗LT (ρ))]. (3.26)
Equation (3.26) shows that whether or not short-term debt dominates long-term debt depends
not only on the level of effort induced by each type of maturity, but also on the cost and the
marginal cost of effort, private benefit of control, and the information synergies function (the
benefit of having correlated investments since
1
g (ρ)
is increasing in correlation).
In the previous section, I analysed the conditions under which the optimal effort level is higher
with short-term financing. If short-term debt is to be the optimal financing instrument for
banks, the higher optimal effort it induces, should generate a higher total social surplus. To
see whether or not this is the case, I study ∆SW (ρ) from (3.25). When p∗ST (ρ)> p∗LT (ρ), the
first difference inside the bracket on the RHS of (3.25) is positive whilst the second one is
negative. This is because the cost function is increasing and convex. Moreover since B is
positive, the sign of ∆SW (ρ) is not necessarily positive. This means that inducing a higher
optimal level of effort with short-term debt does not necessarily lead to a higher social surplus.
Thus even though short-term debt can potentially increase the optimal level of effort, whether
or not it is the optimal financing option depends on the level of private benefit of control,
the cost function and the correlation between banks’ investments. The following proposition
summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 3.2. Under the conditions specified in Proposition 3.1, short-term debt financing
can induce higher efforts. However the level of inefficiency of early liquidation, costs of exerting
effort and the loss of the private benefit of control can lead to a lower total social surplus
achieved with short-term debt. When this is the case, long-term debt becomes the optimal mode
of financing despite the lower level of effort it leads to.
3.3.3 Role of correlation
Having studied the conditions under which short-term debt induces bankers to exert more
effort and whether or not this higher effort leads to a higher social welfare, I now study the
role of bank’s asset correlation on the trade-off between the disciplinary effects of short-
term debt and its roll over losses. Specifically, I study how the optimality of short-term debt
can be affected in the presence of positive and negative externalities induced by correlated
investments. To do so, I assume a benchmark case where banks are indifferent between
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short-term and long-term financing. Assume there exists a level of correlation ρ0 such that
at ρ = ρ0 total surplus in the case of long-term debt is equal to the total surplus in the case
of short-term debt. Thus for ρ = ρ0, bankers are indifferent between issuing long-term and
short-term debts and the following holds
∆SW (ρ0)=
g (ρ0)[C
′(p∗ST (ρ0))p
∗
ST (ρ0)−C ′(p∗LT (ρ0))p∗LT (ρ0)+C (p∗LT (ρ0))−C (p∗ST (ρ0))]−qB = 0.
(3.27)
Given that ∆SW (ρ0) = 0, I can study how the difference between total surpluses ∆SW (ρ)
changes by changing the correlation from the original level of ρ0. To do this, I calculate the
derivative of ∆SW with respect to correlation
∆SW ′(ρ)= g ′(ρ)[C ′(p∗ST (ρ))p∗ST (ρ)−C ′(p∗LT (ρ))p∗LT (ρ)+C (p∗LT (ρ))−C (p∗ST (ρ))]
+ g (ρ)[C ′′(p∗ST (ρ))p∗ST (ρ)p
′∗
ST (ρ)−C ′′(p∗LT (ρ))p∗LT (ρ)p
′∗
LT (ρ)].
(3.28)
Since at ρ = ρ0, (3.27) holds we can evaluate the derivative of ∆SW (ρ) at ρ0
∆SW ′(ρ0)= g (ρ0)[C ′′(p∗ST (ρ0))p∗ST (ρ0)p
′∗
ST (ρ0)−C ′′(p∗LT (ρ0))p∗LT (ρ0)p
′∗
LT (ρ0)]
+ g
′(ρ0)qB
g (ρ0)
.
For this derivative to be positive we need to have
C ′′(p∗ST (ρ0))p
∗
ST (ρ0)p
′∗
ST (ρ0)>C ′′(p∗LT (ρ0))p∗LT (ρ0)p
′∗
LT (ρ0)−
g ′(ρ0)qB
g 2(ρ0)
. (3.29)
If (3.29) holds, ∆SW ′(ρ0) is positive and ∃ρ > ρ0 for which ∆SW (ρ) will be positive. Therefore,
short-term debt becomes the optimal mode of financing for at least some level of correlation
bigger than the benchmark level of ρ0. When ∆SW (ρ) is a monotonic function of correlation
(which is the case in the numerical example that I study in the next section),∆SW (ρ) is positive
for all ρ > ρ0 and short-term debt is the optimal mode of financing for all levels of correlation
bigger than the benchmark level of ρ0.
So whether or not short-term debt is the optimal mode of financing depends not only on each
bank’s individual characteristics, but also on how systemic banks’ investments are. Increasing
or decreasing the correlation from a benchmark case where bankers are indifferent between
short-term and long-term financing, can make short-term debt the dominant or dominated
mode of financing depending on the level of existing positive and negative externalities. A
representative bank framework does not include these negative and positive externalities and
thus can lead to misleading results when banks invest in correlated assets.
As a special case, assume that ρ0 = 0. This means that bankers are indifferent between
short-term and long-term debt exactly when their investments are not correlated, i.e. the
representative bank framework studied in Repullo et al. (2013). When (3.29) holds at ρ0 = 0,
∆SW ′(0) is positive and bankers would no longer be indifferent between short-term and
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long-term financing if they were to make correlated investments. In fact in this particular
case, moving away from a representative bank framework to a case where banks’ assets are
correlated, can make short-term debt the optimal mode of financing. In other words as soon
as banks start investing in correlated assets, short-term debt becomes more appealing. By
contrast, if ∆SW ′(0) is negative long-term financing becomes the optimal mode of financing
as soon as we move away from the representative bank framework to a set-up where banks’
investments are correlated.
If ρ0 > 0 and (3.29) holds, decreasing correlation from ρ0 can make long-term debt the optimal
mode of financing whilst increasing it beyond ρ0 can make short-term financing optimal.
This means that for at least some given investment correlation of ρ > ρ0 > 0, short-term debt
is the optimal mode of financing. However when banks’ maturity structure is studied in
a representative bank framework which is equivalent to the case where ρ = 0, the optimal
choice of maturity will appear to be long-term debt. When ∆SW ′(ρ) given by (3.28) is zero at
ρ = 0, a representative bank framework gives an accurate result of the optimality of short-term
versus long-term debt. In this case the difference between social surpluses is indifferent to the
correlation between banks’ assets and thus the optimal choice of debt maturity is independent
of the level of banks’ asset commonalities. I formalize my results from this section in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. When banks make correlated investments,
• their optimal mode of financing depends not only on their individual characteristics but
also on the positive and negative externalities induced by the correlation between assets.
• studying the optimality of short-term debt in a representative bank framework, ignores
these externalities and can lead to misleading results.
How correlation affects the optimality of short-term debt depends on the level of negative (fire-
sale) and positive (information synergies) externalities. To see this better, I study a numerical
example in the next section where I can show how the optimal mode of bank financing can
change from short-term debt to long-term debt and vice versa by changing the correlation of
banks’ investments.
3.3.4 A numerical example
To study a numerical case, I use the model parameters reported in Table 3.3, and I calculate the
optimal effort levels in both long-term and short-term debt cases and the resulting total social
surpluses. Calculating ∆p (the difference between the optimal effort levels with short-term
financing versus long-term financing), I study whether or not short-term debt induces bankers
to exert more effort. When the threat of early liquidation with short-term debt provides more
incentives for bankers to exert effort,∆p becomes positive. Next, I compare the total surpluses
at the optimal effort level for both maturities by calculating ∆SW to decide which maturity is
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optimal for this set of parameters. A positive ∆SW means the total social surplus with short-
term debt is higher than with long-term debt and thus it is optimal for bankers to finance their
risky projects with short-term debt. For the set of parameters in Table 3.3, condition (3.17)
is satisfied. So the short-term debt used to finance each bank’s project is indeed risky and is
only rolled over to the final date if the good signal is received at t = 1. Thus short-term debt
financing has the potential to act as a disciplinary device.
Since investment correlation affects the optimal level of effort and the optimal maturity
structure through negative and positive externalities, in addition to the benchmark case I
study the effort level and the total social surplus in different environments with low, medium
and high levels of fire-sale externalities and information synergies. In each of these cases, I
study the effects of changing investment correlation, projects’ outcome, and private benefit of
control on the optimal level of effort and the optimal debt maturity. Additionally, I analyse
the effects of changing externality parameters (a,b) on the level of effort and the total social
surplus in three cases with high, medium and low investment correlations.
Given the base case parameters value in Table 3.3, the correlation at which ∆SW is zero and
thus bankers are indifferent between short-term and long-term debt is around 0.65. Moreover,
at a zero investment correlation level (in a representative bank framework) ∆SW is negative
and thus long-term debt is the optimal mode of financing. This optimal maturity structure
changes to short-term debt when the level of correlation increases to more than 0.65. Below
I summarize how the optimal maturity structure is affected by the main parameters of the
model, specially the investment correlation, fire-sale externalities and information synergies.
Investment correlation (ρ)
The benchmark case I study has average levels of fire-sale externalities and information
synergies. The base case values for fire-sale externalities parameter (a) and information
synergies parameter (b) are set to 0.5 and 0.05 respectively. Figure 3.1 shows that in this
benchmark case both ∆p and ∆SW increase by increasing investment correlation. This
means that when bankers invest in more correlated assets, the difference between effort
levels induced by short-term and long-term financings increases. Moreover, with the baseline
parameters of fire-sale externalities and information synergies, when increasing investment
correlation, the increase in ∆p leads to an increase in ∆SW until it eventually becomes
positive, i.e. short-term debt eventually becomes the optimal mode of financing at ρ = 0.65. At
correlation levels above 0.65 short-term debt is the optimal maturity structure whilst at lower
levels of correlation, long-term debt is the optimal mode of financing.
As discussed in the last section, the effects of increasing correlation between banks’ assets on
∆p and ∆SW depend on how severe fire-sale externalities and how beneficial information
synergies are. To see this, I study different environments with different levels of fire-sale
externalities and information synergies. For each case, I keep one of the two parameters at
the medium level, whilst I change the other parameter to a "high" or "low" level. Thus I have
4 additional cases: high and low fire-sale externalities cases and high and low information
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synergies cases.6
As the top panel of Figure 3.1 shows, increasing correlation induces a much higher effort
level with short-term debt compared to long-term debt when fire-sale externalities are big
or information synergies are small. On the contrary, for low fire-sale externalities or high
information synergies, short-term and long-term financing effort levels become closer when
the correlation between banks’ investments is increased.
Note that in all cases∆p is positive for any given level of investment correlation, i.e. short-term
debt always induces bankers to exert more effort regardless of how systemic banks are. This
is true for different levels of information synergies and fire-sale externalities. However when
fire-sale externalities are very high or information synergies are very low, a more significant
difference in effort level for any given level of correlation is observed. In other words, the
optimal effort level with short-term debt financing is closer to the optimal effort level with
long-term debt financing when information synergies are high or fire-sale externalities are
low.
When fire-sale externalities are high, increasing correlation results in a significant drop in
early liquidation value when both banks default at the same time. This lower liquidation value
provides more incentives for bankers to exert more effort with short-term debt. Moreover,
for a given level of correlation, higher fire-sale externalities result in lower expected early
liquidation values and thus a higher effort level is to be exerted with short-term debt. The op-
posite holds for high information synergies. When information synergies are high, increasing
correlation results in a significant drop in the costs of exerting effort. When exerting effort
is less costly, bankers find it optimal to exert more effort even with long-term debt so ∆p
decreases. Additionally for a given level of correlation, when information synergies are lower
the cost of exerting effort is higher and so bankers are more reluctant to exert effort. In this
case, there is a stronger disciplinary role for short-term debt financing.
Although ∆p remains positive when changing investment correlation in different environ-
ments, the social surplus in case of short-term financing is not necessarily higher than the
social surplus with long-term financing. This is demonstrated in the bottom panel of Figure
3.1 which shows that the level of ∆SW can change from negative to positive depending on
the level of correlation, fire-sale externalities and information synergies. This is in line with
both Proposition 3.2, and Proposition 3.3. It is only for a high enough level of difference in
effort levels that higher effort in short-term debt can lead to a higher total social surplus. ∆SW
does not only depend on ∆p but also on the level of private benefit of control, cost of exerting
effort and the level of inefficiency of early liquidation. The cost of exerting effort and the
early liquidation value both depend on the correlation between banks assets and the level of
6 For high and low fire-sale externalities cases I keep the information synergies at a medium level (b = 0.05) and
I study the cases where there are high fire-sale externalities (a = 0.9) or low (no) fire-sale externalities (a = 0). For
high and low information synergies cases I keep the fire-sale externalities at a medium level (a = 0.5) and I study
the cases where the information synergies are high (b = 0.1) or where there are low (no) information synergies
(b = 0).
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fire-sale externalities and information synergies this correlation leads to. Thus correlation
affects the optimal maturity both indirectly through its effects on ∆p and directly through
its effects on the cost of effort and the early liquidation value. In the benchmark case with
an average level of fire-sale externalities and information synergies, increasing correlation
increases the disciplinary benefits of short-term debt relative to its early liquidation costs
and at one point short-term debt becomes optimal. This shows that in this case, although
when banks’ investments are uncorrelated, the benefits of short-term debt can not overcome
its costs, increasing correlation beyond a point (here ρ = 0.65) changes this result and the
disciplinary benefits of short-term debt eventually dominate its costs and make it the optimal
choice of financing.
The patterns observed in the benchmark case remain for both high fire-sale externalities and
low information synergies cases. However in both of these cases the increase in ∆SW is more
significant compared to the benchmark case. When fire-sale externalities parameter is as high
as 0.9, short-term debt becomes optimal for correlations as low as 0.3 and when there is no
information synergies, short-term debt dominates long-term debt for levels of correlations as
low as 0.4. On the other hand when there is no negative externalities and so the liquidation
values do not depend on the correlation of banks’ investments, not only short-term debt
never becomes optimal, its benefits decrease relative to its costs by increasing correlation.
This is because the threat of early liquidation is not strong enough and thus only results in
a small variation in the level of effort. As the top panel of Figure 3.1 shows in this case ∆p
is very small and decreasing with correlation. The small increase in the level of effort with
short-term debt is not enough to overcome the costs of early liquidations short-term financing
leads to and thus short-term financing is never optimal. In the case where there is a high
level of information synergies the benefits of short-term debt increase relative to its costs by
increasing correlation. However similar to the previous case this increase is never enough for
short-term debt to become optimal. As demonstrated in the top panel of Figure (3.1), here
again∆p is very small and decreasing with investment correlation. High information synergies
decrease the costs of exerting effort and motivates bankers to exert more effort even with
long-term financing. Increasing correlation decreases the costs of effort levels and thus ∆p
even further. The increase in ∆p is not big enough to overcome the costs of short-term debt
and thus long-term debt remains the optimal mode of financing for all levels of investment
correlation.
My results so far show that the relative benefits of short-term versus long-term debt signifi-
cantly depend on the level of correlation of banks’ investments and how this correlation affects
their cost of exerting effort and their liquidation values. The following statement summarizes
these results
Result 3.1. There is a more important role for short-term debt in high correlation, high negative
fire-sale externalities and low information synergies environments.
The disciplinary effects of short-term debt can make bankers exert more effort and thus
increase not only the probability of each individual bank’s success but also the probability
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of a joint success. However, only when the correlation is high and the negative fire-sale
externalities are higher relative to the positive information synergies that these disciplinary
benefits overcome the costs of early liquidation induced by short-term debt, and short-term
financing becomes optimal.
Negative and positive externalities (a,b)
Figure 3.2 shows ∆p and ∆SW as functions of fire-sale externalities a and information syner-
gies b. Since investment correlation, and negative and positive externalities affect bankers’
effort levels and social welfare simultaneously, in addition to my benchmark case where corre-
lation is set to an average level of (ρ = 0.5), I study the effects of a and b in a high correlation
environment with ρ = 0.9 and a low correlation environment with ρ = 0.2.
The effects of fire-sale externalities and information synergies on ∆p is demonstrated in
the top panel of Figure 3.2 in three different cases with low, medium and high investment
correlations. ∆p is positive in all three cases and remains so when changing the level of
positive and negative externalities. This means that short-term debt always induces a higher
effort level. However ∆p decreases (the level of effort with short-term debt becomes closer to
the level of effort with long-term debt) when information synergies are increased and when
fire-sale externalities are decreased. This means that the disciplinary effects of short-term
debt increase for higher levels of negative externalities and lower levels of positive externalities.
This is because higher levels of fire-sale externalities lead to lower expected early liquidation
values in the case of short-term debt financing and provides incentives for bankers to exert
more effort. On the other hand, when information synergies are high bankers have more
incentives to exert effort in both short-term and long-term debt cases because exerting effort
is less costly. Since bankers are willing to exert more effort on their own, the disciplinary effects
of short-term debt become less important and ∆p decreases.
High fire-sale externalities make early liquidations more costly and thus induce bankers to
exert more effort with short-term debt, the higher effort increases the expected pay-off of
the project and thus the social welfare. At the same time, fire-sale externalities increase the
cost of early liquidations. So when fire-sale externalities increase, early liquidation becomes
more costly but at the same time less probable. The bottom panel of Figure 3.2 shows that
the first effect dominates and ∆SW increases when increasing a. Whether or not short-
term debt becomes dominant for some higher levels of fire-sale externalities depends on the
level of correlation of the banks’ investments. In high correlation cases the increase in ∆SW
when increasing the fire-sale externalities is more significant and can eventually lead to the
optimality of short-term debt. However, in low correlation cases ∆SW increases at a lower
rate when increasing fire-sale externalities. When the correlation is low enough the increase
in ∆SW is never big enough to make short-term debt optimal.
Increasing the level of information synergies decreases the benefits of short-term debt com-
pared to its costs and makes it less and less attractive. High information synergies decrease the
cost of exerting effort and thus ∆p. When the level of effort induced by short-term debt is not
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significantly higher than the effort level with long-term debt, the early liquidation costs with
short-term debt become the more important factor and ∆SW decreases. For low correlation
cases ∆SW starts at negative levels and decreases even further when increasing information
synergies, meaning that short-term financing is never optimal. For higher correlation cases
although short-term debt starts as the optimal mode of financing, by increasing informa-
tion synergies it loses its relative advantage over long-term debt and it eventually becomes
dominated by long-term debt. The following statement summarizes the key results of this
discussion.
Result 3.2. With benchmark case parameters of Table 3.3
• increasing fire-sale externalities or decreasing information synergies, increases the relative
benefits of short-term debt and leads to higher ∆SW s.
• whether or not this increase is enough to lead to the optimality of short-term debt depends
on the level of investment correlation.
Although these results are obtained in my numerical example, it is clear that in general
whether or not short-term debt is optimal depends on the level of investments’ correlation
and the negative and positive externalities this correlation implies. Thus when banks invest
in correlated assets, studying the optimality of short-term debt in a representative bank
framework is not conclusive.
Projects bad outcome (RL)
In addition to the benchmark case, I study the effects of changing projects’ bad outcome in
high and low correlations, fire-sale externalities and information synergies environments. In
each case I keep two of the parameters ρ, a, and b at their medium levels and change the
remaining parameter to a high or low value.7
The top panel of Figure 3.3 shows that increasing the bad outcome of banks’ projects decreases
∆p. This holds for all cases of low, medium and high investment correlation and positive and
negative externalities. A higher bad outcome of the project increases the expected pay-off
of the project. This higher expected pay-off leads to higher pay-offs in case of liquidation.
Thus the banker has less incentives to exert more effort with short-term debt compared to
long-term debt.
As the bottom panel of Figure 3.3 shows increasing RL decreases ∆SW rapidly from a positive
level where short-term debt dominates long-term debt to a negative level where short-term
debt is dominated by long-term debt. This means that by increasing RL the benefits of short-
term debt decreases relative to its costs. This happens at a faster rate for cases in which there
7To be precise, in addition to the benchmark case (ρ = 0.5, a = 0.5, b = 0.05) I study the following cases: low
correlation (ρ = 0.2, a = 0.5, b = 0.05), high correlation (ρ = 0.9, a = 0.5, b = 0.05), low (no) fire-sale externalities
(ρ = 0.5, a = 0, b = 0.05), high fire-sale externalities (ρ = 0.5, a = 0.9, b = 0.05), low (no) information synergies
(ρ = 0.5, a = 0.5, b = 0), and high information synergies (ρ = 0.5, a = 0.5, b = 0.1).
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is low correlation between banks’ investments, low fire-sale externalities and high information
synergies. So the level of RL above which short-term debt financing is not optimal depends on
the level of the correlation and the magnitude of the positive and negative externalities this
correlation leads to.
Projects good outcome (RH )
The top panel of Figure 3.4 shows that increasing the good outcome of banks’ projects has a
similar effect to increasing the bad outcome of the project and decreases ∆p. This holds for all
cases of low, medium and high investment correlation and positive and negative externalities.
Similar to the last case, a higher RH increases the expected pay-offs in case of early liquidation.
Thus the banker has less incentives to exert more effort with short-term debt compared to
long-term debt.
As the bottom panel of Figure 3.4 shows, the effects of increasing the good outcome of banks’
investments on ∆SW are similar to the effects of increasing the bad outcome. By increasing
RH benefits of short-term debt decreases rapidly relative to its costs and it eventually becomes
dominated by long-term debt. This means that the disciplinary effect of short-term debt
is only present for quite low levels of investment’s good outcome. This is in line with the
results obtained in Repullo et al. (2013). However what is interesting is how the level of RH
above which short-term debt is not optimal changes when the correlation between banks’
investments changes. For a high level of correlation the disciplinary effect of short-term
debt remains the dominant factor for higher levels of RH , whilst in the low correlation case
short-term debt becomes dominated by long-term debt quite rapidly. Keeping correlation at
a medium level, I can study how these results are affected by changing the level of negative
and positive externalities. In the presence of very high negative fire-sale externalities the
disciplinary benefits of short-term debt dominates its costs of early liquidation for a wider
range of RH , whilst in the case where there is no negative externalities short-term debt becomes
quickly dominated by long-term debt at very low levels of RH . Positive externalities have the
opposite effects; lower information synergies leads to a bigger range of RH over which short-
term debt is optimal whilst higher information synergies decrease the benefits of short-term
debt faster and make it become the suboptimal mode of financing at lower levels of RH .
Private benefit of control (B)
When bank projects are financed by short-term debt, bankers risk losing their private benefit
of control if short-term debt leads to early liquidation. If the level of this private benefit of
control is higher, bankers have more incentives to prevent early liquidations in the fear of
losing this benefit of control. This is why ∆p increases by increasing B . The lower the private
benefit of control, the closer the effort level with short-term debt will be to the effort level
with long-term debt. The top panel of Figure 3.5 shows that decreasing the private benefit
of control beyond a point, can actually induce a lower level of effort with short-term debt
compared to long-term debt. This argument holds for all investment correlations and all levels
of positive and negative externalities.
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Increasing private benefit of control can affect ∆SW in two opposite directions. An increase in
private benefit of control motivates bankers to exert higher levels of effort with short-term
debt to avoid early liquidation and collect this higher benefit of control; this decreases the
costs of short-term debt. On the other hand increasing private benefit of control makes early
liquidation more costly in the case of short-term debt compared to long-term debt where
the probability of early liquidation is zero; this implies a higher cost of short-term debt. The
bottom panel of Figure 3.5 shows how ∆SW first increases and then decreases by increasing
the private benefit of control. This means that increasing B to some levels implies a net
decrease in the cost of short-term debt (the first effect dominates) but a further increase
beyond this level implies a net increase in the costs of short-term debt and reduces its relative
advantage (the second factor dominates).
High and low correlation, fire-sale externalities and information synergies do not change
the general pattern. However with average levels of positive and negative externalities, the
increase in ∆SW is only big enough to result in the optimality of short-term debt when the
level of correlation is high. For average correlations short-term debt becomes optimal when
we increase private benefit of control only in high fire-sale externalities or low information
synergies cases.
3.4 Conclusion
I study the optimal debt maturity in a framework where banks are subject to systemic risk
through correlated investments. Fire-sale externalities and information synergies in the pres-
ence of correlated assets can affect the trade-off between the disciplinary effects of short-term
debt and its roll over risk.
I show that whether or not short-term financing increases the total social surplus does not
only depend on each bank’s individual risk, but also on the systemic risk banks are exposed
to. Specifically there is a more important role for the disciplinary effects of short-term debt
in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and low information synergy environments.
Analysing the optimality of short-term debt versus long-term debt in a representative bank
framework abstracts from the externalities correlated investments lead to and thus can be
misleading.
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Table 3.1: Long-term debt pay-offs
Investment at t = 0 Cash flow at t = 2 Pay-off at t = 2
Investors Banker
−1
RH Di RH −Di +B
(Pr. pi )
RL
λRL B
(Pr. 1−pi )
(Pr. p j ) (Pr. p j )
f (ρ)λRL B
(Pr. 1−p j ) (Pr. 1−p j )
The table shows the long-term debt pay-offs for bank i where i and j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j . The
cost of effort for bank i is g (ρ)C (pi ).
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Table 3.3: Base case parameter values
Interpretation Symbol Value
Project’s good outcome RH 2.0
Project’s bad outcome RL 0.5
Liquidation parameter at t = 2 λ 1
Liquidation parameter at t = 1 ψ 0.8
information synergy parameter b 0.05
Fire-sale externalities parameter a 0.5
Marginal cost parameter γ 0.25
Private benefit of control B 0.2
The quality of signal q 0.95
Investment correlation ρ 0.5
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Figure 3.1: ∆p and ∆SW versus investment correlation (ρ)
a = 0,0.5,0.9 b = 0,0.05,0.1
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The figure shows how ∆p (top panel), and ∆SW (bottom panel) change with respect to the
changes in banks’ investments’ correlation. The left hand panel shows the cases of high
(dotted red line), medium (solid blue line) and low (dashed black line) fire-sale externalities
(a = 0,0.5,0.9) and the right hand panel shows the cases of high (dotted red line), medium
(solid blue line) and low (dashed black line) information synergies (b = 0,0.05,0.1).
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Figure 3.2: ∆P and ∆SW versus positive and negative externalities (a and b)
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W
The figure shows how ∆p (top panel), and ∆SW (bottom panel) change with respect to both
positive (the left panel) and negative externalities (the right panel). High (ρ = 0.9), medium
(ρ = 0.5), and low (ρ = 0.2) cases of correlation are shown by dotted red, solid blue, and dashed
black lines respectively.
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Conclusion
This thesis makes three main contributions to the research on bank liability structure. First,
in a cash management model in which liquidity problems are the major source of default
for banks, the first chapter of this thesis studies SIFI’s optimal capital structure from a social
point of view and when it has access to CoCo debt financing. The social welfare perspective
adopted in this chapter has two features: first, SIFI’s failure entails significant social costs that
are not borne by its shareholders. Second, the tax advantage of debt (a mere transfer between
taxpayers and bank’s shareholders) does not create any value. In this set-up, we show that
CoCo bonds like any other form of market debt are a socially inefficient way of financing SIFIs
if their only advantage is to provide tax subsidies. CoCo bonds reduce both the probability of
default (which is good for regulators) and the taxes paid by banks (which is good for financial
industry). However this is done at the expense of tax payers for whom the optimal mode of
financing for SIFIs is 100% equity.
Second, developing a theoretical model of a bail-in contract that eliminates the inefficient
liquidations of SIFIs and their subsequent social costs, this thesis seeks to address the too-big-
to-fail problem. To this end, the second chapter of this thesis introduces a countercyclical
CoCo debt as a hybrid security that converts into equity in the context of a pre-defined
retstructruing plan that the bank commits to ex-ante. The conversion which is triggered when
the bank is in distress and recapitalization is too costly and is followed by the reissuance of
CoCo debt, helps ease bank’s financing constraints in bad times. With this model, I study
the effects of the bail-in contract and its design features on bank’s optimal financing and
pay-out policies and its optimal choice of capital structure. I show that higher conversion
ratios increase the debt capacity of the bank and lead to higher potential leverage ratios. At
the same time by providing a new source of outside liquidity and eliminating liquidation costs,
bail-in plans decrease shareholders’ incentives to build up cash buffers within the bank and to
recapitalize when they can. So bail-in plans can potentially lead to a less capitalized, more
levered banking system, however, they can create value from both private and social points of
view since they eliminate both the costs of liquidation and the costs of negative externalities
associated with SIFIs’ failures.
Third, this thesis contributes to the literature studying the optimal debt maturity of banks.
In particular the third chapter investigates the optimality of short-term debt financing in a
framework where banks are subject to systemic risk through correlated investments. Asset
123
Conclusion
commonality leads to fire-sale externalities and information synergies which in turn can affect
the trade-off between the disciplinary effects of short-term debt and its roll over risk. I show
that, similar to the representative bank framework, short-term debt can induce bankers to
exert more effort to achieve a higher investment return. Whether or not this higher level of
effort increases the total social surplus depends on the costs of exerting effort and the costs of
early liquidations. Higher investment correlations make exerting effort less costly but make
early liquidations more costly. As a result the optimality of short-term debt is directly affected
by the level of banks investment correlation and the magnitude of the positive and negative
externalities this correlation leads to. Specifically there is a more important role for short-term
debt financing in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and low information synergies
environments. My results in the third chapter conclude that analysing the optimality of
short-term debt in a representative bank framework abstracts from the externalities correlated
investments lead to and thus can provide misleading results.
Further research
In this thesis, I have sought to answer some of the concerns about the stability of the financial
system. My focus is specifically on the liability structure of banks whose distress affects other
banks and financial institutions. In the first two chapters I study the effects of CoCo debt
financing and bail-in requirements on the optimal capital structure and optimal pay-out and
financing policy choices of banks. To do so, I have assumed that banks hold a fixed level of
assets. This means that I do not explore how CoCo debt financing or bail-in contract can affect
bank’s choice of risky assets, i.e. loan portfolios. Further research can be conducted to study
how access to CoCo debt financing or commitment to a bail-in contract can also affect the
level and composition of banks’ portfolio of risky assets.
Additionally, in the first chapter I assume that banks default due to liquidity and not solvency
problems. Specifically I consider a profitable financial firm that may be forced to close down
because of liquidity problems. A more general model that incorporates both solvency related
and liquidity related defaults can be the ideal framework for future research studying the
optimal mode of financing for SIFIs.
Another possible area for further research is related to the cost structure of CoCo reissuance
in the second chapter. In this chapter, I assume that banks incur a fixed cost when reissuing
CoCo debt that replaces the converted debt. This cost is assumed to be independent of
the terms of the bail-in contract. Equivalently, investors’ appetite for CoCo bonds does not
depend on how these bonds are designed. However, in practice, the design of the CoCo debt
specially the conversion trigger can affect the investor demand for such securities and thus the
costs associated with its issuance. Investors may be more willing to hold "investor friendly"
CoCo bonds with conversion ratios closer to 1. This means that the design of the bail-in
contract affects shareholders’ capital structure and policy choices both directly through the
dilution upon conversion and indirectly through the costs of CoCo reissuance. Moreover, I
assume conversion of CoCo debt into equity is efficient and costless. Further research can be
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conducted to study bank’s optimal capital structure and policy choices when the cost of CoCo
issuance depends on the design of the CoCo debt and/or when conversion is inefficient and
costly.
In the third chapter of this thesis I focus on the debt maturity of banks when they invest in
correlated assets. To do so, I abstract from the choice of leverage and assume banks have
no capital. Moreover in my model I assume banks can either choose to finance their assets
with short-term debt or long-term debt. Further research can deviate from these assumptions
and allow for a mix of long-term and short-term debt and equity financing. I also assume
the correlation between banks’ assets is exogenously given. A model in which banks can
choose the level of correlation between their assets at the same time as their optimal maturity
structure can be the subject of further studies.
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A Appendices
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1 Proofs of Propositions 1.1 to 1.6
Proposition 1.1 We need to prove that the optimal coupon payment when interest payments
are not tax deductible is zero, i.e. c∗ = 0.
Proof. Shareholders maximization problem is equivalent to
max
m∗,c
,V (m∗;c,m∗)−m∗.
Defining a new function h(m;c,m∗) = V2(m;c,m∗), and taking the derivative of (1.4) with
respect to c, we have

r h(m;c,m∗) = 1−V1(m;c,m∗)+ [µ(1−θ)− c]h1(m;c,m∗)+ 12 (1−θ)σ2h11(m;c,m∗)
h(0;c,m∗) = 0
h1(m∗;c,m∗) = 0,
(A.1)
where V1(m;c,m∗) is the derivative of V (m;c,m∗) with respect to m, and h1(m;c,m∗) and
h11(m;c,m∗) are the first and second derivatives of h(m;c,m∗) with respect to m.
Given that h(m;c,m∗) is continuous, it has a maximum on the interval (0,m∗). We prove below
that this maximum is non-positive which will guarantee that ∀m,c,m∗ : h(m;c,m∗)≤ 0.
• if the maximum is attained at m = 0, ∀m,c,m∗ : h(m;c,m∗) ≤ 0, because of the first
boundary condition of (A.1).
• if the maximum is interior, h1(m;c,m∗) = 0, and h11(m;c,m∗) < 0 at the maximum.
Given (A.1) and the fact that V1(m;c,m∗)> 1: ∀m,c,m∗ : h(m;c,m∗)< 0.
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• if the maximum is attained at m∗, since h1(m∗;c,m∗) = 0 then h11(m∗;c,m∗) ≤ 0.1
Given (A.1) and the fact that V1(m∗;c,m∗)= 1: ∀m,c,m∗ : h(m;c,m∗)≤ 0.
So h(m;c,m∗) = V2(m;c,m∗) is always negative or zero; which means that V (m;c,m∗) is
non-increasing in c. Therefore the maximum value of the bank is attained when c is set to
zero.
For the case of regulators the proof of c∗ = 0 is identical.
We also need to prove that privately optimal capital ratio is lower than regulatory optimal
capital ratio, i.e. m∗ <m∗R .
Proof. We define ϕ(m) = z21ez1m − z22ez2m . Dividend threshold is determined by the super
contact condition in both equity holders and regulators cases.
V ′′(m∗)= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗)= 0,
and
R ′′(m∗R )= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗R )= γz2z1e(z2+z1)m
∗
R (z2− z1)> 0.
Since z1 > 0 > z2, ϕ(m) is an increasing function of m, and thus m∗R has to be bigger than
m∗.
Lemma 1 We need to prove that the discounted probability of default p(m) is decreasing in
m∗.
Proof. Taking the derivative of p(m) given by (1.8) gives
∂p(m)
∂m∗
= z1z2(z2− z1)e
−m∗(z1+z2)(ez2m −ez1m)
(z1e−z2m
∗ − z2e−z1m∗)
which is negative since z2 < 0< z1.
Proposition 1.3 We need to prove that for a large enough tax rate, it is optimal for shareholders
to have some debt financing.
1Indeed if h11(m
∗;c,m∗) was positive, the Taylor expansion around m∗:
h(m;c,m∗)∼ h(m∗;c,m∗)+ h11(m
∗;c,m∗)
2
[m−m∗]2
would contradict the fact that h(·;c,m∗) is maximum at m∗.
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Proof. We first define
T V (c)=V (m∗(c),c)−m∗(c)
as the function to be optimized by shareholders at time zero. We need to show that the max
value of T V (c) is attained when c is positive, in other words T V ′(0)> 0.
Since
V (m∗(c),c)= c
r
[1−P (m∗,c)]+E(m∗(c),c),
and
E(m∗(c),c)= (1−θ)(µ− c)
r
,
T V ′(0)= ddc [V (m∗(c),c)]c=0− dm
∗
dc (0) can be calculated as
T V ′(0)= 1−P (m
∗(0),0)
r
− 1−θ
r
− dm
∗
dc
(0) (A.2)
where P (m∗(0),0) is given by
P (m∗(0),0)= z1e
z2(m−m∗)− z2ez1(m−m∗)
z1e−z2m
∗ − z2e−z1m∗
.
m∗(c) is given by
m∗(c)= ln y
2
2(c,θ)− ln y21(c,θ)
y1(c,θ)− y2(c,θ)
,
or equivalently
m∗(c,θ)= ln y
2
2(c,0)− ln y21(c,0)
y1(c,0)− y2(c,0)
[1−θ],
where
yi (c,0)≡ (1−θ)yi (c,θ)
Given (A.2), the condition for a positive coupon payment to be optimal becomes
θ > P (m∗(0),0)+ r dm
∗
dc
(0). (A.3)
Taking the derivative of m∗ with respect to c evaluated at c = 0, we get
dm∗
dc
(0)=
2
z2
d y2
dc (0)− 2z1
d y1
dc (0)
z1− z2
−
d y1
dc (0)−
d y2
dc (0)
(z1− z2)2
ln
z22
z21
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where
d yi
dc
(0)= zi
µ+σ2(1−θ)zi
.
Since the super contact condition holds at m∗(0), (e−z2m
∗(0) = z
2
2
z21
e−z1m
∗(0)), we can rewrite
P (m∗(0),0) as
P (m∗(0),0)=
∣∣∣∣ z2z1
∣∣∣∣(
z1+z2
z1−z2 )
(A.4)
Using the expression for d yidc (0),
dm∗
dc (0) can be simplified as
dm∗
dc
(0)= 2σ
2(1−θ)+µm∗(0)
[µ+σ2(1−θ)z2][µ+σ2(1−θ)z1]
(A.5)
Given (A.4) and (A.5), we can rewrite (A.3) as
θ >
∣∣∣∣ z2z1
∣∣∣∣(
z1+z2
z1−z2 )+ r (2σ
2+ µ1−θm∗(0))
[µ+σ2(1−θ)z2][µ+σ2(1−θ)z1]
(A.6)
When the tax rate is high enough such that (A.6) is satisfied, it is optimal for shareholders to
choose some debt financing (i.e. c∗ > 0).
We also need to prove that commitment on future dividend threshold delays dividend distri-
bution.
Proof. Define ϕ(m)= y21e y1m − y22e y2m . Dividend threshold is determined by super contact
condition on the value of equity and the total value of the bank in the cases of equity holders
and committed equity holders respectively.
E ′′(m∗)= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗)= 0,
and
V ′′(m∗Com.)= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗Com.)=
c
r
(y2− y1)y1 y2e(y1+y2)m
∗
Com. > 0.
Since ϕ(m) is an increasing function of m, m∗Com. has to be bigger than m
∗ for any given level
of c.
Similarly for regulatory dividend threshold we can define φ(m)= y21e−y2m − y22e−y1m . So
V ′′(m∗Com.)= 0=⇒φ(m∗Com.)=
c
r
(y2− y1)y1 y2.
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R ′′(m∗R )= 0=⇒φ(m∗R )= (
c
r
+γ)(y2− y1)y1 y2.
For as long as γ> 0, m∗R has to be bigger than m∗Com . So m∗R >m∗Com. >m∗ for any given level
of c.
Proposition 1.5 We need to prove that the socially optimal financing mode for a SIFI is 100%
equity when the only benefits to debt are tax subsidies.
Proof. Similar to Section 1.3.1 we can define a function h(m;c,m∗W )=W2(m;c,m∗W ). By taking
the derivative of (1.14) with respect to c, we have
r h(m;c,m∗W ) = (1−θ)(1−W1(m;c,m∗W ))+ [µ(1−θ)− c]h1(m;c,m∗W )
+ 12 (1−θ)σ2h11(m;c,m∗W )
h(0;c,m∗W ) = 0
h1(m∗W ;c,m
∗
W ) = 0.
(A.7)
Given that h(m;c,m∗W ) is continuous, it has a maximum on the interval (0,m
∗
W ):
• if the maximum is attained at m = 0, ∀m,c,m∗W : h(m;c,m∗W )≤ 0, because of the first
boundary condition of (A.7).
• if the maximum is interior, h1(m;c,m∗W ) = 0, and h11(m;c,m∗W ) < 0 at the maximum.
Given (A.7) and the fact that W1(m;c,m∗)> 1 and θ < 1: ∀m,c,m∗W : h(m;c,m∗W )< 0.
• if the maximum is attained at m∗W , since h1(m
∗
W ;c,m
∗
W )= 0, then h11(m∗W ;c,m∗W )< 0.
Given (A.7) and the fact that W1(m∗W ;c,m
∗
W )= 1: ∀m,c,m∗W : h(m;c,m∗W )< 0.
So h(m;c,m∗W )=W2(m;c,m∗W ) is always negative or zero; which means that W (m;c,m∗W ) is
non-increasing in c . Therefore the maximum social value of the bank is attained when c is set
to zero.
Results of Section 1.4.2 We need to prove that commitment increases the dividend threshold
and that the socially optimal dividend threshold when there are tax subsidies to CoCo bonds
is higher than the privately optimal dividend threshold, i.e. m∗R,b >m∗Com.,b >m∗b .
Proof. Define ϕ(m)= y22e y1(m¯−m)− y21e y2(m¯−m). The equations to find the dividend threshold
for different cases are given by:
for equity holders
E ′′b (m
∗
b )= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗b )= y1 y2(y2− y1)(1−α)Ea(m¯),
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for committed equity holders
V ′′b (m
∗
Com.,b)= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗Com.,b)= y1 y2(y2− y1)(Va(m¯)−
c
r
),
and for regulators
R ′′b (m
∗
R,b)= 0=⇒ϕ(m∗R,b)= y1 y2(y2− y1)(Ra(m¯)−
c
r
).
Since y2 < 0 < y1, ϕ(m) is a decreasing function of m. Given that regulators incur the cost
of failure Ra(m¯)<Va(m¯). Moreover Va(m¯)− cr = Ea(m¯)− cr < Ea(m¯)−CC (m¯)= (1−α)Ea(m¯),
since the value of CoCo bond is smaller than the risk-free debt with the same coupon payment
((CC (m¯)= cr (1− A(m¯)< cr , as A(m¯)≥ 0). Therefore we have
Ra(m¯)− c
r
<Va(m¯)− c
r
< (1−α)Ea(m¯).
This means that m∗R,b >m∗Com.,b >m∗b .
Proposition 1.6 We need to prove that CoCo bonds are socially suboptimal when the only
benefits of debt are tax subsidies.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1.5 we can define a function h(m;c,m∗W )=Wb,2(m;c,m∗W ). By
taking the derivative of (A.9) in Section A.1.4 with respect to c, we have
r h(m;c,m∗W ) = (1−θ)(1−Wb,1(m;c,m∗W ))+ [µ(1−θ)− c]h1(m;c,m∗W )
+ 12 (1−θ)σ2h11(m;c,m∗W )
h(0;c,m∗W ) = 0
h1(m∗W ;c,m
∗
W ) = 0.
(A.8)
As before, we can prove that h(m;c,m∗W )=Wb,2(m;c,m∗W ) is always negative or zero; which
means that Wb(m;c,m
∗
W ) is non-increasing in c. Therefore the maximum social value of the
bank is attained when no CoCo bonds are issued.
A.1.2 Security re-issuance
In this section we relax the assumption that the cost of issuance is so high that the bank never
finds it optimal to re-issue any security. As Décamps et al. (2011) discuss, when there is no
uncertainty of funds availability in the secondary market and the cost of re-issuance is not
too high, the firm will always find it optimal to re-issue new securities as soon as it runs out
of cash. In this case, the firm never defaults. Since our aim is to study a SIFI whose default
imposes high social costs on the whole society, a default-free set-up is not ideal. To make
our model more representative of a SIFI, we introduce capital supply uncertainty into our
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model. In the same esprit of Hugonnier et al. (2015) we assume that the SIFI needs to search
for investors in the capital markets who are willing to purchase its securities. If this is the case,
there might be instances where the bank would like to issue new securities but it has no access
to investors that are willing to purchase its securities. In such a set-up, the bank can run out of
cash and thus faces a positive probability of default. In the next section we study the optimal
capital structure of a SIFI when capital supply is uncertain.
Uncertain capital supply
To incorporate the capital supply uncertainty, we assume, as in Hugonnier et al. (2015), that
the bank meets new investors at the jump times of a Poisson process Nt with intensity of λ≥ 0.
Under this additional assumption, the cash reserves of the bank evolve according to
dmt = (1−θ)(µd t +σd Zt )+ ( ft − i )d Nt −dLt ,
where ft is the funds raised through the equity issuance upon arrival of the new investors.2
ft is a non-negative predictable process. i is the fixed cost of issuance. We assume that i
is low enough for a new security issuance to be sometimes optimal.3 Given that there is a
fixed cost of issuance even when λ=∞ (which is when there is no capital supply uncertainty),
the capital markets are not frictionless and the bank has a need to keep precautionary cash.
If λ = 0, no matter how small i is, the bank never meets new investors and thus can never
re-issue any securities and we are back to the case of no security reissuance.
Bank owners need to decide on the financing and liquidation policy of the SIFI. As before, there
exists a target level of cash reserves m∗∗ above which cash is distributed outside the bank. This
is where the marginal value of cash inside and outside the bank is equal. In addition, note that
when current shareholders decide to issue new equity, they will get V (m∗∗)− (m∗∗−m)− i .
Shareholders would only be willing to do so if their abandonment value V (m), is below the
value they would get upon re-issuance. This is equivalent to
V (m)−m ≤V (m∗∗)−m∗∗− i .
Since the left hand side of the above equation is decreasing in m, there exists a level of cash
reserves 0<m <m∗∗, below which it is optimal to reissue whenever possible, i.e. whenever
one can find new investors. When the bank’s cash reserves are below m, the bank issues new
equity as soon as it meets new investors which allows to bring its cash holdings back to the
target level m∗∗. Finally, the bank gets liquidated when its cash holdings reach zero.
2We abstract from introducing a continuous coupon payment c into our cash reserves process, since it can be
proven easily and similar to Section 1.3, that in the absence of tax subsidies, the optimal c chosen by both bank
owners and regulators is zero.
3See Décamps et al. (2011) for more details. If i is small enough, we are in the case where secondary issuance
is optimal and the firm would always reissue capital as soon as it runs out of cash. However in our set-up since
capital supply is uncertain, the timing of the re-issuance changes. This is discussed later-on.
133
Appendix A. Appendices
We thus conjecture that we have three different regions for the value of the bank.
• First in the region (0,m), the bank retains earnings and issues new equity as soon as a
new investor is found. Thus in this region, the value of the bank follows the following
ODE
r V (m)= (1−θ)µV ′(m)+ σ
2
2
(1−θ)2V ′′(m)+λ[V (m∗∗)− (m∗∗−m)− i −V (m)]
with boundary conditions
V (0) = 0
V (m−) = V (m+)
V ′(m−) = V ′(m+)
As before, the left hand side of this equation represents the required rate of return for
investing in the bank (the risk-free rate). The right hand side consists of the effects of
cash savings and the volatility of bank’s cash flows (captured in the first and second
terms). The additional last term on the right hand side represents the effects of capital
supply uncertainty and fixed cost of issuance. As previously discussed, since the cost of
equity issuance is fixed, the optimal amount to issue when new investors are found, is
the exact amount that takes the cash reserves back to the target level m∗∗. So whenever
the bank meets a new investor, which happens with a probability of λ, the bank issues
new equity to take its cash reserves from m to m∗∗ and thus the value of the bank from
V (m) to V (m∗∗). To do so, the bank incurs a fixed cost of i .
The first boundary condition V (0)= 0, shows that when bank’s cash reserves hit zero, it
defaults. This means that the bank has not been able to meet enough investors who are
willing to inject new capital into the bank before it runs out of cash. The second and
third boundary conditions are required for the value of the bank to be continuous.
There is an additional condition from which m, the lower barrier level below which
equity issuance is optimal can be solved for
V (m)=V (m∗∗)− (m∗∗−m)− i .
This condition holds because when the level of bank’s cash reserves is exactly at m, the
bank is indifferent between issuing and not issuing new equity.
• The second region is (m,m∗∗), when cash reserves are between the lower equity issuance
level m and the target cash level m∗∗. In this region, the bank’s cash reserves are high
enough that it is not optimal for the bank to issue new securities and pay the cost of
re-issuance upon the arrival of new investors. Thus in this region the bank does not
re-issue equity and the total value of the bank is given by the following ODE and its
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boundary conditions
r V (m) = (1−θ)µV ′(m)+ σ22 (1−θ)2V ′′(m)
V ′(m∗∗) = 1
V ′′(m∗∗) = 0.
Since there is no re-issuance of the equity in this region, the last term of the ODE for the
first region is not included here. The first boundary condition states that the marginal
value of cash at the target level of m∗∗ is equal to one. The last boundary condition
is the super contact condition which determines m∗∗, and can also be represented as
V (m∗∗)= (1−θ)µ
r
.
• The third region is [m∗∗,∞), where cash reserves are bigger than the target level of m∗∗.
In this region the bank pays-out any additional cash to keep its cash reserves at m∗∗.
There is obviously no equity re-issuance. Thus the value of the bank is given by
V (m)=V (m∗∗)+m∗∗−m.
What is important in our discussion is not the explicit value of the bank, but the fact that there
exists a distress region where it is optimal for the bank to issue equity and increase its cash
reserves. However since investors are not always available, there is a positive probability that
bank’s cash reserves hit zero and it defaults. There is no dividend distribution in this region.
Second, there exists a distribution region where it is not optimal for the bank to re-issue equity
even upon the arrival of investors, but it is optimal to distribute cash outside the bank when
cash reserves are above a target level.
The possibility of equity re-issuance does not change the optimal capital structure of the bank
of 100% equity. Indeed since the marginal value of the funds is decreasing, for as long as it is
bigger than one, any kind of payment that draws funds from the bank’s cash reserves would be
suboptimal.
From the point of view of regulators the value function is similar to the value function for
equity holders with one major difference: the costs of SIFI’s failure that are not internalized by
SIFI’s equity holders. This means that the three regions of the value function stay the same,
but the thresholds below which equity re-issuance happens and the pay-out threshold are not
the same as before. So we can characterize the social value of the SIFI as follows
• In the region (0,mR ], SIFI retains earnings and issues new equity whenever new in-
vestors are found. When the bank meets no new investors before it runs out of cash,
it can default. There is a social cost of SIFI’s default γ, which is not internalized by its
shareholders. Thus the regulatory value of the bank solves the following ODE with its
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boundary conditions
r R(m) = (1−θ)µR ′(m)+ σ22 (1−θ)2R ′′(m)
+ λ[R(m∗∗R )− (m∗∗R −m)− i −R(m)]
R(0) = −γ
R(m−R ) = R(m+R )
R ′(m−R ) = R ′(m+R ).
The following condition determines the re-issuance threshold
V (m¯R )=V (m∗∗R )− (m∗∗R −mR )− i .
• In the region (mR ,m
∗∗
R ), the bank does not re-issue equity and its social value solves the
following ODE which is identical to the case of equity holders, with a different pay-out
threshold m∗∗R
r R(m) = (1−θ)µR ′(m)+ σ22 (1−θ)2R ′′(m)
R ′(m∗∗R ) = 1
R ′′(m∗∗R ) = 0.
• In the region [m∗∗R ,∞), the bank pays-out any cash in excess of m∗∗R and its value to
regulators is equal to
R(m)=R(m∗∗R )+m∗∗R −m.
The positive probability of failure and its social cost lead to different objective functions
for equity holders and regulators. Equity holders, if left alone, would not choose a high
enough pay-out threshold, and thus choose a too low book equity target: they would distribute
dividends too often. Regulators would like SIFI’s to build up more cash before they start
distributing any cash outside the bank. Our results from this section are formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition A.1. In the presence of issuance costs and capital supply uncertainty
• privately optimal financing mode is still 100% equity.
• the only difference with no-re-issuance case and the always re-issuance case is that there
is a positive probability of equity re-issuance and a positive probability of default.
• since default is possible, the objective function of the regulator is not the same as the
objective function of equity holders and thus there is a need for capital regulation.
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A.1.3 Closed form values of equity and debt
Straight debt case
In this appendix, we calculate the closed form solutions for the value of equity and debt where
the debt to be included in the capital structure is in the form of a straight bond. We start from
the case where shareholders are in charge of the optimization problem.
Every time the level of bank’s cash reserves hit m∗, shareholders collect dividends and they get
zero when the cash reserves hit zero. Thus the value of the bank’s equity solves the following
ODE subject to its boundary conditions.
r E(m) = (1−θ)(µ− c)E ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2E ′′(m)
E(0) = 0
E ′(m∗) = 1
E ′′(m∗) = 0.
The above ODE along with its boundary conditions results in
E(m∗)= (1−θ)(µ− c)
r
.
It is then easy to solve for the value of equity in the closed form solution.
E(m)= e
y1m−e y2m
y1e y1m
∗ − y2e y2m∗
,
where y1 and y2 are given in (1.11), and the dividend pay-out threshold is given explicitly by
m∗ =
ln( y2y1 )
2
y1− y2
.
Debt holders receive the coupon payment of c continuously till the time of default when
they also get zero since the liquidation value is set to zero. Thus the value of debt solves the
following ODE.
r D(m) = c+ (1−θ)(µ− c)D ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2D ′′(m)
D(0) = 0
D ′(m∗) = 0.
Since every dollar in addition to m∗ is distributed to shareholders, at dividend boundary
threshold the marginal value of debt is zero. Solving the above ODE gives the closed form
solution of the value of the straight debt.
D(m)= c
r
[1−P (m,c)],
137
Appendix A. Appendices
where P (m,c) is the expected probability of default and is given in (1.12). The expressions
for the value of equity and debt stay the same in the case of committed equity holders and
regulators except that dividend threshold m∗ is to be replaced by the appropriate dividend
thresholds in each case (m∗Com. for committed equity holders and m
∗
R for regulators.)
In the social welfare case since no debt is issued, the value of equity is equal to the total value
of the bank.
CoCo bonds case
In this appendix, we calculate the closed form solutions for the value of equity and debt where
the debt to be included in the capital structure is in the form of a CoCo bond. We start from
the case where shareholders are in charge of the optimization problem. Similar to calculating
the value of the bank, we start from the period during which the conversion has already been
triggered and we work backwards to date zero.
After the conversion of the CoCo bond and since there is no more debt included in the capital
structure the value of equity is equal to the whole value of the bank.
Ea(m)= e
z1m−ez2m
z1ez1m
∗
a − z2ez2m∗a
,
where z1 and z2 are given in (1.6), and the dividend threshold m∗2 is given explicitly by
m∗a =
ln( z2z1 )
2
z1− z2
.
Before conversion the value of equity solves the following ODE with its boundary conditions.
r Eb(m) = (1−θ)(µ− c)E ′b(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2E ′′b (m)
Eb(m¯) = (1−α)Ea(m¯)
E ′(m∗b ) = 1
E ′′(m∗b ) = 0.
So the expression for the value of equity before conversion is given by
Eb(m)= [(1−α)Va(m¯)+
e y2m¯+y1m −e y1m¯+y2m
y1e
y1m∗b+y2m − y2e y2m∗b+y1m
]A(m)
where y1 and y2 are given in (1.11), A(m) is the expected probability of conversion given in
(1.20), and the dividend pay-out threshold satisfies
y22e
y1(m¯−m∗b )− y21e y2(m¯−m
∗
b ) = y1 y2(y2− y1)(1−α)Ea(m¯).
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The value of CoCo bonds solves the following ODE
rCC (m) = c+ (1−θ)(µ− c)CC ′(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2CC ′′(m)
CC (m¯) = αEa(m¯)
CC ′(m∗b ) = 0.
CoCo bond holders get their coupon payment until the level of cash reserves hit m¯ at which
point CoCo bonds convert to equity and CoCo bond holders get a fraction α of the bank. Since
every dollar in addition to m∗ is distributed to shareholders, at dividend boundary threshold
the marginal value of CoCo bonds is zero. Solving the ODE gives the closed form solution for
the value of CoCo bonds
CC (m)= c
r
[1− A(m)]+αV2(m¯)A(m).
So the value of the CoCo bond consists of two parts: the value of a risk-free debt until the
time of conversion and the value to debt holders equal to a fraction α of the whole bank at
conversion.
The expressions for the value of equity and CoCo bonds stay the same in the cases of committed
equity holders and regulators except that dividend threshold m∗b and conversion threshold m¯
are to be replaced by the appropriate dividend thresholds and conversion thresholds in each
case.
In the social welfare case since no CoCo bonds are issued, the value of equity is equal to the
total value of the bank.
A.1.4 CoCo bonds - social welfare
To find the social value of SIFI at time zero we solve the problem starting from the social value
after conversion which is given by the following ODE with its boundary conditions
r Wa(m) = θµ+ (1−θ)µW ′a(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2W ′′a (m)
Wa(0) = −γ
W ′a(m∗W,a) = 1
W ′′a (m∗W,a) = 0.
So the closed form expression for the social value of the bank after conversion is given by
Wa(m)=
(1+ (γ+ θµr )z2ez2m
∗
W,b )ez1m − (1+ (γ+ θµr )z1ez1m
∗
W,b )ez2m
z1e
z1m∗W,b − z2ez2m
∗
W,b
,
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where z1 and z2 are given in (1.6), and m∗W,b is the socially optimal dividend threshold after
conversion which is determined by the super contact condition
W ′′b (m
∗
W,b)= 0=⇒ z21e−z2m
∗
W,b − z22e−z1m
∗
W,b − (γ+ θµ
r
)z2z1(z2− z1)= 0.
Before conversion the social value of the SIFI solves the following ODE
r Wb(m) = c(1−θ)+θµ+ (1−θ)(µ− c)W ′b(m)+ 12σ2(1−θ)2W ′′b (m)
Wb(m¯W ) = Wa(m¯W )
W ′b(m
∗
W,b) = 1
W ′′b (m
∗
W,b) = 0.
(A.9)
Solving this ODE gives the following closed form solution for the social value of the bank
before conversion
Wb(m)=
c(1−θ)+µθ
r
[1− AW (m)]+ [Wa(m¯W )+ e
y2m¯W+y1m −e y1m¯W+y2m
y1e
y1m∗W,b+y2m − y2e y2m
∗
W,b+y1m
]AW (m),
where y1 and y2 are given in (1.11) and AW (m) which is the discounted expected probability
of conversion in this case is given by
AW (m)= y1e
y1m∗W,b+y2m − y2e y2m
∗
W,b+y1m
y1e
y1m∗W,b+y2m¯W − y2e y2m
∗
W,b+y1m¯W
.
To maximize SIFI’s social value, and given the dividend threshold that solves the super contact
condition on the social value of the bank, an optimal conversion threshold and an optimal
amount of CoCo bond to be issued should be decided on at time zero when initial cash
injection is m0 =m∗W,b
max
c,m¯W
Wb(m
∗
W,b)−m∗W,b .
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Figure A.1: Optimal capital structure and pay-out policy - CoCo bond
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Panel B (σ)
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Panel C (θ)
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Panel D (γ)
γ = 1
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The figure shows how the optimal dividend threshold and the optimal coupon payment of
the CoCo bond change with conversion threshold. Solid lines and dashed lines represent
shareholders and regulators respectively. Panels (A),(B),(C), and (D) show the results for
different levels of profitability, volatility, tax rate, and external cost of failure respectively.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2.1 Values of bank’s securities - straight debt
Given the system of equation in (2.6), and the boundary conditions discussed in Section 2.3.1,
I can solve for the closed form solution of equity value in the bad state of the world:
EB (w)=

piBG (EG (W ∗G )−W ∗G−γE ,G )
r+piGB +
piBG (1−θ)(µ−c)
(r+piBG )2 +
piBG w
r+piBG +α3ex1w +α4ex2w , ∀w ∈ (0,W ]
β1ez1 w+β2ez2 w
piBG+piGB −
piBG (α1e y1 w+α2e y2 w )
piBG+piGB , ∀w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
piBG (EG (W ∗G )−W ∗G )
r+piBG +
piBG (1−θ)(µ−C )
(r+piBG )2 +
piBG w
r+piBG +α5ex1w +α6ex2w , ∀w ∈ (W ∗G ,W ∗B ]
EB (W ∗B )+w −W ∗B , ∀w >W ∗B
(A.10)
where y1 > 0> y2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
r +piGB +piBG = (1−θ)(µ−C )y + 1
2
σ2(1−θ)2 y2, (A.11)
z1 > 0> z2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
r = (1−θ)(µ−C )z+ 1
2
σ2(1−θ)2z2, (A.12)
and x1 > 0> x2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
r +piBG = (1−θ)(µ−C )x+ 1
2
σ2(1−θ)2x2. (A.13)
Similarly given the equation in (2.5), and the boundary conditions discussed, the closed form
expression for the value of equity in the good state of the world is as follows:
EG (w)=

EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G −γE ,G ∀w ∈ (0,W )
β1ez1 w+β2ez2 w
piBG+piGB +
piGB (α1e y1 w+α2e y2 w )
piBG+piGB , ∀w ∈ [W ,W ∗G ]
EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G , ∀w >W ∗G
(A.14)
where y1, y2, z1, and z2 are given in (A.11), and (A.12). α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6, and β1, and β2
are solved for by using the relevant boundary conditions in Section 2.3.1.
145
Appendix A. Appendices
The value of straight debt in the bad state is given by:
SDB (w)=

CSD+piBG SDG (W ∗G )
r+piBG +α9ex1w +α10ex2w ∀w ∈ (0,W ]
CSD
r +
β3ez1 w+β4ez2 w
piBG+piGB −
piBG (α7e y1 w+α8e y2 w )
piBG+piGB , ∀w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
CSD+piBG SDG (W ∗G )
r+piBG +α11ex1w +α12ex2w , ∀w ∈ (W ∗G ,W ∗B ]
SDB (W ∗B ), ∀w >W ∗B
(A.15)
where y1, y2, z1, z2, and x1, and x2 are given in (A.11), (A.12), and (A.13).
Finally, the closed form solution to the value of straight debt in the good state of the world is:
SDG (w)=

SDG (W ∗G ), ∀w ∈ (0,W ]
CSD
r +
β3ez1 w+β4ez2 w
piBG+piGB +
piGB (α7e y1 w+α8e y2 w )
piBG+piGB , ∀w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
SDG (W ∗G ), w >W ∗G
(A.16)
where y1, y2, and z1, and z2 are given in (A.11), and (A.12). α7, α8, α9, α10, α11, and α12, and
β3, and β4 can be solved for by using the boundary conditions of the value of straight debt
that are discussed in Section 2.3.1.
A.2.2 Values of bank’s securities - CoCo debt
When the bank commits to a bail-in plan the value of equity in the good state of the world
satisfies the following equation
r EG (w)=(1−θ)(µ−C )E ′G (w)
+ 1
2
(1−θ)2σ2E ′′G (w)+piGB (EB (w)−EG (w)).
(A.17)
The value of equity in the bad state of the world satisfies the following system of equations:
r EB (w)=

(1−θ)(µ−C ) E ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 E
′′
B (w)
+piBG (EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G −γE −EB (w)) w ∈ (0,W ]
(1−θ)(µ−C ) E ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 E
′′
B (w)
+piBG (EG (w)−EB (w)) w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
(1−θ)(µ−C ) E ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 E
′′
B (w)
+piBG (EG (W ∗G )+w −W ∗G −EB (w)) w ∈ (W ∗G ,W ∗B ]
(A.18)
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These equations each include a term (the last term on the right hand side) that reflects the
effects of the time varying financing frictions on the equity value depending on the level of
cash buffer. (A.17) and (A.18) are solved subject to the following boundary conditions
E
′
i (W
∗
i ) = 1
E
′′
i (W
∗
i ) = 0
E
′
G (W ) = 1
EB (0) = (1−α)(EB (W ∗B )+C DB (W ∗B )−W ∗B −γC )
and the following continuity and smoothness conditions at W ∗G and W :
lim
w↓W ∗G
EB (w)= lim
w↑W ∗G
EB (w)
lim
w↓W ∗G
E ′B (w)= limw↑W ∗G
E ′B (w),
lim
w↓W
EB (w)= lim
w↑W
EB (w),
lim
w↓W
E ′B (w)= limw↑W E
′
B (w).
The value of CoCo debt in the good state of the world satisfies the following ODE:
rC DG (w)=CC D + (1−θ)(µ−C )C D ′G (w)
+1
2
(1−θ)2σ2C D ′′G (w)+piGB (C DB (w)−C DG (w)).
(A.19)
The value of CoCo debt in the bad state of the world satisfies the following system of equations:
rC DB (w)=

CC D + (1−θ)(µ−C ) C D ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 C D
′′
B (w)
+piBG (C DG (W ∗G )−C DB (w)) w ∈ (0,W ]
CC D + (1−θ)(µ−C ) C D ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 C D
′′
B (w)
+piBG (C DG (w)−C DB (w)) w ∈ (W ,W ∗G ]
CC D + (1−θ)(µ−C ) C D ′B (w)+ (1−θ)
2σ2
2 C D
′′
B (w)
+piBG (C DG (W ∗G )−C DB (w)). w ∈ (W ∗G ,W ∗B ]
(A.20)
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(A.19) and (A.20) are subject to the following boundary conditions:
C D
′
i (W
∗
i ) = 0
C DG (W ) =C DG (W ∗G )
C DB (0) =α(EB (W ∗B )+C DB (W ∗B )−W ∗B −γC )
and the following continuity and smoothness conditions at W ∗G and W :
lim
w↓W ∗G
C DB (w)= lim
w↑W ∗G
C DB (w)
lim
w↓W ∗G
C D ′B (w)= limw↑W ∗G
C D ′B (w),
lim
w↓W
C DB (w)= lim
w↑W
C DB (w),
lim
w↓W
C D ′B (w)= limw↑W C D
′
B (w),
The expressions for the values of equity in the bad and good states of the world are identical to
(A.10), and (A.14) respectively. However, the boundary conditions that are used to solve the
coefficients α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6, and β1, and β2 are different as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
The closed form expressions for the values of CoCo debt in both bad and good states are
also given in (A.15), and (A.16) but the coefficients are solved using the boundary conditions
relevant to the case of CoCo debt.
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